

EDUCATION, ART, AND CIVICS

GEORGE L. RAYMOND



LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

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etc., etc.

FUNDAMENTALS
IN
EDUCATION, ART
AND CIVICS

Essays and Addresses

BY

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PREFACE

This volume was first suggested by inquiries for certain material in it which is now virtually out of print. Most of this material was originally prepared by request, and presented in various forms, written or oral, at a time when the subjects treated were supposed to be of current interest. Nothing, however, has been included here which may not be considered to have also some present interest, either practical or historic. To most of the contents, indeed, both these tests might be applied. What is said, for instance, with reference to education and to art not only upholds principles and methods that it is believed that success in these departments must put into practise to the end of time; but, to those who can read between the lines, it will also reveal the particular necessity for upholding the same occasioned by theories and tendencies illustrated in certain facts concerning the developments of these departments in our own country during the latter part of the last century. A similar connection may be equally recognized between the mainly historic nature of certain of the subjects, and the never ceasing practical importance of the inferences logically deducible from them.

It is hoped that the reader will consider leniently a few places in which, especially in the educational papers, the same general thought, tho in different connections and with different phraseology, has been repeated. This result could not well be avoided in

papers prepared at intervals separated by many years. Nor can it be corrected now, without interfering with the consecutiveness of thought in passages in which the repetition occurs.

The book is printed in the hope that it may fall into the hands of some resembling those who seem to have thought themselves helped by certain parts of it when they first appeared.

GEORGE L. RAYMOND.

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FUNDAMENTALS OF EDUCATION IN ACADEMY, COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY: A PLEA FOR COLLEGE TRAINING INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE UNIVERSITY

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The wisest thought of the world is suggested, at least, by that which is most widely thought. The sense that least commonly errs is common sense. This is the principle at the basis of our country's faith in the vote of the majority. The faith is not always justified, because the vote does not always represent thought so much as the unconsidered results of prejudice or persuasion. But, divorced from such influences, the conceptions of ordinary people are likely to be correct. At least, they can be used with profit as clues through which to solve the complexities of by no means ordinary problems.

2-1-1912 Applying this thought to our schools for higher education, which, in a general way, we may class as academies, colleges and universities, we shall find that most people are accustomed to judge of the efficiency of the academy by the way in which, as they say, it has prepared its students,—that is, prepared their minds to continue to study; of the college by the way in which it has cultured them; and of the university by the way in which it has stored them. No one expects the ordinary graduate of an academy to be able to think very effectively, or even to be very well informed. But both results are looked for in the college graduate. Not even he, however, is expected to be, in any distinctive sense, a scholar, ex-

cept by those who do not know him. This distinction is reserved for the university graduate, who is usually credited with being exceptionally proficient in the one branch, at least, in which he has taken his degree.

Of course, it is impossible to separate practically, as has been done theoretically, the three aims of institutional instruction thus indicated. Some training to think, and some imparting of knowledge must be included in the work of the academy; and some methods distinctive of the academy, or of the university, must be included in the work of the college. But it is possible in each institution to subordinate that which is secondary and incidental to that which, for it, is primary and essential. No matter how much an academy may have stimulated minds to think, or stored them with information, it has failed, if it have not also prepared them to study to advantage. One can go further than this and say that if it have merely prepared them to study, it frequently has done more than, without this, it would have done to secure their ultimate mastery of the powers both of thinking and of accumulating facts.

What is meant may be illustrated by certain personal experiences of my own, which will be used further on to illustrate a still more important subject. When I was ten years old, I happened to be sent to a school taught by an Englishman by the name of Raleigh. He knew how to teach. He lived before the times of the modern Normal School. I began Latin with him. Every afternoon for an hour—to me always the most delightful of the day—he used to drill the whole school together in the paradigms and the laws of syntax, making us repeat them in

unison so as to memorize them, and then stopping to fire rapid questions at us, like "of a muse?" "to the muses?" "I loved?" "you should have loved?" etc., so as to make us, in the right connections, recall what we had memorized. This man left town, and the next year I went to another school. Its teacher put me into the old "Latin Reader." After a few days—I have forgotten how many—I asked him why he gave us such short lessons. He seemed not to understand my question. I explained by telling him that I had read through the whole book. He examined me in it, and, at once, put me into Virgil. There I had no difficulty in keeping up with a mature student, making a hurried preparation for college. He actually graduated from it just seven years before I did. I was able to keep up with him not because of precociousness, but merely because I had been well instructed. I had no similar experience in Greek; but I did have one in mathematics. An aunt of mine—also not a student of a Normal School—happened to be making a long visit at my home when I was trying, with little success, to master the intricacies of fractions in arithmetic. She recognized a defect in my training. Making me go back, she drilled me, first, in the multiplication table, then in all the processes of computation, every one of which she explained to me, and made me explain, over and over again, to her, thus instructing me in accordance with the workings of a child's mind, which, while it can understand and ought to be made to do so, cannot of itself find and put together the elements needed for a logical whole, as is expected to be done by students in our law-schools when learning the principles of a subject through deducing them

from cases to which they have been applied. What was the result of my aunt's instruction? That which might be anticipated from the fact that one becomes interested in a subject in the degree in which he has mastered its details, and can himself, therefore, direct and determine its developments. When, later—I may have been fifteen years of age—I got into algebra, it took me exactly three weeks to go through the whole book, working out by myself every problem from cover to cover. Yet no one ever accused me of being a mathematical genius. The inference to be drawn from these experiences ought to lie on the surface. Even if instruction in the preparatory school were confined—I do not urge that it should be confined—to the training of the mind to remember and recall,—confined to preparing the mind to study effectively in the future, even then, in the sum total of time given to education, there would be, as a fact, not less but more of this time devoted to those forms of mental development for which, as has been said, we should look mainly to the later courses of the college and the university. In addition to this, it should not be overlooked that thorough drill in a preparatory school gives to the mind, when studying, not only in Latin and mathematics but in every department, a habit of thinking accurately, which, in any other way, can be acquired only occasionally, and that usually by accident. It is in this, as in other things. Slowness at the start is often the very best means of securing sureness and swiftness at the finish. It takes much longer to build an automobile than a bicycle. But after the first has been prepared for its work, it can go much faster and further. In all education, as in musical,

in which everyone recognizes the fact, later proficiency is the result of early practise and patience. The expert in using all the elements of sound began his familiarity with them by being introduced to them, one by one, and over and over again, because he could not otherwise remember them; and the thrill that we get when he masters his forces is the direct result of the drill that he got from those who mastered him when a boy.

To give a drill that would prepare the student for advanced courses was the recognized work of the academies of fifty years ago. At that time, too, a graduate of any one of them of high standing could enter any one of our foremost colleges without additional or different preparation. But, soon after, a few colleges—not, however, without the strongest protests from others, and the most accurate prophecies of detriment that have since been verified—began, each on its own initiative, to change and, as it was termed, raise the standard for admission to its Freshman class. One hesitates to say why this was done. The motives were mixed; but one of them, mentioned by opponents at the time and not denied, was of a nature to justify the belief that whatever wisdom leaves wickedness in some form has entered. The change was attributed not to a general interest in education throughout the country so much as to a special interest in the particular institution which the higher requirements might make prominent. General interest in education would have been satisfied by raising the quality rather than the quantity of the academic work demanded. But few people can recognize the significance of changes in quality. They need to see quantity. The change in this,

therefore, was made with the instincts of a business man trying, in some way, to advertise his own wares as superior to those of all others. It was attendant upon the introduction into educational development of the commercialism unfortunately characteristic of so many other phases of our national life. Many Americans may fail to perceive anything wrong in this. The fact is no proof that it is not wrong. It is a proof, merely, of the importance of directing attention to the subject. Everything that has to do with mind or soul is wrong that involves any impoverishing of others in order to enrich oneself, or any waiving of ideal advantage for all, in order to make real what is termed practical success for a few.

The results of raising the standards for admission into certain colleges were what had been prophesied by many, and should have been foreseen by all. The change at once threw the arrangements for teaching in most of our academies into disorder, obliging not a few of them to do much more work than, with their equipment, they were prepared to do—at least to do thoroughly. The same condition, which is continued in our own time, still obliges large academies that fit for different colleges to have two or three times as many different recitation-exercises as formerly, and, to conduct these rightly, necessitates, frequently, two or three times as many instructors, involving, often, two or three times as much expense. Worse than this; the additional quantity required by the colleges has, in all but the foremost academies, and in them too, one sometimes fears, lessened the quality of the preparation. I am saying now what I know. Year after year, I used to hear Professor O. M. Fernald of Williams, a thor-

oughly competent witness, a graduate of Harvard who was once called to be the head of Phillips Academy, Exeter, speak of the growing superficiality of the teaching in our preparatory schools; and he ascribed it to an endeavor to meet the increased requirements. Aside, too, from this consideration, it is easy enough to see that if the quantity had been less emphasized, and an effort had been made mainly to raise the quality, we should have escaped in a perfectly normal and satisfactory way, three very serious educational problems that now confront us, and are not likely soon to be solved. In the first place, by emphasizing quality rather than quantity we should have secured academic thoroughness; in the second place, by requiring all academies to have reasonably similar curriculums we should have secured economy in the number of teachers employed, and in the money paid them; and in the third place, by confining academic instruction to essential courses, especially in connection with the improvements that have been made in appliances and facilities of instruction, we should have kept the same, in certain cases, and have lowered, in other cases, the ages of those entering college, and thus have enabled them to get both a college and a university education, and yet to enter upon their lifework at a comparatively early age.

Now let us pass on and notice what should be done in the college. It has been intimated that the conceptions of ordinary people, especially when unprejudiced and unpersuaded, are likely to be correct. To apply this suggestion to our present subject,—what are the tests that college students themselves use, and that people influenced by them expect these

students to use, when judging of one another? In the academy, the tests may be a genial disposition, a strong physique, an accurate and retentive memory; but in college a man may have all these, and yet, to quote a student-term, may "queer" himself. That which prevents him from being hazed, and gets him elected into clubs, fraternities, and class offices, and even, sometimes, despite physical inferiority, into athletic teams, is the way in which he can use what he has and present it to the recognition of others. If not able to stand these tests, he may have the kindest of dispositions, the most unflinching courage, exceptional knowledge of books, wide experience in travel, and even positive genius; but it will be months, possibly years, before any of these win for him what may be termed general appreciation. In perfect harmony with the application of the tests thus indicated, we find the majority of the same students who accepted cheerfully, if not enthusiastically, the drill of the preparatory school, and who, by and by, will become indefatigable readers, if not positive book-worms, in the professional school or university, decidedly opposing, both by sentiment and action, any tendency on the part of a professor or a student to approve of the use of such methods in college. Such students are not wholly wrong. Just at this stage in their educational development, their instincts as well as our reasoning ought to suggest to us that they need something different from either of the methods which are thus condemned.

In the academy, a course, as has been indicated, may be supposed to have been successful, in case it has given a student through experience, a knowledge of what the tools of the mind can do, and has

sharpened them. In the following stage, in the college, he must learn how and where to use them, how and where to get for his own what awaits in the world about him, and to appropriate this in such a way as really to add to his mental equipment and effectiveness. Before he has learned these things, he never can attack successfully the harder problems with which the unknown confronts mature scholarship. The world will never read carved on the stony cliffs that rise before him any message of his own signed by any name that the years will not destroy. His tools will break almost before his hands have gathered in sufficient débris from the rocks to bear witness to even his vain attempt.

That which should be done in the college is different from that which is supposed to be done in the European university. This fact was fully recognized years ago. In a pamphlet printed in Germany in 1876 reporting certain speeches made by Americans at a banquet in Stuttgart on the Fourth of July, I find the following language attributed to myself: "No one who knows what a scholar is in any department, imagines that the American college, if judged by its ability to produce one, is a success. In what regards is it a success then? In two regards: First, it turns out a man fitted to take an interest in many branches, and to communicate this to others; fitted, that is, to become an intelligent and helpful citizen. Again, it turns out a man fitted, on account of the glimpses that have been given him in college of the many different avenues opening to intellectual effort, to choose wisely that one which, if he intend to become a scholar, he shall begin to pursue with thoroughness. This last sentence suggests

the direction in which our education is mainly deficient. The only institutions in America that can be compared with the German universities are our professional—not universities, but, as we term them, ‘schools.’ A graduate of Harvard University, for instance, must study two or three years longer in the same institution before he can receive a diploma from the Harvard Law, Medical or Divinity ‘School.’ We need more ‘schools’ of this description,—‘schools’ that shall supplement all the range of studies to which the student is introduced in college, and enable him to master with some degree of thoroughness the principles not only of Theology, Law and Medicine, but also of the Natural Sciences, Philosophy, History, Language, Criticism and the Arts. It is mainly, I think, these latter branches, in addition, of course, to the modern languages that can be studied to better advantage here than at home.’”

This quotation will show that a method of higher education in our country, such as would have developed normally, and not, as it were, artificially, because of disregarding and destroying that which had already been done, was foreseen and outlined at least thirty-four years ago. However, it came from an obscure source. Anything very sensible usually does. The recognized rulers of the world, like the devil whom the scriptures declare to be the prince of it, generally have more will than wisdom.

The way in which, as a fact, our higher educational system was revolutionized rather than developed is as follows: Our colleges, with the results on academic work that have already been indicated, raised their standards for admission. Then, finding

that students in college were a little older than they had been under the former standards, and thinking that, on account of their age, irrespective of their acquirements, they should have something corresponding to the university privileges of Europe, our educators began to call the colleges universities, which they were not, and, in connection with this, to give instruction according to the methods of the university for which the students thus instructed were not prepared. Two results followed, both so inevitable that it is strange that nobody should have foreseen them. The first was that every college began to think that, like a university, it must provide instruction in all possible branches. To do this, necessitated doubling, and, in some cases, tripling the number of its instructors, and the amount of money needed for their salaries. The other result was that students were deprived of that guidance to symmetrical and successful intellectual training which in the former college had been afforded by a wholly or partly required course of study. Not one Freshman out of ten is fitted to choose wisely the subjects best suited to his educational needs. Yet, in many institutions, he is now allowed to make his own selection. Even when the faculty is supposed to advise and direct him in this, a really efficient oversight on its part is often, owing to a lack of sufficient knowledge of his individual wants, not practicable and, often, when it is so and departments are prescribed, he is still allowed his choice of courses in them. In these cases, he usually prefers lecture-courses. As a rule, these require on his part little preparatory study, and, often, no thinking whatever. Nor do they prove of much use in adding to his in-

formation. To do this, they need to be accompanied, as in a foreign university, by extensive reading and laboratory practise. The resulting superficiality in education is often augmented, too, by allowing certain students to graduate in three rather than in four years. This positively tempts them to spend their time in what is very appropriately termed "cramming," i. e., swallowing without digesting, which, translated into terms of mind, means memorizing without reflecting. President J. M. Garfield once said something to the effect that his conception of being in college and getting a college education was to be sitting on one end of a log bench with President Mark Hopkins of Williams College sitting on the other end of it. Where could students, anxious to graduate in three years, find time in their schedules for a course pursued for nine hours a week throughout an entire year such as used to be given by Dr. Hopkins, especially in view of the fact that, probably, his best scholar, at the end of the year, could not have begun to pass as successful an examination in philosophy, which was supposed to be the subject of his course, as a mediocre student of the modern system could pass at the end of six weeks? Nevertheless, the pupil of Dr. Hopkins would have been taught to think and, in this sense, have been educated, while the latter would have been taught merely to know what somebody else had been thinking.

The same principle can be illustrated from the former as contrasted with the present methods of conducting instruction in other departments. It is especially noticeable in the fact that, in former times, but not now, many essays were read, orations deliv-

ered, and debates given in the presence of both professors and students,—all designed to train in ability to think and to present thought. It will not do to answer this by saying that the former system was changed because it was not effective. It is indisputable that there are no orators to-day that begin to compare with Webster, Beecher, Phillips, and others trained under that system. Nor are there any writers like Emerson, Motley, Holmes, and Hawthorne. Possibly, we do not need them now. Such certainly is the opinion of many advocates of the present system. At a recent centennial celebration of one of our colleges, a professorial friend of mine was seated next to a scientist. They were listening to a brilliant speech from a prominent clergyman. The scientist was to follow. Before he did so, he made a disparaging remark, indicating that he felt that he should be commended because he could not, and would not, attempt anything resembling what had immediately preceded. My friend in repeating his remark indicated that he also agreed with the scientist in this self-commendation. Neither, apparently, was able to perceive his own limitations sufficiently even to regret them. A few years ago, a well-known writer—I regret to confess it,—a professor of English, gave me a report of a speech that he had just heard from Dr. Richard S. Storrs of Brooklyn, and, with an assumption of affected superiority, criticized the uselessness of that orator's rhetoric. Is it necessary to argue that where such sentiments prevail and are expressed by those who desire to make themselves popular, no great efforts will be expended upon the methods of presenting thought; and if so, that no high standards will be

reached in the spheres peculiar to literature, whether of prose or of poetry? You cannot expect art to be manifested in the use of language in any college or country where there is general disparagement of endeavors to make language artistic. During my Freshman year in Williams College, I can remember hearing repeated by students who made no pretensions to being literary, quite a number of epigrams, metaphors and similes that had been used at public performances by certain oratorical heroes of the last graduating class. No student would repeat such phrases to-day. There are no such public performances. If there were, few would attend them. If they did, they would hear little above the level of the editorial of the college periodical written, apparently, during the sleepy hour following dinner.

Of course, the excuse given for this lack of interest in style is that, in our age, we are too much interested in substance. But the excuse is disingenuous. The peculiarity of the style of Phillips was that he could put more substance, and interesting substance, too, into a few sentences than an ordinary man could put into as many pages. The peculiarity of the styles of both Beecher and Phillips was that they made the substance, not the superficialities, of thought luminous with additional associated meaning that kindled imagination, and set fire to enthusiasm. A howling mob summoned by a cry for help may bring together substance to protect those in danger. But the coming sound of martial music, and the tread of disciplined troops, will be more likely to adjust the matter in a style that will recall the feeling of nationality, the authority of govern-

ment, and the supremacy of law, thus reestablishing permanent order. In this utilitarian age, we might get along without certain poetical rhapsodies of literature; but our practical arguments cannot afford to be without those forms of language which, by giving stimulus and suggestion, like the sparkle and flash that sometimes shoot out from an electric current, light up the course of thought on either side of the straight line of logic. It is not enough to show men the grounds of an opinion. Grounds may contain nothing beyond sand and gravel. To recognize and realize and relish all that there is in the world of proof, men need to know something of the glaciers of its mountains, the verdure of its valleys, the fragrance of its flowers.

The failure to assign due importance to cultivating the ability to think and to present thought with all its breadth of import seems to accord with many prevailing tendencies of our age and country. Many if not the most of us are materialists; and materialists recognize fully only the demands of matter. Many are utilitarians, and utilitarians estimate highly only that which is a utensil. It may be easy enough for both to perceive the need of practise in order to acquire skill in arts like painting or music. They can see the fingers, hands, throats that need to be trained. But when it comes to that which has to do solely with the unseen mind, they fail to perceive a like necessity of acquiring facility in such subtle things as observation, classification and logical and analogical inference. They have no realizing conception of what was meant by Henry Ward Beecher when he ascribed to practise his success not only in speaking but in writing and formulating that

imaginative presentation of thought which made all the world term him a genius. Without such a conception, the importance of training in college is overlooked by students, their parents and their professors. Some of the latter, indeed, are so influenced by an excess of utilitarianism that, even when they know better, they are willing to be guided by less expert opinion. In response to the supposed demands of the age, they are chiefly solicitous to make their institution popular. Accordingly a curriculum is allowed which fails to train the mind; and not only so, but fails even to reveal to the student, as a little practise required in experimenting, surveying, expounding, debating might do, his own especial aptitudes; yet no one who does not discover these can ever make a real success of his life.

As a rule, only the artist who starts out, as does a great painter or orator, by training some part of the body ends by learning, through practical experience, how much the same sort of training can do for the mind also. Few instructors, except of art, have had this experience. Probably this is why our present neglect of mental training has been due—as it has—mainly to the influence of teachers of science. It involves no disparagement of science *per se* to remind some of these of certain requirements of time and place. A bachelor may not object to a woman *per se*, although he may object, very decidedly, to having her introduced into his room in the morning before he is prepared to receive her. The truth seems to be that certain forms of science, and certain methods of teaching it are not adapted to the mental needs of ordinary college students. Underlying astronomy and physics, for instance, there

are many general principles as well as facts which every intelligent person can understand, and ought to know, like the theories with reference to the formation and movements of the heavenly bodies, with reference to the vibrations causing sounds and colors and harmony in both, and with reference to many of the more practical phases of mechanics and electricity. The study of these is appropriate for a college course. But I have known very brilliant college professors so obtuse to the limitations of the unmathematically developed mind as to dwell only on the mathematics of such subjects. They did this with a motive perfectly legitimate to a university, i. e., in order to impart knowledge and efficiency such as necessitate carrying out mathematical principles. Yet their method left more than one-half of their pupils where they, probably, derived no benefit from the course and possibly derived great harm, because deriving from it a habit of becoming willing to go over a subject without understanding it. In other cases, I have known science to be taught without any quizzing whatever, as philosophy, for instance, would have been taught by Mark Hopkins, in case he has spent his time merely in lecturing, or in finding out what students had learned by rote from a text-book.

The general conclusion that it seems important to emphasize here is that professors who consider it to be the sole object of their profession to see that students become learned in a technical and scholastic sense should get out of the college, and go into the university. No one ever yet succeeded in making the ordinary college-student a scholar. The failure to do so should suggest that some mistake has been

made in supposing that it can be done. Yet the old-time professor left over to the present who recognizes that it cannot be done, and addresses his teaching to the development of the understanding of the average mind is considered, in these days, to be antiquated. Other professors, faculties in general, and students in particular think that he needs to "modernize"—by which, too often, is practically meant to advertise—himself. This conception is frequently, at least, faithfully carried out. Instructors fresh from German or other universities are hardly in their seats in front of the Freshman before they hurry to exhibit all the treasures that they themselves have accumulated in apparently precocious mental explorations. Their ideal seems to be to talk to staring eyes and gaping mouths about the empyrean and the bottom of the sea. But these are too far off to be seen by the unhelped eye; and most of the Freshmen can neither fly nor dive, and have not even learned to use telescopes. How very few teachers appear to be aware that self-denial and self-sacrifice on their own part, are the prices that must always be paid by those who would redeem another from his deficiencies, either of mind or of spirit! Instead of giving an unpopular drill, they accept memorizing for mathematics, and, for Latin, haphazard sight-reading, without any of that careful discrimination in the use of synonyms and grammatical forms which according to the older method, could improve, at least, one's English.

As for English itself, anyone acquainted with the conditions knows that, influenced by the scientific tendencies of the age, professors in this have been tumbling over one another, in a rush to prove, for-

sooth, that their department too is scientific. This fact accounts for much of the instruction to those who will never use it in old English, Anglo-Saxon, Gothic and philology. But it accounts for more too. I recently had occasion to look over two examination-papers in English literature prepared in one of our foremost universities. It is not an exaggeration to say that a student could have passed perfectly in each of them, and not had the slightest conception of that which was important in the particular authors to whom they referred, nor the slightest appreciation of prose or poetry in general. Not only so, but he might have failed completely in each examination, and yet possess most delicate and discriminating taste, cultivated by extensive and judicious reading. The questions were all what might be termed historical or philological, like "What character in the book or play said or did this, and why?" or "What is the derivation of this word or phrase, and how used by other writers?" All this, of very slight interest or importance to any but an extremely technical scholar, had apparently been called to the attention of students at the expense of omitting practical requirement in the way of discovering, analyzing and interpreting the elements of plot or style; or of reproducing the same thoughts and effects with other phraseology, figures or framework; or of expressing and presenting original conceptions according to similar methods of statement or suggestion. This latter kind of work has been dropt for the reason, apparently and, in some cases, confessedly, that instructors in science, and, as applied to English, in pseudo-science, have discovered at last—what, of course, was not appre-

hended during the hundred years previous—that no professor attending performances in which a student presents the results of such work can expect to gather new information from them! Why, therefore, should the performances take place?

Of course, the answer is, for the sake of the student,—to train the mind of the boy into that of the man by cultivating that which a boy cannot have but a man should have. Beginning with the needs of a growing physique, this justifies gymnastic requirements, possibly a military drill—for all not connected with athletic teams. It justifies elocutionary requirements, voice-building being the only known way in which to give an uncultivated rustic the tones of a gentleman, or of training growing lungs to draw blood into every part of them, and, through doing this, into every part of the brain. It does seem strange that materialists, of all men, should not recognize how much this blood is needed. There is no subtly philosophical, only a physiological reason, why many a student too dull to take interest in other branches has been led through elocution to discover interest in them, and, ultimately, to develop not only brightness but brilliancy. The aim of the college requires rhetoric too with composition, analysis of themes, and debating, all practised in the presence of an instructor.

With reference to other branches, paradoxical as it may seem, the chief obstacle in the way of pursuing a rational method is that combined result of the experience and reasoning of our foremost educators embodied in what is termed the graded system. This is adapted to meet the need of the average student, but it keeps the bright one back after he is pre-

pared to go on; and, before this, it drags the dull one forward. As a result, the first of these is apt to develop a lack of interest and positive laziness, because he is not kept busy; and the second to develop a willingness to misunderstand and therefore chronic stupidity, because he has not been given time to master, with his class, those elements of the subject essential to intelligent progress. Why was I myself made, as I have already described, to recite in Latin five or six times a week for almost eight years after I could read Virgil with ease? Why was I not allowed to go on to something else, or to read through the whole field of Latin literature? Why, after I had finished algebra in three weeks, and felt an interest in the subject, was I not allowed to go on and complete my studies in mathematics? Was it not a waste of time for me to recite and to listen to recitations in algebra for about four successive years following this? Why, in a high school examination held recently, should less than thirty per cent. have been able to work out successfully simple arithmetical problems studied in a lower class? Should they not have been kept in this class a little longer?

A recognition of certain evils thus suggested connected with the graded system led, a few years ago, to the establishment of the elective system. But this corrects merely the mistake of obliging all students, irrespective of their tastes, acquirements, or purposes in life, to study the same branches. It does little more than allow the choice of one graded system rather than another, and leaves untouched the greater evil arising from the fact that students differ not only in mental tastes and purposes in life,

but in mental efficiency and ability to acquire. That which would correct the latter evil would be an arrangement whereby a student should be allowed, whenever ready for it, to pass an examination upon a certain amount of work, and, after having done so, to move on to the study of something else. In preparatory schools, the age and experience of pupils, most of whom need constant oversight and explanation, might prevent this plan from being feasible; but in colleges it would afford exactly that academic freedom which most students now seem to be demanding.

It may be asked how such an arrangement could make the college efficient in developing ability to think, as well as in causing an acquisition of knowledge. It could be done in this way,—by requiring, in addition to examinations in the subject-matter of certain books—Latin, German, mathematics, as the case might be—an attendance upon a certain number of exercises designed to develop the thinking powers. Of course, recitations and lectures could continue as at present for those needing them. But for those not needing them, thorough and satisfactory examinations could be substituted, and put on the credit side of the record required in order to secure a diploma. As for training in thinking and in presenting thought, there are some departments—those, for instance, having to do with the translating of foreign languages, or with the drawing of plans or the analysis of themes—in which it can be judged by its results. But there are other departments in which one can never be sure that it has been given, except by taking account of the time that has been devoted to it. This is, perhaps, the main reason for

the old custom of requiring recitations and quizzing exercises, as well as exercises in rhetoric, debate and oratory. At present, owing to certain abuses, by no means necessary, but incident to the elective system, students, in some colleges, can receive diplomas for very little work of this latter, practical kind,—for very little work, in fact, beyond that of memorizing. This would not be possible if, in addition to examinations in certain subjects, there were also required actual attendance upon exercises designed to necessitate thinking. It would not be necessary to require these in every course, nor, often, to restrict the student's choice of them. Certain professors particularly proficient in this form of instruction would and ought, probably, to draw disproportionate numbers of pupils. It would be necessary merely to require a student, before taking his diploma, to be present at a certain number of these exercises—say, including those in practise of rhetoric, six hundred in all, which would make one hundred and fifty a year for a course of four years, and two hundred a year for a course of three years.

Notice some of the advantages of this system: *first*, it would place the amount of the subject-matter required upon a rational basis, causing us to judge of the student's acquirements by the results; *second*, it would leave the student more free than at present to work when and how he chooses,—an arrangement that he desires, and that some think that he ought to desire; *third*, it would solve the most important part of the problem with reference to absences; no student could get credit for exercises that he did not attend; *fourth*, it would give similar meaning and value to every diploma, notwithstanding the fact

that it might enable a bright student to graduate in two years, and keep a dull one at work for six years; *fifth*, it would allow students to attend what is termed a university, and yet not wholly escape getting an education; indeed one might argue that it would afford the only feasible method of enabling them, from such an institution, without its being radically and, perhaps, unwisely, changed from the form which it has, at present, assumed, to obtain a complete and competent college course; *sixth*, it would develop a class of teachers, now greatly needed, who would become as famous for quizzing as a lawyer often does for cross-questioning; and, *seventh*, it would actually do more than the present system toward accomplishing the results at which this system aims. It would turn out better scholars, judged only by the knowledge obtained. The reason is this: the memory always works according to the principle exemplified when children learn by rote. Subjects of thought are retained in the mind, and retained permanently, in the degree in which they are repeated at short intervals of time. A man devoting the whole of several successive days to translating a single foreign language will come upon the same forms and phrases so frequently, that it will be impossible for him not to remember them. Were he to devote only a single half-hour each day, to this work, he would come upon them less frequently, and would usually forget them before seeing them a second time. By consequence, the repetition would do him no good. Students should, therefore, be allowed and encouraged to concentrate their attention upon one subject at a time, as would

be the case, were we to abolish our graded system, and merely require before the end of the course, a certain amount of subject-matter. This is the method adopted in the foreign university not only, but by almost every individual scholar who, in any department, becomes really proficient. It is strange that the fact has been entirely overlooked in the arrangements for college courses. But, if something were not awry in these courses, students, and scholarly students too, would not so frequently fret at being obliged to spend so much of their time in running to-and-fro upon a campus like bell-boys summoned by those in want, as they sometimes feel, mainly of imprecation. That which may be necessary in the academy is not always even a necessary evil in a college.

It may be said, therefore, that the sort of curriculum suggested would be aimed directly toward making a man a thinker, and yet would probably be more effective than the present in making him a scholar. Why cannot we have a college course of this kind, extending over a few years, at least, if not four? Must the call of the ideal and the rational be wholly disregarded merely because a large number of those to whom neither appeals urge us not to heed it? Is there nothing left among us of the spirit that was in Frederick Douglass when he said "One with God is a majority"? Has the scholar forgotten that, in certain emergencies, it is his duty to think for the people as well as with them? We might as well attempt to obtain high agricultural results by merely fencing in the soil that we find about us as to obtain high educational results by merely inclosing in a college wall the products of a culture planned to do

no more than fulfil the expectations of the uneducated world outside of it. That which, by destroying for a time apparent fertility and delaying development, a Luther Burbank can do in the production of plant and flower and fruit, the faculty of a college can do in the field of education. Through following the guidance of the spirit of an age in haste to get into remunerative work, it may turn out graduates who, without mastery of implements, comprehension of possibilities, or associated powers of initiative, can do as well as can be expected from the natural endowment of an unskilled workman; or, by sharpening wits, widening knowledge, and stimulating conceptions, it may do for its students what natural endowment cannot do. In this case, those who continue their studies in a higher institution will be prepared to know that branch of learning for which they have aptitudes, its relation to other branches, and the departments of it in which development and discovery are needed; and the much larger number of graduates who, without further study, go forth into the business of the world, will do so to find in it not only money for themselves but motives for others, whom they may benefit not only as day-laborers but as those who, in dreams as well as deeds, are working out the results of broad culture that can estimate rightly, of practised experience that can execute wisely, and of enlightened purpose that can lead intelligently.

ART AND EDUCATION *

Human intelligence is a manifestation of many different tendencies, but all may be resolved into three,—those having their sources in the understanding, in the will, and in the emotions; and the departments in which mainly the three are respectively exprest are science—not philosophy, for this is a broader term, derived from a different principle of classification—religion, and art. Science, as a development of the understanding, begins in observation and tends toward knowledge; religion, as a development of the will, begins in conscience and tends toward conduct; and art, as a development of the emotions, begins in imagination and tends toward sentiment. It must not be supposed, however, though we can thus in conception separate the three departments, that there is ever a time when in practise they fail to act conjointly or mutually to affect one another. When we examine some of the oldest monuments of the world—like the Pyramids of Egypt—it is difficult to tell the results of which of the three we are studying. Mathematicians and astronomers say of science; moralists and theologians, of religion; and archeologists and artists, of art. So with the older civilizations of the world,—those of Judea, Greece, Rome.

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The physician or the jurist traces in them as many indications of the science of the laws of health or government as the ritualist or the rationalist does of the religions of theism or stoicism, or as the litterateur of the critic does of the arts of poetry or of sculpture.

The dark ages rendered men equally unable to carry on scientific observations, to recognize the spiritual claims of a human brother, or to reproduce his bodily lineaments. When the Renaissance began to dawn, it is difficult to determine from which the sky first gathered redness,—from the flash of Roger Bacon's gunpowder, the light of Wyclif's Bible, or the fire of Dante's hell. When it was bright enough to see clearly, no one knows which was the foremost in drafting the plan of progress,—the compasses of Copernicus, the pen of Calvin, or the pencil of Raphael. Even in the same country, great leaders in all three departments always appear together,—in Italy, Columbus, Savonarola, and Angelo; in Spain, James of Mallorca, Loyola, and Calderon; in France, Descartes, Bossuet, and Molière; in Germany, Humboldt, Schleiermacher, and Goethe; in England, Watt, Wesley, and Reynolds. In fact, the three seem as inseparably connected in indicating sovereignty over civilization as were of old the three prongs of the trident of Neptune in indicating sovereignty over the sea.

When things go together, they usually belong together. When they belong together, no one of them can be at its best without the presence of the others. The bearing of this fact upon the subject before us is sometimes overlooked. There are sci-

entists who think that, when they give forth a word from their department, they have about as much need of re-enforcement from the utterances of religion as have locomotive engineers of the pipings of a penny whistle. There are religionists who think that they can get along without the mathematical discipline of science about as well as can the marchers in a processional without a military drill; while both are inclined to an impression that art may actually interfere with their success, as much as a liveried footman with that of a country doctor. Nevertheless, art not only furnishes important aids to the full development of the other two, but is even essential to it. If neglecting knowledge, toward which science tends, religion lacks intelligence, and art observation. If caring nothing for conduct, at which religion aims, science lacks practicality, and art inspiration. If destitute of imagination and sentiment, which art cultivates, science becomes divorced from philosophy, and religion from refinement. It was in the dark ages, when they had no art, that the test of a sage was the ability to repeat by rote long, senseless incantations; and the test of a saint was to fulfil the rule, scrupulously passed for his guidance by the councils of the Church, that he should never wash himself.

But to indicate more specifically what is meant. Science has to do mainly with matter, religion with spirit, and art with both; for by matter we mean the external world and its appearances, which art must represent, and by spirit we mean the internal world of thoughts and emotions, which also art must represent. The foundations of art, therefore, rest in the realms both of science and of religion;

and its superstructure is the bridge between them. Nor can you get from the one to the other, or enjoy the whole of the territory in which humanity was made to live, without using the bridge. Matter and spirit are like water and steam. They are separate in reality: we join them in conception. So with science and religion, and the conception which brings both into harmonious union is a normal development of only art.

In unfolding this line of thought, it seems best to show how art develops the powers of the mind, first, in the same direction as does science; and, second, in the same as does religion; and, under each head, so far as possible, to show, in addition, how art develops them conjointly also in both directions.

Let us begin, then, with the correspondences between the educational influence of the study of art and of science. The end of science is knowledge with reference mainly to the external material world. We must not forget, however, that the latter includes our material body, with both its muscular and nervous systems. To acquire a knowledge of the world, the primary condition, and an essential one—a condition important in religion, but not nearly to the same extent—is keenness of the perceptive powers, accuracy of observation. No man can be an eminent botanist, zoologist, or mineralogist, who fails to notice, almost at a first glance, and in such a way as to be able to recall, the forms and colors of leaves, bushes, limbs, rocks, or crystals. No man can make a discovery or invention, and thus do that which is chiefly worth doing in science, unless he can perceive, with such retention as to be able to recall, series of outlines

and tints, and the orders of their arrangement and sequence. Now can you tell me any study for the young that will cultivate accuracy of observation, that will begin to do this, as can be done by setting them tasks in drawing, coloring, carving, or, if we apply the same principle to the ear as well as to the eye, in elocution and music? In order to awaken a realization of how little some persons perceive in the world, I used to ask my classes how many windows there were in a certain building that they had passed hundreds of times, or how many stories there were in another building. Scarcely one in six could answer correctly. Is it possible to suppose that one could have avoided noticing such things in case his eyes had been trained to observation through the study of drawing, to say nothing of the effect of special training in the direction of architecture? Of course, there are men born with keen powers of perception, on which everything at which they glance seems to be photographed. But the majority are not so. They have to be trained to use their eyes as well as their other organs. President Chadbourne, of Williams College, at a time when professor of botany in that institution, was once lost with a friend in a fog on Greylock Mountain. It was almost dark; but, in feeling around among the underbrush, his hand struck something. "I know where we are," he said. "The path is about two hundred feet away from here. There is only one place in it from which you see bushes like these." I used to take walks with an old army general. Time and again, when we came to a ravine or a rolling field, he would stop and point out how he would distribute his forces in the neighborhood,

were there to be a battle there. These are examples of the result of cultivating powers of observation in special directions. The advantage of art education, given to the young, is that it cultivates the same powers in all directions. While the nature is pliable to influence, it causes a habit of mind—in a sense, a scientific habit—that is important in every department in which men need to have knowledge. Not only the botanist and the soldier, but the teacher, the preacher, the lawyer, the politician, the merchant, the banker, is fitted to meet all the requirements of his position in the degree in which his grasp of great and important matters does not let slip the small and apparently insignificant details that enter into them. Some years ago a poor boy from the country, hoping to obtain a position, brought a letter of introduction to a London bank; but he found no place vacant. He turned away disappointed; but, before he had gone far, a messenger overtook and recalled him. The proprietors had decided to make a place for him. Years afterward, when he had become the leading banker of London and the Lord High Treasurer of the kingdom, he was told the reason why he had been thus recalled. As he was leaving the bank, he had noticed a pin on the pavement, and had stooped down, picked it up, and placed it in his waistcoat. The one who saw that single little act had judged, and judged rightly, that he was the sort of boy whose services the bank could not afford to lose.

Observation of this kind contributes to success, not only in the larger relations of life, but still more, perhaps, in the smaller. What is the germ of tact, courtesy, and kindness in social and

family relations? What but the observation of little things, and of their effects? And notice that the observation of these in one department necessarily goes with the same in other departments. What is the reason that a man of esthetic culture is the last to come into his home swearing like a cowboy, cocking his hat over the vases on the mantelpiece, or forcing his boots up into their society? Because this sort of manner is not to his taste. Why not? Because, for one reason, he has learned the value of little matters of appearance; and for any man to learn of them in one department is to learn of them in all departments. But, to turn to such things as are especially cultivated by art, what is it that makes a room, when we enter it, seem cheerful and genial? What but the observation of little arrangements that prevent lines from being awry and colors from being discordant? What is the matter with that woman whom we all know,—the woman who, when on Sundays she is waved into the pew in front of us, makes us half believe that the minister has hired her to flag the line of worshipers behind, so as to give them a realizing sense that, even while taking the name of the Lord upon their lips, they may be tempted to expressions appropriate only for miserable sinners? She gets into the street-car, and we feel as if we had disgraced ourselves in bowing to her. She comes to our summer hotel; and the mere fact of recognizing her involves our spending much of the rest of our time in proving to others the contradictory proposition that, notwithstanding her extravagance in lending lavish color to every occasion, she has not yet exhausted all the capital that

keeps her from being "off-color." But think what it must be to live perpetually in the glare of such sunshine! Physically, inharmonious hues produce a storm amid the sight-waves, and amid the nerves of the eye, too, and, as all our nerves are connected, amid those of thought, emotion, digestion. In fact, the whole nervous system sails upon waves, just as a ship does; and storms may prove disagreeable. It has not a slight bearing, then, upon comfort, health, geniality, and sanity to be color-blind, or -daft, or -ignorant. It is not of slight importance to have children trained so that they shall realize that warm colors and cold colors, though not necessarily inducing changes in temperature, may induce changes in temper; that the cheering effects of the room characterized by the one are very different from the somber effects produced by the presence of the other; that the brilliance of the full hues echoing back wit and mirth in the hall of feasting might not seem at all harmonious to the mood in need of rest and slumber.

Fully as important as that which leads to personal or social advantage is that which enhances one's own inward satisfaction. It is no less true that our lives are worth to others exactly what they see that we find in the world, than that the world is worth to us exactly what we find in it for ourselves. If this be so, how important is it for us to learn to observe!

One method of learning this, as has been said, is through studying the elements of art practically. Few can study them thus, however, without beginning to study them theoretically also; nor without beginning to take an interest in the products of the

great artists in all departments. And here again, to whatever art we look, in the degree in which a work rises toward the highest rank, it continues to train our powers of observation. One difference between the great poet, for instance, and the little poet is in those single words and phrases that indicate accuracy in the work of ear or eye, or of logical or analogical inference. Recall Tennyson's references to the "gouty oak," the "shock-head willow," the "wet-shod alder." We all admit that genius, especially literary genius, is characterized by brilliance. A brilliant concentrates at a single point all the light of all the horizon, and from thence flashes it forth intensified. This is precisely the way in which a brilliant stylist uses form. In describing anything in nature, he selects that which is typical or representative of the whole, and often not only of the whole substance of a scene, but even of its atmosphere. Notice the following from Shakespeare:

"The battle fares like to the morning's war,
When dying clouds contend with growing light;
What time the shepherd, blowing of his nails,
Can neither call it perfect day nor night."

3 *Henry VI.*, ii., 5.

Observe what a picture could be made of this; yet that which most suggests it is put into exactly four words, *blowing of his nails*. The same fact is true of painting and sculpture. Of course, many factors enter into excellence in these arts, and pre-eminent success in certain directions may compensate for deficiencies in other directions. But, as a rule, the rank of a picture or a statue is determined by the relative manifestation in it of accuracy in

observing and in reproducing the results of observation; *i.e.*, by the manifestation of imitative skill and of technical facility. Not that all products equally successful in these are of equal excellence. Back of one product there may be a spiritual significance, a psychologic charm lifting it into a sphere where are gathered only the works of those who are the gods of the artistic Olympus, while back of another may be nothing suggestive of the possibility of what we term artistic inspiration. Nevertheless, what has been said will be found to be true. Art always deals with effects which nature presents to the ear or eye, and never survives the fashions of the times in which it is produced except in the degree in which it manifests accuracy in the observation of nature. Music survives in the degree in which it fulfils laws founded upon the observation of tones, the blendings and sequences of which cause agreeable effects upon the ear; architecture in the degree in which it fulfils laws founded upon the observation of shapes and outlines, the harmonies and proportions of which cause agreeable effects upon the eye. Painting and sculpture fulfil not only the formative laws, but reproduce the formal effects of outline and color; and the first condition of successful reproduction is accuracy. This accuracy is not inconsistent with leaving out some features and emphasizing others, and presenting the whole from different points of view. But it is inconsistent with distortion of any kind. Why? For the same reason that, if we wish a man to see anything through a field-glass, we must adjust the glass exactly to the point of sight. If not, he sees mainly certain obscuring effects of the

glass. Tho meant to be an agent, it has become an end. When we look at a picture in which the drawing or coloring is defective, causing disproportion in the parts, unatmospheric sharpness of outline, absence of shadowy gradation—above all, a predominating impression of paint everywhere—the effect is exactly like that of powder and rouge on a woman's face. It is impossible to see any soul through or past the form. This, if it do not blur or blind the eye to ulterior suggestions, at least, appeals to it in such a way as to be a barrier preventing them from exerting their normal imaginative influence. Therefore, tho, viewed in one aspect, imitative skill and technical facility are merely conditions for making possible the spiritual and mental effects of art, viewed in another aspect, they have more importance than the word *condition* might imply; for they are indispensable. As most of us know, Mr. Beardsley's name is sometimes mentioned by prominent and able American critics with a certain degree of respect, owing to his manifestation, as is said, of originality and invention. One cannot refrain from feeling that further reflection would cause these critics to withhold anything in the direction of actual commendation. Mr. Beardsley's work * is legitimate neither to decorative painting nor to figure-painting. Decorative art, like architecture, should fulfil certain mathematical laws controlling the intersection and curvature, the balance and symmetry, of lines, as well as certain physical laws controlling concord and contrast of colors, introducing figures, if at all,

* This was first printed in 1898. The "fad" then criticized is now, in 1910, no longer popular.

only in a subordinate way. These principles of decorative art Mr. Beardsley's work does not fulfil. Figure-painting, tho partly fulfilling the same principles, subordinates them to the reproduction of natural appearances. Yet Mr. Beardsley fails to reproduce these appearances with accuracy, showing either that he does not know how to observe or that he does not know how to draw, or, at least, fails to manifest the results of his knowledge. If this be true, it follows, as a corollary from what was said a moment ago, that, just in the degree in which it is true, his work fails to be a medium connecting the mind with nature, and influencing it according to the method of nature. But what of that? it may be asked. Why not treat his pictures and others of the "Yellow Book" and the posters of the period—for all manifest the same tendency—as artistic jokes or caricatures? Why not? For the very sufficient reason that artists and critics insist upon our not treating them so. The style has begun to influence serious work, and, by consequence, to accustom, not only people in general, but artists to pictures not accurately drawn and colored. I have lately seen certain angels in a stained-glass window by a well-known artist, capable of doing fine work. They manifest their poster-progeniture in limbs so deformed, flesh so dropsical, colors so diseased, and expressions of countenance so forbidding that no sane mind conceiving them to represent an ideal would ever—to say no more—"want to be an angel." Indeed, if one after death were to meet angels like them, however good he might be, he would be sure to turn around, and go straight down hill.

It is a fact overlooked by many how rapidly art, owing to its other necessarily imitative methods, when it once begins to decline, continues to do so. The sense of proportion in the human face and form was entirely lost once, and recovered again, during the period of the art of ancient Egypt. It was lost in Europe all the time between the third and thirteenth centuries. It has been lost many times in China and Japan. In architecture, as developed in Greece, the same sense was lost before Rome was in its prime. It continued lost till the rise of Gothic architecture. It is lost again in our own time. The simplest principles of proportional perspective, which the Greek applied to buildings precisely as we do to pictures, are not merely misapprehended, but are not considered possible either of apprehension or of application by our foremost architects.* So with color—from Apelles to Leonardo an almost constant decline. And think what a sudden decline there was after the period of the great Italian painters. Notice, too, that these declines were largely owing to the inability of the people, to whom the art works appealed, to perceive the defects. Little by little, they had accepted these, one after another, because supposing them to accord not necessarily with nature—for some knew better than that—but with the conventionalities of art. Just as everybody in Italy, before the time of Dante, supposed that literature could be written in only Latin, tho unintelligible to the common people, so everybody in these ages of

* This was first printed in 1898. Since then it has become not true of some of our architects. See the author's "Proportion and Harmony."

decline had come to expect, in art, forms that were not natural, and so far, for the reasons just given, not intelligible; and all were disappointed if they saw anything else. Suppose that, because the poster art has commercial value, our younger artists begin to imitate it—I mean keep on imitating it—or, if not its precise forms, the principles underlying them—what will follow? A framed picture will begin to occupy exactly the same position in the eyes of the populace as a dressmaker's show-window. What is there this year seems beautiful. What was there five years ago seems ugly. Not because either is beautiful or ugly intrinsically—perhaps I ought to say neither is beautiful intrinsically—but because the dressmaker has to make money. And people call, and most of them think the prevailing style beautiful, merely because it happens to be current and popular. They are so constituted that, consciously or unconsciously, they are unable to resist the tide that, apparently, is bearing along every one else. When the same tendencies appear in art it strikes me that the critic who is of value to the world is the man who, in case public opinion be setting in the wrong direction, is able to resist it, is able to look beneath the surface, analyze the effects, detect the errors, put together his conclusions, and have independence enough to express them. When the current theory is riding straight toward the brink, he is the man who foresees the danger, screws down the brakes, and turns the steeds the other way—not the sentimentalist irresponsibly swept into folly by the fury of the crowd, or the demagog whooping its shibboleth to the echo, because, forsooth, he must be popular.

The truth is that, just so far as the tendency of the kind of art of which we are speaking has its perfect work, just so far there will be no necessity for accuracy in drawing or coloring, and very little discipline afforded the powers of observation, while trying either to produce or to appreciate the completed artwork.

This last sentence suggests that we have not quite ended yet all that can be said of the tendency of the study of art to cultivate these latter powers. With observation of the external material world must be included, as has been intimated, that of our own material bodies, involving both their muscular and nervous systems, involving, therefore, so far as developed from the nervous system, especially through physical exercise, the mind and its various possibilities. Science does much, of course, toward bringing us to a knowledge of these possibilities. No man can use his eyes, ears, memory, as science necessitates, to say nothing of his powers of analysis and generalization, without learning a very great deal. But think how much more he can learn, when he is forced into the repetitious and conscientious practice which is always necessary before one can acquire that skill which is essential to success in art.

Just here, in our survey of art, we are approaching the boundary line which separates its relations to science from its relations to religion. Notice that, while a man is acquiring skill, he is being brought into the conditions of life and of method which are necessary in order to attain religious ends. What is the object of religion except through practice, in obedience to will and conscience, to

make the mind supreme over matter, to make a man's higher powers the master of his lower powers, to make the body, as the Bible terms it, a living temple for the spirit? When we think of it, we recognize that, while science does comparatively little in this direction, art does an immense deal. The student of art cannot keep from learning through personal experience how months and years of exercise in voice and gesture, in playing music, in drawing, in painting, in carving, give one a mastery over the physical possibilities of the body not only, but of the mind. He is forced to realize as others cannot that there comes to be a time when every slightest movement through which music, for instance, passes with the rapidity of electricity from a printed score through the mind and fingers of a performer, is overseen and directed by mental action which, while intelligent, works unconsciously, all the conscious powers of the mind being absorbed in that which is producing the general expressional effect. The student of art has thus before him constant experimental evidence of the way in which the higher mental nature can gain ascendancy over both the lower physical and the lower psychical nature. He knows practically as well as theoretically in what sense it can be true spiritually that the man who is to enter into the kingdom of heaven, who is to become with all his powers subject to the spirit that is sovereign there, and who is, without conscious effort, to embody in conduct its slightest promptings, is the man who consciously starts out with scrupulous and often painful efforts to do the will of the Father who is in heaven. Thus, in this regard, the study of art completes the lesson

learned from science; and it does so by co-ordinating it to the lesson learned from religion.

Now let us unfold further the thought suggested in what has just been said. We have been considering art education as related to developing the powers of observation, and everything that enables the mind to master—as is mainly, tho not exclusively, necessary in science—that which comes to it from the material world without. Let us turn from this to consider the same branch of education as related to developing powers of reflection; *i.e.*, of constructive thinking, and the mastery—which is mainly, tho not exclusively, necessary in religion—of that which comes from the mental world within.

A man begins to reflect, to construct thought, when he learns to draw an inference as a result of putting together at least two things. Of course, he does this when engaged in scientific pursuits. For success in them, nothing is more essential than classification; and the fundamental method of classification is grouping like with like. But notice to how much greater extent a man is obliged to carry on this process at the very beginning of his work in art. Art is distinctively a product of imagination, of that faculty of the mind which has to do with perceiving images,—the image of one thing in the form of another. While science, therefore, may find a single form interesting in itself, art, at its best, never does. It looks for another form with which the first may be compared. While science may be satisfied with a single fact, art, at its best, never is. It demands a parallel fact or fancy, of which the first furnishes a suggestion.

This imaginative and suggestive character of art

does not need to be proved. We can recognize its influence in every artistic result. The movements of sound in music image, for the sake of the beauty that may be developed in connection with the construction of such an image, the movements of the voice in speaking. The metaphors and similes of poetry image by way of description the scenes of nature. Pictures and statues image them on canvas or in marble; and architecture, even when devoid of sculptural ornamentation, is a method of working into an image of beauty the forms through which the primitive savage provides for security and shelter. We may say, therefore, that the very beginning of the mental tendency that culminates in art is a suggestion to the imagination of a relationship existing, primarily, between forms, and, secondarily—because both are necessarily connected—between methods or laws which these forms illustrate. And how is it with the continuation and conclusion of this mental tendency? Do these, too, emphasize, in a way to be of assistance to science, the same conception of a relationship? A moment's thought will reveal to us that they do, and that here, too, therefore, as in the former part of this discussion, the study of art can be shown to be of assistance to the study of science by way both of anticipating its needs and of completing its results. Consider, for instance, the two directions in which it is important for the scientist to notice relationships, and in connection with this consider the respective classes of studies which are usually considered the best for training the mind to think in these directions. The directions are those corresponding to space and time, which are ordinarily

termed comprehensiveness of thinking and consecutiveness. The studies supposed to develop thinking in these directions are the languages, especially the classics, and mathematics. The classics, requiring the student, as they do, to observe, between almost every word and some other word, several different relationships, as of gender, number, case, mood, voice, etc., are supposed to cultivate breadth, or comprehensiveness, of thinking; *i. e.*, the ability to consider things not as isolated, but as related to many other things, and, in the last analysis, to all things, *organically*. The mathematics cultivate consecutiveness of thinking; *i. e.*, the ability to consider things as related one to another, *logically*. Everybody admits the importance of training the mental powers in both directions. But notice, in the first place, how much art has to do with furnishing the possibility of either form of training. Where would have been any study whatever of the classics, had art done nothing for literature? We should have had no laws of Latin and Greek prosody unless the poets had written in rhythm, and no laws of syntax unless philosophers and historians, as well as poets, had been careful about art in style. Again, where would have been our study of mathematics, of the resulting effects upon one another of lines in curves or angles, or our study of physical science as determined by such laws as those of sound, or of color, had it not been for the interest first awakened by their esthetic effects in architecture, music, painting, or sculpture? Whether considering nature or art, men always notice appearances before they investigate the causes determining them. The old Egyptians were studying

architecture when they began the investigations which built up their system of mathematics. Pythagoras was studying music when he began the discovery of the laws of sound, and Leonardo and Chevreul were studying art when they made their contributions to the understanding of color; and, tho the time has now come when those composing the advancing army of science have moved into every remotest valley of the invaded country, apparently needing no longer any leadership of the kind, they never would have begun their advance unless, like the hosts of almost every conquering army, they had at first marched behind a standard that in itself was a thing of beauty.

So much for the services of art in anticipating the needs of scientific study. Now let us notice how art aids in completing its results. When the mind has attained all that classical and mathematical training can give, when one has learned to relate organically and logically everything on each side of him and in front of him, what then? Where does the breadth of view cultivated by classical culture cease? Where does the line of logic projected along the vista of mathematical sequence end? I think that you will admit that the one ceases and the other ends where it should, in the degree in which each attains to something hitherto undiscovered in the knowledge of facts or in the understanding of principles. Now I wish to show that this result follows only in the degree in which imagination, in the form in which it is cultivated in art, works in conjunction with the other powers of the mind. There always comes for the scientist a place where material relationships are no longer

perceptible, a time where logical sequences of ascertainable phenomena end. He finds the course of his thought checked, whether he look sideways or forward. There is still infinity in the one direction and eternity in the other; and the mind that can make discoveries of great truths and principles is, as a rule, the mind that, when it can advance no longer, step by step, can wing itself into these unexplored regions. How can it do this? Through imagination. How can imagination, when doing it, detect the truth? According to a law of being which makes the mind of man work in harmony with the mind in nature, which makes an imaginative surmisal with reference to material things a legitimate product of an intelligent understanding of them. This is the law of correspondence or analogy, which can often sweep a man's thoughts entirely beyond that which is a justifiable scientific continuation of the impression received from nature. Only in art is the mind necessitated and habituated to recognize this law, which fact may not only suggest a reason why so many successful inventors have started in life, like Fulton, Morse, and Bell, by making a study of some form of art; but it may almost justify a general statement that no great discovery is possible to one whose mind is not able to go beyond that which is ordinarily done in science. As a rule, before an expert in this can become what we mean by even a philosopher, not to speak of a discoverer, he must possess, because born with it or trained to it, that habit of mind which leaps beyond scientific conclusions, in order to form imaginative hypotheses. It is only after some one has made suppositions, as Newton is said

to have done, when he saw the image of gravitation in the falling of an apple, that a mind adhering strictly to a scientific method finds work to do in endeavoring to prove them. Nevertheless, many scientists have a subtle, even a pronounced disbelief, in that arrangement of nature in accordance with which matter and mind, knowledge and surmisal, always move forward on parallel planes with the mind and its surmisal some distance ahead. Their disbelief is owing to a lack of imagination, and this is often owing to a lack of the kind of culture which they might derive from giving attention to some phase of art. And yet the majority of them, perhaps, believe that art is a mere adjunct to intellectual training,—an ornamental adjunct, too, introducing, like the carving on the keystone of an arch, what may be interesting and pretty, but is not essentially useful. This is a mistake. In important particulars, it may be said that art is not the carving on the keystone, but the keystone itself, without which the whole arch would tumble.

It will be noticed now that we are approaching the place at which, in a far more important sense than has yet been developed, art may be said, in accordance with what was affirmed at the opening of this paper, to spring the bridge across the gulf that separates religion from science. The mind is never strictly within the realm of science when it is arriving at conclusions otherwise than through methods dealing with material relationships. Nothing is scientifically true, unless it can be shown to be fulfilled in fact; *i.e.*, in conditions and results perceptible in ascertainable phenomena. The moment that thought transcends the sphere possible

to knowledge, it gets out of the sphere of science. But, when it gets out of this, what sphere, so long as it continues to advance rationally, does it enter? What sphere but that of religion? And think how large a part of human experience—experience which is not a result of what can strictly be termed knowledge—is contained in this sphere! Where but in it can we find the impulses of conscience, the dictates of duty, the cravings for sympathy, the aspirations for excellence, the pursuit of ideals, the sense of unworthiness, the desire for holiness, the feeling of dependence upon a higher power, and all these together, exercised in that which causes men to walk by faith, and not by knowledge? The sphere certainly exists. Granting the fact, let us ask what it is that can connect with this sphere of faith the sphere of knowledge? Has any method yet been found of conducting thought from the material to the spiritual according to any process strictly scientific? Most certainly not. There comes a place where there is a great gulf fixed between the two. Now notice that the one who leads the conceptions of men across this gulf must, like the great Master, never speak to them without a parable—*i.e.*, a parallel, an analogy, a correspondence, a comparison. Did you ever think of the fact that, scientifically interpreted, it is not true that God is a father, or Christ a son of God, or an elder brother of Christians, or the latter children of Abraham? These are merely forms taken from earthly relationships, in order to image spiritual relationships, which, except in imagination, could not in any way become conceivable. This method of conceiving of conditions, which may be great real-

ities in the mental, ideal, spiritual realm, through the representation of them in material form, is one of the very first conditions of a religious conception. But what is the method? It is the artistic method. Unless this could be used, science would stop at the brink of the material with no means of going farther, and religion begin at the brink of the spiritual with no means of finding any other starting-point. Art differs from both science and religion in cultivating imagination instead of knowledge, as does the one, and instead of conduct, as does the other. But notice, in addition to what has been said of its being an aid to science, what an aid to religion is the artistic habit of looking upon every form in this material world as full of analogies and correspondences, inspiring conceptions and ideals spiritual in their nature, which need only the impulse of conscience to direct them into the manifestation of the spiritual in conduct. This habit of mind is what art, when legitimately developed, always produces. It not only necessitates, as applied to mere form—and in this it differs from religion and resembles science—great accuracy in observation, but also, as applied to that which the form images—and in this it differs from science and resembles religion—it necessitates the most exact and minute fulfilment of the laws of analogy and correspondence. These laws, which, because difficult and sometimes impossible to detect, some imagine not to exist, nevertheless do exist; and they give, not only to general effects, but to every minutest different element of tone, cadence, line, and color, a different and definite meaning, tho often greatly modified, of course, when an element is differently combined with other elements.

This fact is exemplified in all the arts; and it is that which makes an art-product, as distinguished from a scientific, a combined effect of both form and significance—of form, inasmuch as it fulfils certain physical laws of harmony or proportion, which make the effect agreeable or attractive to the physical eyes or ears; and of significance, inasmuch as it fulfils certain psychical laws, as of association or adaptability, which cause it to symbolize some particular thought or emotion. If, for instance, we ask an artist why he has drawn a figure gesturing with the palm up instead of down, he cannot say, if giving a correct answer, that he has done it for the sake merely of the form, in case he means to use this word in its legitimate sense as a derivation of the old Latin word *forma*, an appearance. The one gesture, if as well made, may *appear* as well as the other. The difference between the two is wholly a difference of ~~meaning, of significance~~. This difference, moreover, is artistic. For merely scientific purposes the one gesture, in such a case, might be as satisfactory as the other.

That form in art as contrasted with form in science is suggestive in the sense just explained, we all, to a certain extent, recognize. When, in music or poetry, we are discussing the laws of rhythm, harmony, or versification, we are talking, as the very titles of most books written upon these topics indicate, about the science of these subjects. When we are discussing the influence upon thought or emotion of consecutive or conflicting themes or scenes in an opera of Wagner or a drama of Shakespeare, we are talking about that which, tho partly conditioned upon the laws of science, nevertheless transcends its possibilities. No matter how perfect

rhythm or rhyme one may produce through arrangements of words, the result is prose, not poetry, unless the thought, instead of being presented directly, is represented, as we may say, indirectly, so as to cause it to afford virtually an argument from analogy. Frequently, one judges of poetic excellence by the degree in which the thoughts or emotions could not be communicated at all unless they were thus suggested rather than stated; by the degree, therefore, in which their essential character is subtle, intangible, invisible—in short, spiritual. The same is true of sculpture, architecture, and painting, tho the fact is not equally acknowledged in each of these arts. No one thinks of not judging of a statue by its significance for the mind—*i.e.*, by the subject represented in its pose, gestures, and facial expression—fully as much as by the mathematics of its proportions or the technical skill of its chiselling. Large numbers of persons judge of a building in a similar way, considering the embodiment of the mental conception in the general arrangements and appearances causing them to be representative of the plan of the whole, or illustrative of special contrivances of construction in the parts, to be fully as important as the character of the material or even the proportion and harmony of the outlines. But, when we come to pictures, altho apparently the rest of the world, aside from those who are in art-circles, accept without question the view that has just been presented, we find that many painters and many critics influenced by them deny the importance of considering mental and spiritual significance as distinguished from that which has to do with the ap-

peal of the form to the eye. Of course, if they deny this, we are obliged to infer from what has been said already that they do so because, in some degree, they fail to perceive that art involves that which transcends the possibilities of science. If, with this suggestion as a clue, we examine the facts, we shall find that those of whom we are speaking are apt to be colorists, not draftsmen. Of late years the development of coloring has necessarily proceeded on scientific lines. This fact, in connection with the fact that color in nature is not fixed, but changes with every shifting of the sun, may furnish one reason why certain students of color hold to the view that in art as in science the meaning that a form conveys by way of exercising definite control over the imagination need not be specially considered.

But beyond this reason there seems to be another. It may be suggested by the following: a friend of mine, who sent his son to a school in England, told me that the boy came back a "perfect fool." To restore a rational action of mind, it became necessary to resort to argument. "What do you roll so for, when you walk? Are you drunk? What do you stick out your elbows so for? Are your arm-pits chapped? Do you think yourself drowning every time you try to shake hands?" "Oh," said the boy, "you Americans haven't any way of letting people know that you have been in good society." This answer may give us a hint of one reason why the opinion of common people is not always accepted by those who wish to be thought uncommon. Thus put, it may seem an unworthy reason, not consistent with earnestness and sincerity.

Yet such an inference would scarcely be justified. The fact that people ordinarily judge of a picture by its significance is a proof that the ordinary picture has significance. But the artist does not wish to produce an ordinary picture. So he says: "The kind of picture that I produce need not have significance." His motive is praiseworthy. He wishes to attain distinction. But, intellectually, he starts with an erroneous premise; and this, of course, leads him to an erroneous conclusion. It is not significance that makes a picture ordinary: this merely makes it a picture rather than a product of decorative art. That which makes it ordinary is the form in which the significance is presented. To change a theological essay into a "Paradise Lost," it would not be necessary to drop the significance: that could be kept; but it would be necessary to change the form.

We may be sure that any theory true as applied to one art is in analogy to that which is true of every other art of the same class; and I, for one, refuse to take from the art of painting its right to be classed among the other higher arts. Why does it rank with the humanities, and not with the merely decorative arts?—why, but because its products so distinctively give expression to human thought,—in other words, so unmistakably suggest significance? Some time ago I heard a story intended to represent the effect that should be produced by this art. It was said that some one, in a French gallery, noticed two painters approach a picture, and heard them discuss the coloring of some fowls. After about ten minutes they turned away; and, just as they were doing so, one of them said to the other:

“By the way, what was that picture about? Did you notice?” “No,” said the other. Now, while this illustrates the kind of interest which not only the painter, but the artist in any art—music, poetry, sculpture, or architecture—necessarily comes to have in the technic of his specialty, it does not illustrate all the interest which one should have who has a true conception of what art can do for people in general. It does not illustrate the sort of interest that Angelo, Raphael, and Murillo had in their productions. A musician or poet who should have no higher conception of the ends of art would produce nothing but jingle. In this the laws of rhythm and harmony can be fulfilled as perfectly as in the most inspired and sublime composition. Do I mean to say, therefore, that every artist, when composing, must consciously think of significance and also of form? Not necessarily. Many a child unconsciously gestures in a form exactly indicative of his meaning. But often, owing to acquired inflexibility or unnaturalness, the same person, when grown, unconsciously gestures in a form not indicative of his meaning. What then? If he wish to be an actor, he must study the art of gesture, and for a time, at least, must produce the right gestures consciously. And besides this, whether he produce them consciously or unconsciously, in the degree in which he is an artist in the best sense, he will know what form he is using, and why he is using it. The fact is that the human mind is incapable of taking in any form without being informed of something by it; and it is the business of intelligent, not to say honest, art to see to it that the information conveyed is not false, that the thing made corresponds

to the thing meant. Otherwise, we all know or ought to know the result. Who has not had experience of it? I have seen college dormitories meant to be comfortable and healthy, but so planned that not a ray of sunshine could get into more than half of their study rooms; libraries meant to read in, but with windows filled with stained glass that would injure the eyes of every one who attempted to read in them; auditoriums meant to see and hear in, yet crowded with stone pillars preventing large numbers from doing either, or filled with rectangular seats crowded together so that no one could even remain in the place with comfort. These were results of paying attention to form, and not to significance, or that for which the form is intended. Analogous effects are just as unfortunate in painting. I have been in court-rooms, supposed to be decorated for the purpose—for this is all that decoration of the kind is worth—of producing upon those entering them an impression of justice; but the only possible impression that could be produced was that the halls were to be devoted to perpetual investigations into the mysteries of orgies not conducted according to the conventions of Puritanic propriety:—women who ought to have been in a warmer place, and whom it was impossible to conceive of as winged creatures, doomed to eternal roosting upon the cornice against the domed ceiling. And what inspiration there might have been for the common people, accustomed to gather there, had the walls been filled with representations of great acts of justice and humanity with which the pages of history of almost every age and country are crowded! Granted that some paintings like

this are flamboyantly panoramic. A great painter can make them something else; and historic paintings in themselves are as legitimate as historic dramas. Granted that the literary tendency in painting is sometimes misleading, tho not so misleading as the deductions which artists and critics without ability to think have drawn from the fact. The paintings of which I speak now need not be literary in any sense that makes them inartistic. Indeed, a very important element in the suggestion made, that which allies it to what has just been said of architecture, is the fact that every elementary line or color before as well as after being combined into the general effect of a picture has in nature, owing to its predominating uses and associations, a meaning appropriate to itself; and an artist who does not recognize that this is the case, no matter how well he understands the science of line and color, fails. "What kind of a painter is he?" I asked the other day of an artist-friend, mentioning at the same time the name of one of whom all of us probably know. "Why," replied the artist, "he is what I call a vulgar painter." "Are you getting ethical in your tastes?" I said. "Not that," he answered, "but don't you remember that picture of a little girl by Sargent in the National Academy Exhibition last year? You couldn't glance at it, in the most superficial way, without recognizing at once that it was a child of high-toned, probably intellectual, spiritually-minded, aristocratic parentage and surroundings. Now, if this man had painted that child, he could not have kept from making her look like a coarse-haired, hide-skinned peasant." It is easy to perceive that,

if this criticism were justifiable—and the one, at least, who made it must have thought that it was—the fault would lie back of any scientific knowledge of color or any technical facility in the use of it. It would lie in the fact that the artist had never learned that the round, ruddy form of the vital temperament that blossoms amid the breeze and sunshine of the open field has a very different significance from the more complex and delicate curves and colors that appear where the nervous temperament is trained up behind the sheltering window-panes of the study. An artist who believes in significance merely enough to recognize the necessity of representing it in some way can, with a very few thrusts of his knife, to say nothing of his brush, at one and the same time relieve the inflammation of chapped cheeks, and inject into the veins some of the blue blood of aristocracy.

As intimated a moment ago, those who claim that the highest quality of art can be produced without regard to significance are conceiving of art as if it involved exclusively that which is in the domain of science. Yes, it may be answered; but are not those who insist upon the requirement of significance, especially significance of an elevated character, conceiving of art as involving that which is in the domain of religion? Certainly they are, yet not as involving this exclusively. Art includes something that pertains to the domain of science, and also something that pertains to the domain of religion. When an artist depicts nature just as it is, if there be any such thing as natural religion, he produces upon the mind something of the effect of natural religion. If he depict human-

ity, he produces—if there be any such thing—something of the sympathetic effect of social religion. And in both cases he adds to the effect the influence which each has had upon his own character, and produces, if he have any, something of the effect of personal religion. Art combines the influences of God in nature, God in humanity, and God in the individual. It makes an appeal that is natural, sympathetic, and personal; but it does all this in a way that seems divine, because the factors of representation are reproductions of the divine handiwork. As applied to literature, for instance, it is a fact that, when spiritual discernment and brotherly charity that judge by faith that is deeper than creeds, and by motives that lie nearer to the heart than actions, fulfil their missions of guidance and enlightenment for their age, the very same ideas which, if stated in plain prose, would send their writers to ostracism or the stake, are accepted and approved, if, through the suggestive methods of art, they are represented in what may be called the divine terms of nature. What would have become of Dante, in his age, if he had proclaimed that a pope could be kept in hell or a pagan welcomed in Paradise? Yet, when he pictured both conditions in his great poem, how many persecuted him merely because of that? We may apply the same principle to any form of literary art. It is less the influence of the pulpit than of the novel that in our own land, within the memory of some still living, has not only freed the slave and unfrocked the aristocrat, but has snatched the standards of sectarianism from the hands of hypocrites and bigots, and restored for all the Church the one

standard of Constantine, and that one not held up by the hands of man, but flaming in the sky. So with the other arts. Even in the rhythm and harmony of music, tho representing laws almost too subtle for our comprehension, there is something that tends to make throb in unison not only every pulse, but every protoplasmic fiber whose deep roots are in the soul. Under the pediment of the temple, the arches of the cathedral, the dome of the mosque, always, too, in the degree in which these are great works of art, the predominating impression is that of the universal fatherhood of God, which all alike represent. Nor is there a statue or a painting which depicts natural life, especially human life, as we are accustomed in our own day to see it—yet notice that this argument could not apply, even remotely, to anything approaching deformity or vulgarity—but every curve or color in it seems to frame at times the soul of one to be loved, not by another, but by ourselves; and, so far as Providence sends spiritual development through imparting a sense of sympathy with friend, brother, sister, father, mother, wife, or child, there, in the presence of art, that development for a while is experienced.

In fact, in every department of art, if only our powers of apprehension were sufficiently subtle, such influences might be perceived in the aspects of great natural forces streaming up from the surface of the globe through the senses of those inhabiting it, and radiating into a spiritual halo stretching starward above every realm and age that the world whirls into sight, as it goes spinning onward.

But enough. The conception suggesting this

paper has been sufficiently unfolded, if it have been made clear in what sense it is true that esthetic studies, among which one may include anything that has to do with elocution, poetry, music, drawing, painting, modeling, building, or furnishing, whether we consider their influence upon the artist or upon the patron of art, are needed, in order to connect and complete the results of education as developed through science alone or through religion alone. These studies can do for our minds what science cannot, crowning its work with the halo of imagination and lighting its path to discovery. They can do for us what religion cannot, grounding its conceptions upon accuracy of observation and keeping them true to facts. Art unites the separated intellectual influence of the two other spheres. It can not only hold the mirror up to nature, but it can make all nature a mirror, and hold it up to the heavens. In times of intellectual and spiritual storm and stress, when night is above and waves below and winds behind and breakers ahead, the voice of art can sometimes speak peace to conflicting elements, and bring a great calm; and then, in the blue at our feet, we can see not only a little of the beauty of a little of the surface of the little star in which we live, but something also of the grandeur of all the stars of all the universe.

ART AND MORALS *

The human mind is a unity, and all its tendencies act conjointly. When we ascribe one expression in thought or deed to good judgment, a second to strong imagination, and a third to shrewd self-interest, we seldom mean to attribute it to any one of the three exclusively; but only mainly. We know that the most logical argument is colored, more or less, by the arguer's temperament and intention; that the most enthusiastic speculation is not entirely free from suggestions of both conviction and purpose; and that the most exacting demand has in it not a little of both calculation and feeling. It is the same with the departments of outward activity through which one mind endeavors to influence other minds. Theoretically, our various definitions can separate philosophy, science and religion; but, when we come to examine any one system of either, we recognize that all are connected. The quality of a man's philosophic conceptions depends as much on what has been his knowledge and experience in the spheres of science and religion, as does the quality of waters in a lake on what has been that of the springs from which they flow. The same analogy holds good with reference to his scientific and religious conceptions. For this

* Enlarged from parts of an address prepared by request for the first regular meeting of the National Society of the Fine Arts at Washington, D. C., in November, 1905.

reason, the more knowledge and experience that a man has had in all three of these spheres, the more accurate and comprehensive—in short the greater—will be his achievements in the one sphere to which he mainly devotes his attention.

It is this principle that should be applied when considering the connection between art and morality. There is no doubt that the two differ. Art is one thing, and morality is another thing. A statue, a picture, a drama, or a dance, may be immoral in its influence, and yet artistic. But, in this case, it is seldom artistic in every one of its features. If it were, people would not speak of it, as some invariably do, when referring to products of this character, as “lacking in good taste.” Art, as a pleasurable result, may appeal in a pleasurable way to a man’s whole nature; and nothing can do this that, in any degree, shocks and repels him because recognizing it to have an impure and harmful influence upon thought, feeling or conduct. In this fact, indeed, lies the difference in effect between what men consider the partly artistic and what they term the completely beautiful. The artistic may result from any isolated proof of craftsmanship. Not so with the beautiful. It is general in its effects, and these transcend those of the craftsman. The light that it possesses is like that of a halo. It illumines everything of which it forms a part, its influence on the mind extending to the whole mental environment, giving suggestions to imagination, stimulus to aspiration, and filling every allied department and recess of energy with that subtle force which men attribute to inspiration. It is merely in accordance with a law of nature, therefore, that, as a fact,

all such statues, pictures, poems, buildings of past ages as are universally considered to be great conform to the laws of ethics almost as fully as to the laws of esthetics,—in other words, that one test of greatness in art has always been its influence upon morals. Why should this not have been the case? It is a test universally applied to everything else of a kindred nature, whether social, political or philosophical. Besides this, it is natural to suppose that the effects upon one another of two departments of activity should be reciprocal; and everybody acknowledges that, as a rule, the quality of morality is improved by that which comes from art. We respect a moral man who is a boor; but when there is enough of esthetics in him to make him also a gentleman, we admire him, and strive to imitate him. We tolerate earnest reformers who, in rowdy mobs boisterously insult all who differ from them; but most of us connect ourselves with such leaders only as do their work “decently and in order,” in places where they have more or less of refinement in their surroundings. Why cannot this rule be reversed, and art be bettered by its moral quality?

To answer this question in the affirmative does not necessitate our holding that art can accomplish all its ends by being moral, or that morality can accomplish all its ends by being artistic. But it does necessitate recognizing that both, in accomplishing their highest end, can and should cooperate; and that, when they do this, both exert important and salutary effects upon one another. It may seem strange that any should doubt that this latter is the case. Nevertheless, many have not

only doubted it, but argued strenuously that it is not the case. For instance, it has been seriously maintained by certain writers that the development of art in a nation is contemporaneous with its intellectual and political, but especially with its social and moral, decline. At first thought, too, this theory has seemed well founded. Tho not true of poetry, the fine arts never reveal their full possibilities in any land, until many individuals have come to have sufficient wealth and leisure to enable them to become patrons or producers of that which is ornamental as well as useful. Nor does decline come to a nation until exactly the same conditions of wealth and leisure have caused many to care more for luxury than for right living. There is, therefore, a certain connection between artistic development and national decline.

The connection, however, is not that of cause and effect, but merely of coincidence. Indeed, considered in this light only, a more careful study of history will reveal that the connection is by no means as close or inevitable as is sometimes represented. As a fact, centuries elapsed between the age of Pericles and the intellectual and political decline of ancient Greece. Rome survived by almost as long a time her most flourishing period of architecture and sculpture. Other agencies than those of art could be shown to underlie the partial decline of Italy and Spain between the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Centuries; and there is no indisputable proof of any deterioration whatever in any of the other nations of Europe as a consequence of their artistic activity during the last three centuries.

But besides the teachings of history those of ex-

perience are sometimes invoked in order to bear witness against the ethical influence of art. Arguments thus presented usually seem to owe their force to the fact that art has many unintelligent advocates and adherents. Like other things, it needs sometimes to be saved from its friends. For instance, there was the lady from Chicago, who, some years ago, undertook to initiate me into the secrets of art-appreciation. Expressing, what was, apparently, her whole conception of the subject, and of its requirements, she assured me that she and her daughters had discovered none of this appreciation in themselves until they had traveled in Europe. "After that," she said, "we became accustomed, you know, to seeing things without drapery." I asked her if she were aware that the Japanese as a people were probably the most appreciative of art of any in the world. She said that she had heard so. Then I asked her if she had also heard that the kind of effects of which she was speaking were practically unknown to the higher art of Japan; and having performed that primal duty of every one, where he finds a superstition floating around—to fling at it the weightiest element of doubt that comes handy—I left her. It is no one's business, in this world, to pound away with arguments until he has exhausted his own breath, or benumbed the brain of the one who differs from him. It is his business to testify to the truth; and then to have faith enough in it and in God to leave it to do its own perfect work. The Japanese have so high a conception of the distinctively intellectual and spiritual missions of art, that, as if by mutual agreement, they eliminate from

such spheres of representation as are intended to have high rank anything not supposed to be distinctively suggestive of this mission,—even tho the customs of their country—differing in this regard from those of our own—would often seem to justify a contrary course.

These facts ought not to be without their lessons for us. There is at least one country in which the esthetic and the ethic coincide. Products in our country in which, according to the judgment of people of good taste, they do not coincide—whether novels, plays, statues or paintings—could be shown—most of them at least, and possibly all of them—to be as inartistic as they are inappropriate. Consider only one aspect of the subject: plays and novels that make us spend hours with people such as we never meet, or meet only to avoid; and statues and pictures equally objectionable, do not represent for us real life as we know it, and cannot appeal, therefore, to our sympathies as art should. Or consider another aspect: there is the statue of Washington that for many years has been facing the east front of the National Capitol.* It represents the Father of his Country in heroic size, seated unclothed, save for a sheet thrown over the lower part of his body. The statue is not mentioned here because, in any sense, it can be considered immoral. It is too stupid for that. No one who knows the Devil has ever doubted his intelligence. But while not immoral, it is easy to see that the extreme nudity which is sometimes considered

* How much or how little this criticism contributed to the action which has followed I do not know. But since the address including it was delivered some one in authority has given the order which has removed the statue to the new National Museum.

ethically objectionable might be developed from the tendency which the statue manifests. The important fact to observe in connection with it is that, long before this tendency could become ethically objectionable, it would become esthetically so. The statue is not, as is all true art, a representation of nature. It is not a representation of life natural to a human being with the characteristics of Washington. No one ever saw him in the condition depicted, except, possibly, his valet. The whole conception is an imitation, and an affected imitation, conceived by a mind that has been brought into contact with the form but not with the spirit of classic sculpture. Take again a coat-of-arms prepared, some years ago, to be carved in stone and placed in the façade of the University Club of New York City. The general conception of the one who planned this could scarcely be bettered,—an altar of friendship with a figure of a young man on either side of it. How, with such a conception, any person of artistic instincts could have failed in determining the character that should have been given these figures, is inconceivable. Had he placed a student wearing an academic mortar-board and gown on one side, and, on the other, a student garbed in the most picturesque of our athletic suits, the future Chinaman, digging among the ruins of New York, forty generations hence, and finding the whole, might have been able from it to form a tolerably fair conception of the two main tendencies of our university life. But what did the artist do? He put a nude figure on either side wrapt about in places by what he may have meant for a toga, but which looked, and necessarily looked to those

not accustomed to togas, like a towel. Either toga or towel would have been appropriate in Roman art. Bathing in public was a feature of their form of civilization. But I know of few colleges in this country that have swimming-tanks. Even in these swimming is never the most prominent of the college exercises; and so far as most of us are aware, people in general never assemble to see the students make an exhibition of wiping themselves. Here, again, we can see, at the very beginning of what might become contrary to the principles of ethics, that we already have what is clearly contrary to those of esthetics.

How is it now with reference to literature, especially to that phase of it often considered, and always claiming to be, the most distinctively artistic,—the phase that it assumes in the drama? Is there any necessary connection between good morals and the theater? Certain facts, as well as certain theories held by critics of influence, would seem to indicate that there is not. Recall the number of severe criticisms that have appeared in recent periodicals directed against the injurious influence of some of our modern plays. Notice, too, a passage like the following from the February number for 1910 of “*Current Literature*.” The passage might be supposed to be ironical; but it is intended to be serious: “Our dramatic conscience,”(?) so it says, “is awakening. We are no longer satisfied with the vulgar sentimental dramatic pabulum of our fathers. We demand life”—by which is meant, as will be shown before this quotation is ended, a form of life with which not one in a hundred, possibly not in five hundred, ever comes in contact—

“and we get it. The grip of the American playwright on the larger ”(?) “ problems of our existence and on all existence, is tightening. Three recent plays by Americans afford proof that the American public appreciates genius divorced from convention,” *i. e.* from the purity of it,—a poor reason for commending a divorce from anything! “Not even continental critics would dare to call these plays conventional or prudish. Illicit love relations are intrepidly revealed by the authors. Fitch introduces the note of incest; rape stalks through Sheldon’s remarkable play; and Belasco presents himself as an advocate of free-love. . . . Not many years ago these subjects were tabooed; but it seems that, of late, the social ”—by which is apparently meant the morbid—“curiosity of America has been stirred. The dramatist, quick to perceive the change in the popular temper, seizes the opportunity of the moment. ‘The dawn of the new social drama in America,’ exclaims William Marley in the ‘Twentieth Century,’ ‘has already passed; it is morning here; the day of its fulfilment has begun.’ ” This quotation indicates a conception of art that involves indifference to the requirements of morality if not opposition to them.

But is such a conception justified? Before attempting to answer this question, the author looked over a number of communications to a newspaper that had solicited them in which various writers had express their opinions concerning what may or may not be supposed to be immoral in dramatic representation; and he found that what had seemed to be true of the writer of this quotation seemed to be true as well of all the writers of

these communications; namely, that, so far as they manifested indifference to the requirements of morality, they manifested also more or less ignorance with reference to the requirements of art. Invariably these writers seemed to imagine that they had compassed the whole field of artistic requirement when they had applied, in order to determine what in art is admissible, one or both of two criterions. The first was that the product should be true to life; and the second that it should point a moral, meaning, of course, a good moral. It hardly seems necessary to argue that both criterions, accurate so far as they go, are inadequate as applied to all the conditions. Of course the word *art* may be broadly ascribed to anything that is made, especially by way of imitation; and, therefore, the term artistic may properly designate any product of this kind. But the word has also a more limited meaning,—the meaning that we all recognize when found in the terms *the fine arts*, or *les beaux arts*. When this is its meaning, the objects that art imitates must be, predominantly at least—as already intimated on page 71—beautiful and the product itself must introduce ugliness, or its concomitant, impurity, only subordinately; by way, so to speak, of contrast, by way of shading that offsets brightness. A good deal that is true to life is not true to the beautiful in life; and, therefore, contrary to the opinion of these writers, is philosophically out of place in the highest art. Of course, this principle, if applied, would rule out of the highest rank a number of our modern plays—some of those by Ibsen, Sudermann, Hauptmann, and d'Annunzio. If so, they ought to be ruled out. The principle is one that

no one who thinks correctly can fail to accept; and, as proved by the survival of interest in Greek art, it is the only principle that all people, at all times, can be expected to accept. As for the other criterion, namely, that art should point a moral, this, too, is accurate so far as it goes; and yet art, imitative art, must do more than point a moral. Its nature is that of representation, not reasoning; it presents a picture to be perceived, not a problem to be solved; and the representation, the picture, not the reasoning or the solution, is that in it which is of supreme importance.

To indicate the practical bearings of these distinctions, one of the correspondents of these newspapers justifies a certain play on the ground that it is a truthful representation of what takes place in Paris at night. It is easy enough to perceive that this ground would justify very much more than, probably, even he—or she, I believe it was—would think it proper to represent. Another writer justifies any amount of indecent portrayal, in case the agent of it comes, at last, to grief, so to speak; and, through doing this, points a moral. If we apply either of these conceptions to real life, and ask what would be the result of one's actually hearing or seeing the sort of things that such arguments are supposed to justify, we shall find exactly what may be expected to be the result when the same are imitated on the stage; for, during the time of a theatrical performance the stage represents real life. Every thoughtful mind will accept the statement that not one of us would want his boys or girls to hear or to see what is taking place by night in the worst parts of Paris, merely, forsooth, because

such things, as an actual fact, do take place. Nor do we think it safe for them to become familiar with the words and actions of drunkards, gamblers, or prostitutes merely because the same streets on which these are found are filled with older persons of the same sort who can teach an unmistakable moral because revealing through their own conditions the ruinous results in later life of their form of dissipation. The fact is that such results, tho clearly perceived, frequently produce little or no beneficial effect. They do not deter people who actually have bad associates from following bad examples. This is so because it is a law of our nature—and all that we know about the communication of forms of morals or of religion proves absolutely that it is a law of our nature—that the sayings and scenes by which we are surrounded produce a much greater effect upon our conduct than do any deductions with reference to them that we may draw in our own minds. This is the principle that a thinker is obliged to apply to theatric performances. It is the language, the picture of life—in short, the *play* that is the thing of chief importance—this wholly irrespective of any possible moral that thinking can draw from it. One cannot refrain from adding, too, that much of this talk about a moral is the flimsiest sort of cant—a mere subterfuge to excuse indecent portrayals which it is supposed—mistakenly, let us hope—will draw a large audience of the purulently curious. As a fact, few indecent plays point an important or even a true moral. They often fail to do this, even when to do so would involve merely that fidelity to nature of which their advocates hypocritically boast.

For instance, one play, greatly praised during this last season, presents among its characters a prostitute who, after six or more years in her profession, appears more hilarious and successful than ever. In real life, she would have become either degraded in position, or hardened in disposition,—probably both. Another play pictures a kind of debased life which, tho meeting with partial failure, by no means seems to close the door of opportunity; and the lesson quite likely to be inculcated is that, on the whole, it may be a safe sort of life to try. Still another play shows us a reformer who spends fifteen minutes—and this apparently is the scene for which the whole play was written, and is acted—in trying to seduce the wife of a man whom he is anxious to influence for good, after which he goes forth and immediately meets with a heroic death.

All this merely proves, some one may think, that the influence of this form of art is debasing; and that the way to put an end to the influence is to put an end to the art. The trouble with such a conclusion—and it is a trouble common to most conclusions that uphold extreme prohibition of any kind—is that life is something to which the conditions of logic can seldom be rigidly applied. The results of logic are reached by tracing thought to some single indisputable premiss. The results of life are traceable to a large variety of conditions, not one of which can be premised to be acting singly, even if indisputably. Accordingly, as applied to action, a line of thought that seems to lead to a certain conclusion may not be that which forms a legitimate sequence for all the facts. In the conclusion just mentioned, the action suggested is not possible of

practical accomplishment. Like marriage and religion, dramatic art is one of those human activities to which, as things are, no one can put an end; and, at certain periods—as, for instance, at the time of the morality plays—its influence has been just the contrary of debasing. What is needed is an endeavor not to abolish but to correct; and, so far as the nature of art has been misunderstood, a first step in doing this must be taken by giving people more accurate conceptions with reference to what art really requires. Making men intelligent does not always make them moral; but, at times, it goes a long way in this direction. There are, to-day, many unintelligent critics, authors and managers who believe that beauty of effect, and a consciousness of exalting associations with saneness, gentleness, purity, integrity, ideality, renunciation, self-sacrifice, and inspirational devotion to lofty aims, as depicted on the stage, have nothing to do with art or artistic success. Such people need enlightenment. A few months since, page after page in the London newspapers, contained accounts of a parliamentary investigation undertaken to determine whether or not a government-censorship of plays—exercised by an official who for years has been charged with the duty of reading and licensing new dramas—should be continued. Without exception, it is said, the managers of the London theaters declared in favor of continuing it. One of their expressed reasons for doing this, was that, because of not having such censorship, the theaters of the continent—especially of France—had so degenerated that they were no longer attended by the self-respecting upper middle classes who, in all countries,

naturally furnish the theater's chief patrons. The managers thus gave expression to a conviction that, in the long run, pure plays and playhouses in which such plays only are produced are the most likely to be successful. Quite a number of their profession in our own country seem to have arrived at a similar conclusion. One of whom I know has, for several seasons, been conducting with such strict propriety a theater situated where for years it was unsuccessful that it is now crowded to the doors every evening. Really, this is only what might be expected. The majority of people want innocent amusement,—for their families, if not for themselves. After a play has been heard, all the harm, whatever it may be, has been done. The sole assurance that they can get the sort of a performance that they want, must be furnished by what they know of the character and taste of the manager. If he be a man who seems to them to be willing to use the people's legitimate desire for recreation in order to debase and degrade them, they will, very soon, come to consider him a man who has a right to attract the world's attention only so far as it has been taught to despise and repudiate him. Nor will it make any practical difference to them whether, in coming to this conclusion, they consider him in the light merely of an off-scouring of the slums, too coarse-grained and gross in his nature to be able to distinguish between the beautiful and the beastly, or in the light of the villain of the bar-room who intentionally pours what he knows to be poison into a glass for which an exhausted fellow-being has paid, supposing that it will afford him needed stimulus. In both cases, the

practical effect of his action will be the same. So, too, ought to be the practical remedy that is applied to him. Greater intelligence with reference to the requirements of art would give the man of the one character the greater culture and refinement that he needs, and also the man of the other character the greater caution and discretion. Wherever there is anything human there, too, exists the possibility of immorality. Art is intensely human. But just as the best type of humanity is distinctly moral: so it is with the best type of art. To this rule, dramatic art furnishes no exception. Nor, for a similar reason, does that of the romance or the novel.

Are there any ethical relations of architecture: and if so, are moral principles exemplified in it? Both questions can be answered in the affirmative. Consider, for instance, the modern skyscraper,—the apartment house, hotel, or office building containing twenty or thirty stories. Sociologists point out how objectionable it is morally, as used in residence districts, either for irrepressible children who need more companions out of doors, or for disaffected parents who need fewer of them indoors; and how objectionable physically, as used in business districts, because depriving thousands of sunlight and fresh air, and increasing the nervous strain of life by crowding streets and streetcars, and adding to the labors of business, the greater labor of trying to get in safety, comfort, and health, despite lungs almost suffocated, to and from one's home. But, long before the sociologist had thought of these results, the artist had realized the beauty of a uniform skyline, as in the streets of Paris and

the Court of Honor at the Chicago Exposition; and had recognized as well the inexcusable lessening in value, because of depreciation in effectiveness, of every building that another adjoining it is allowed to overtop. So one might go on and give to the principle thus illustrated almost universal applicability.

Ethics has its source in conscience, and applies mainly to conduct; and esthetics has its source in feeling, and applies mainly to sentiment. But not only in art;—in every relationship of life, even in individual character, both should be operative, and, when this is the case, they usually operate so as to produce the same result. If either be lacking I am not sure which, by being absent—at least so far as concerns external expression—causes the greater loss to character. I am not sure, for instance, which would best restrain an inexperienced and innocent mind from gross forms of self-indulgence,—a strong conscience or refined feeling, and so through the whole gamut of moral possibilities. I am not sure that a man, whose poverty of adjectives causes him to try invariably with a single and the same syllable to dam the current of every influence opposing his own whims and wishes, is not even more vulgar than he is vicious. So with other evil tendencies. It is said that in Japan good taste alone keeps the rich from seeming to humiliate their poorer neighbors by superfluous ostentation; and that to some such feeling must be attributed also that social movement—almost impossible to conceive of as taking place in London or in New York—which, twenty-five years ago, caused one class of the Japanese aristocracy to surrender voluntarily for the good of their country, their posi-

tion, prerogatives and privileges,—one of which was the sole right to carry weapons.

There is considerable justification, indeed, for those who argue that art has not only a moral, but a distinctively religious influence.* This can be acknowledged without one's conceding that art and religion are, in any sense, the same, or have the same aims. There is no gain to an intelligent view of life in supposing this. The one who does so, and talks about art as his religion, is apt to convey the impression that he is governed by sentiment if not by sentimentality, which two respectively, sentiment and sentimentality, seem to represent the comparative and superlative degrees in which thought in this world is removed from sense. At least, if not misformed, such a man might be said to be misinformed. There is one fundamental difference between a religious and an artistic effect, which all recognize subconsciously, and, therefore, ought to acknowledge consciously. Religious effects are seldom produced by manifestations clearly recognized to be copies or imitations of mere external forms. A Christian man through his conduct, and a church through its service, may represent the Christian life, but the moment that the representative element in either is emphasized, the moment that it is brought to our attention that re-

*In the old, and by no means beautiful chapel at Princeton, the faculty were never able to repress entirely certain irreverent forms of disturbance,—like keeping step with a Freshman when he walked to his seat. When the time came to move into the new Marquand Chapel, some one suggested, in a meeting of the faculty, that the students be particularly requested and warned not to continue these practices. After discussion, however, it was decided to postpone action until something had been done to necessitate it. Nothing ever did necessitate it. Every tendency to disorder was, apparently, completely suppressed by a mere change to a more esthetic environment.

ligious actions, attitudes or facial and vocal expressions are assumed for the purpose of representing, they suggest to us a Pharisee, if not a hypocrite. With art it is the opposite. Its object is to represent: and the actor upon the stage, or the imitator of real life, as delineated in the drama or the novel, or depicted in the picture or the statue, awakens our approval in the exact degree of the unmistakably representative character of his performance.

Let it not be supposed, however, that, because art emphasizes representation, it is, for this reason, to be disesteemed. In doing what it does, it is merely continuing to exert, in a way uniquely adapted to human understanding, the same kind of influence that is exerted upon thought by every sight and sound of external nature. The novel, the drama, the painting, the statue all report, with more or less interpretative additions, that which keen observers have been able to perceive, and to reproduce. The legitimate effect of their work is to enlarge the experience of others who have not had the same opportunity, or the same ability to avail themselves of it, that they themselves have had. Whoever enlarges another's experience imparts not only information, but, with it, something of that wisdom which expresses itself in intelligent action. Of course much depends, as has already been intimated, upon the artist through whose mediumship the wider experience has been imparted. He is like a showman who may throw upon a screen whatever sort of picture he may select. At the same time, in making his selection, he can scarcely fail to be influenced by another fact. It is this,—that only in the degree in which men conceive that

his thought when assuming form in art is in harmony with thought when assuming form in nature, do they conceive him to be influenced by the spirit in nature to such an extent as to term him inspired. Is there any great artist who does not wish to have his work considered to be of this character? Or, if an artist be not great, does he not try, at least, to imitate those who are so, and prefer to be considered of their class? If both these questions can be answered in the affirmative, then it must be true that, practically, in the majority of cases, the forces that are working in nature, as most of us believe, for the enlightenment and uplifting of man will continue to be influential in directing toward the same ends the developments of art.

THE ARTISTIC *VERSUS* THE SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTION IN EDUCATIONAL METHODS *

“ The primal duties shine aloft like stars,”

says Wordsworth. The same may be said of the primal principles of education. But sunlight by day as well as clouds by night may keep the stars from being visible; and some of that which is important in education may be obscured in enlightened as well as in dark ages. Breadth of outlook does not always insure a sharp lookout. Many a man stumbles because he fails to feel the need of keeping his eyes upon the pathway. To keep them upon this, when moving forward with others, is absolutely imperative in only the leader. Those behind him may advance satisfactorily to themselves by merely following his motions, tho, occasionally, from their point of view, taking that which to him is hindermost for the foremost, that which to him is incidental for the essential. Another element also enters into the result. Whatever is primary in any subject should usually be perceptible to all. Why need the leader in thought point it out? Why need he bid men consider anything except his own contribution? But while doing so, at the same time ignoring other considerations, he may consciously or unconsciously emphasize it too strongly, and thus,

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for those whom he influences, destroy the proportions of the whole of that to which he has sought to contribute. To this result some, at least, of the vast expenditure of thought on the part of our ablest educators—with no fault of their own, perhaps—seems to be tending. Many an ordinary modern teacher has become so preoccupied with the new, even when secondary, that he disregards and disesteems the old, even when primary.

Accordingly, when the thought occurs to one, as it will at times, that men like Plato and Æschylus, Virgil and Tacitus, Shakespeare and Bacon, Lessing and Goethe, and the public whom they entertained as well as instructed, were not, in all regards, more poorly educated than are the journalists and magazine-writers of the present century, and with them the constituency that supports them, the supposition may not be altogether unfounded. If not, if there ever were more common interest in a more thorough and profound treatment of subjects than is common at present, it must be because former methods of education trained to more thorough and profound methods of thinking. To suggest that this may be the case is to verge, of course, upon educational heresy. The heresy may become too rank for polite designation when it is added that the fact suggested may be true for the reason that modern education is founded too exclusively upon what those who have originated it are proud of terming scientific methods.

I am aware that the distinction which I am about to make between studies intended to impart information and to impart discipline has often been made before, and that my original contribution at this

point consists solely in the terms which I have chosen to use. Nevertheless, I have thought it wise to use them for two reasons: first, because I have noticed—mainly from what I know of theological controversy—that when a man, in an argument, begins to call names, he invariably calls attention to what he has to say. When he follows the advice of the devil in Faust, and begins to quarrel about words, the world, of which the devil is prince, begins to crowd around him. But, besides this, I have noticed, in the second place, that, when he begins thus to awaken attention, he sometimes causes a few—a very few, “the remnant,” as Matthew Arnold might say—to think about the name that he has used, and of his reason for using it.

What causes the difference in aim between one who devotes himself to science and one who devotes himself to art? This: the scientist must be an informer, the artist a performer. Science develops the powers of understanding and increases knowledge. Art develops the powers of expression or execution, and increases skill. In developing the powers of understanding, science expects a man to examine results, discriminate between those that differ, associate those that are alike, and assign to each class appropriate causes. While doing these things, and thus obtaining understanding, the processes involved are expected so to impress facts and principles upon his mind as to give him both knowledge and remembrance of them. This is the distinctively scientific method. It is undoubtedly, too, the natural method,—the method in accordance with which the primitive man began to learn; and some think that, therefore, it can and should be used in all

forms of education in our own day. They think that either a man or a child, when needing instruction, should be handed, if studying English or a foreign tongue, not an old-fashioned A-B-C Book, but a page of consecutive reading matter; if studying mathematics, not an old-fashioned addition table or multiplication table, but numerals arranged for computation; or, if studying law, not an old-fashioned Blackstone, but cases that have been actually argued and decided in court. They expect him to infer from these completed results—and, when inferred, expect him to remember—the principles of phonetics, linguistics, mathematics, or law. There is undoubted rationality underlying this method of study, especially as applied to mature minds. Such minds probably do retain best that which they understand as a result of their own inferences. But this method is not one that can be applied, except subordinately, to the immature minds of children; and this for two reasons—one founded on the nature of the child's mental actions, and the other on the nature of education. As concerns the child's mental actions, it is enough to say that neither induction nor anything resembling it is natural to a mind that has not at its command a comparatively large collection of facts. These the child does not possess. He therefore cannot practise the method successfully,—a fact which nature, if not man, seems to have recognized; for it has given him a kind of memory that does not require the assistance of explanation or association to the same extent that a man's memory does. The small child acquires, and uses what he acquires, as it were, automatically, precisely as we all learn the

notes of a song, which no mere explanation could enable us to do. After, as well as before acquiring, too, the child makes very little use of mere reasoning. From whatever is presented to thought, whether in accord with fact or not, his mind immediately proceeds, by way of romancing, to construct ideal forms for imagination and ideal standards for conduct. Only later, somewhere between the ages of twelve and twenty, does he naturally begin to use the scientific method. Even after he does so, too, it is extremely important for him to retain some results of the mental habits formed in early youth through the processes especially characterizing childhood—in other words, to continue to remember some things and to imagine others, irrespective of any action of the conscious understanding. Think how little of this action is involved in the mathematical calculations even of science, to say nothing of the most of that, perhaps, which tends to the development of poetry and religion. The latter, especially, must often embody in action the intuitive promptings of conscience wholly aside from reasons derived from any facts that can form a basis for induction. The time to train growth in a tree or a man is when the forces of life which one wishes to train are most active. If in childhood, at the period when memorizing by rote and jumping to imaginative and conscientious conclusions are natural to the mind, these tendencies, instead of being utilized, are checked in order to develop exclusively memory and other mental action by way, merely of association, explanation or understanding, what is to prevent the mind in manhood from being only half developed? One does

not like to make personal applications; but the cases are not few, either in the past or present, in which men educated by scientific parents or guardians have manifested to the end of their lives abnormal deficiencies in all the three directions just mentioned—that is, in rote memory, in imagination, and in intuition.

Now let us pass on to the second reason for doubting the wisdom of making too extensive use of these scientific methods in childhood—the reason founded upon the nature of education. I have just shown where education begins,—not as extreme advocates of the inferential system would have us believe, where the first man's began, but where the last man's—in this case the child's parent or teacher—left off. The child accepts and uses as general principles the arbitrary statements supplied by his elders. He uses the word Fourth of July long before for himself he has discovered it to be the fourth day of the seventh month. He refrains from crying and scratching and lying long before any inductive method has convinced him that these may possibly annoy or injure someone else. Hundreds of things are expected of him, and, when he is normally educated, must be required of him, before it is possible for him to understand them as explained. Moreover, even if he could understand them, his mere understanding of them could not insure his ability to execute them. In other words, to make the principle involved exactly applicable to the subject before us, to understand things, as is necessary in science, cannot, of itself, enable one to do things, as is necessary in art.

Granted that a pupil may be trained to read or

to cipher by being made to understand, he cannot be trained thus to read effectively—to use his voice as in acting or as in operatic singing, or to cipher well, as when trying to outcount a calculating machine. For these results he needs to acquire skill. Skill can be acquired only through practise; and this practise, like that of one learning to play on a musical instrument, always involves thought and labor expended, not upon completed results (see pages 92-3), but upon certain analyzed elements. The practise is needed, too, whether one is to obtain much skill, or only a little. No one can approach artistic proficiency in any branch involving action, without this attention to analyzed elements. He might, indeed, were education merely the imparting of information. But it is not. It includes the imparting of ability to use information.

In order to use information, the first requisite is to be able to recall it. I do not say to retain it, because, as a fact, probably nothing with which the mind comes in contact is ever lost. In cases of fright, fever, hypnotism, the most minute details of events perceived, and whole paragraphs of languages not understood nor even consciously overheard, are repeated with infinite accuracy. What is true of this information is that very little of it thus proved to be not lost can be held in remembrance so as to be recalled when needed. The ability to hold and recall it is largely physical, depending on the fineness, extent, and vigor of the convoluted surface of the brain-fiber—in other words, on the physical strength of the brain. This has been proved by both *post-mortem* and *ante-mortem* examinations. A child or an aged man, on

account merely of physical weakness, has difficulty in recalling words or arguments which in the strength of manhood requires no effort. Of course, the natural strength acquired by growth, can be increased through that acquired by training.

It is a trite thing to say—and, if one were not accommodating himself to the foolishness of others, it would be a foolish thing to deem it necessary to say—that the only way to train physical strength, inside the brain or outside of it, is through practice. The child learns his own or a foreign language by hearing it repeated, and by being himself made to repeat words and phrases. For repetition of this kind, childhood is distinctively the age, because it is the age of imitation. Of course, when introduced into schools, such repetition is tedious, but not necessarily so for the pupil, if the teacher have sufficient vitality and grace to mount the platform and beat time picturesquely. Then the whole performance, because rhythmical, may become, to the very youngest, as entertaining as a rehearsal in a kindergarten of either Mother Goose's or Mother Grundy's melodies. But what if such repetition be tedious for pupil as well as for teacher? Must there be absolutely no obstacles in the pathway of learning? Is the necessity for hard work in mounting upward and onward an excuse for sliding downward and backward? The truth is that some things must be learned by rote, and can be learned satisfactorily in childhood only. In the old-fashioned elementary schools of our country the addition table and multiplication table were repeated in unison by all the pupils at least once every day. There are thousands of children of the

present of whom such practise is never required; and their parents are told that the children need not learn these tables at all. Apparently many of them never do learn them. Why would it interfere with a reasonable alternation of what are termed scientific methods to continue to devote thirty or forty minutes a day to this kind of work; *i.e.*, to repeating—possibly by way of singing—not only these tables, but certain other rudiments of knowledge now ignored altogether, like the order of the letters of the alphabet, and their phonetic sounds when combined, and, later, in connection with maps upon the walls, geographic names, and, still later, paradigms and vocabularies of foreign languages?

Arithmetic and Cæsar's Commentaries are as interesting as puzzles to a child whose mind adds, subtracts, multiplies, declines, conjugates, and translates the forms conjugated automatically. If, because of never acquiring the ability to do this, more advanced studies seem to the pupil wholly uninteresting, this is less frequently because he is dull than because his teachers have failed to carry out certain first principles of the department to which they have devoted themselves. Of course, all teachers, even when most "advanced," do not ignore these principles. No common system can deprive every agent of it of common sense. But, if they were not ignored by some, we should not find—as we do to-day, and would not have done forty years ago—college students who cannot use a dictionary to advantage, because they have never learned automatically the order of the letters of the alphabet; who cannot pronounce a long word never seen before, because they have never learned automatically

the phonetic sounds of the combined letters; who, in Latin or Greek, because they cannot translate automatically the grammatical forms, fail utterly to recognize the delicate interchange of relations between word and word which used to be considered the chief advantage of studying the classics; and, worse still, when viewed practically, who, after passing through algebra and geometry, have too little arithmetic facility to become successful candidates for clerks in country shops, because they cannot add or multiply automatically, but, in making the simplest calculations, must count on their fingers. These are some of the results—by no means universal, but sufficient in number to indicate tendencies—of an endeavor, before minds are prepared for this form of culture exclusively, to cultivate powers of inference and of consequent invention. The endeavor is wise so far as the mother of invention is ignorance. But, possibly, in searching for educational methods, it might be equally wise for us to go to the other extreme. This is what is done in the Orient. The children there spend their entire time, apparently, in repeating aloud what they have to learn. But, owing to the powers of memorizing thus cultivated, the average Oriental, in early manhood, can probably learn five foreign languages while the average American of the same age is learning one of them.

What the Oriental has not learned to do is to *associate* as well as to recollect. A man who is to use to advantage that which has come to his eyes and ears needs to recollect it at the right times and places. That he may do this, that he may attend to many things and collect them together and do

both promptly, the pupil needs to be trained by questions necessitating unexpected connections between things that seem disconnected when learned by rote. I was once permitted to visit all the rooms in the Stuttgart Gymnasium, an institution which has a ten years' course attended by pupils between seven or ten and seventeen or twenty years of age. I found that no work was required outside of the recitation room, except now and then certain written exercises not expected to necessitate more than a half-hour's time. I found, moreover, that while in the recitation room the pupils were constantly under the fire of the teacher's dictating or questioning. The translating into Latin or Greek, for instance, was done not by placing a boy before a dictionary, but by telling the whole class the meaning of a new word, and having all, singly or in concert, repeat, declaim, or conjugate it sufficiently to fix it in memory. This method, pursued too exclusively, fails, perhaps, to cultivate mental independence. At any rate, the German university student seems to be deficient in this. But, so far as concerns the effect of the method upon mere learning, is it any wonder that pupils so instructed are prepared, after reaching the university, to understand page after page of quotations in Latin when merely read to them? Few American students, if questioned as to the meanings of such quotations, would not feel constrained to explain to their German associates that in our country we pronounce Latin according to a different method. How, forsooth, could we understand what was read? Dr. Mark Hopkins, of Williams College, until he was more than seventy years of age, was accus-

tomed to meet his Senior classes nine times a week, and every exercise during the year, with exception of twelve in which he delivered lectures, was devoted to questioning; *i.e.*, to making the students recall, with right associations, facts and principles which they already knew, and in such an order as of themselves to build up the philosophic theory that he wished to impress upon them. Of late years there seems to have been less and less of this kind of instruction in our country, owing largely, too, to the influence of teachers who have studied in German universities, and apparently know nothing of the kind of instruction given in German preparatory schools. In a professional school, which the German university is—a school preceded by very severe drill in a preparatory institution—a school in which the amount learned is to determine the amount to be earned; is to determine very often the life position to be assigned by the government as a result of the university examination—a method of teaching in which lectures without other instruction are given may work successfully. But in the race for a diploma which characterizes the American university, in which students in curriculum as well as in athletics are prone to facilitate themselves upon their dexterity in stripping off every non-essential encumbrance, the method sometimes fails to work. Frequently the only thing that does work, and this does not work hard, is the recollective faculty while memorizing a printed syllabus for a few hours immediately preceding a term examination. This memorizing represents the exact amount of practical training that the study of mental philosophy, for instance, has given one. The

study has developed in only the slightest conceivable way the ability of the pupil to analyze appearances, to associate ideas, or to draw conclusions. Practically, as applied to this branch, the difference intended to be indicated by the diploma granted to one who has gone through a university course and to one who has listened to a course of university lectures has been obliterated. It is a question whether boards of trustees in all undergraduate institutions should not require in all branches some instruction in addition to that imparted through lectures. Unless these latter be followed by the questioning of a recitation exercise, there is no guarantee that the student will understand them, and almost a certainty that he will not remember them or be able to apply their principles.

This thought suggests another element of education. The student needs to be trained not only to *recollect* and *associate*, but also to *apply* his information. In this regard one would naturally suppose that scientific methods—at least in America—would prove satisfactory. And, as a fact, our teachers are too practical not to make their education practical to some extent. At the same time, ciphering, translating with dictionary in hand, working in laboratories, and composing sentences, paragraphs, metaphors, similes, and analyzing themes, is not done to a sufficient extent under the eye of the instructor, which is the only certain way of securing original work. In important directions, too, there is a tendency to teach very practical branches theoretically. For instance, the requirements in English for entrance into our colleges and universities—requirements recommended by

committees of instructors, and now almost universally adopted—necessitate mainly the reading of certain whole novels or poems of high character. No one can object to accustoming the young to pure English as used in such works; but he can object to the proportion of time allotted to their perusal. He can argue, too, that there is no such knowledge of style acquired through reading them as compensates for a neglect of training of a more strenuous character. In reading a long novel, for instance, not even a mature mind, and still less an immature one, notices style after becoming interested in the story for its own sake; *i.e.*, after passing beyond the earlier chapters. To understand style, too, involves discrimination. No one kind of it can be appreciated except as it is compared and contrasted with other kinds.* It can be best studied, therefore, in books containing collections of short stories or essays. Moreover, even as studied in

* First, there is needed here a professor who will teach what is not now taught in English. You will notice that there is no course required of all students in the general history of our literature. Such a course, showing the influences of different periods and products and the connections between them, is to the understanding of literature very much what a scaffolding is to a building. The young need, as much as anything else, a framework into which they can place, and by so doing can relate and harmonize, their information with reference to particulars. To obtain these general conceptions, these broad outlines of knowledge, which accurate study can subsequently fill in,—this is one of the main objects of what we term liberal education; nor are many things more futile than trying to do no more than particularize with reference to subjects that cannot be understood at all except as they are recognized to be parts of a whole. Besides this the same professor, or someone else, should have required courses, in connection with a study of argumentation, logic, the laws of evidence, or some similar branch, in which all the students,—not merely some, as at present—may be trained how to analyze themes and to formulate thought—may be trained if possible, according to a method analogous to that pursued by Mark Hopkins. The right man could probably be found by searching for the bright-

these books, style has little practical effect in training one's own methods, except when the phraseology is either committed to memory, as were passages of the Bible by Bunyan and the many old English writers whose methods of composition this book influenced, or else when intentionally imitated, as in the training given themselves by Stevenson

est young instructor, the one most skilled in questioning, most successful in cross-examining in some law school.

Second, there is needed here a professor who is an expert—and this word should be emphasized—an expert in voice-building and gesture, as well as able to teach other things that pertain to the delivery and composition of orations. Some work with him should be required, too, to the end of the course. I say this because to omit these branches, or to make them in the last two years, as is now done, entirely elective, deprives the student of a most effective stimulus to effort in these directions. In the degree in which he realizes that these last years will reveal, in some way, to his class or to the College, the results of his training, he will take care to make the results what they should be. The requirements that are to come will act like a dam upon a river and lift the whole current of College sentiment and endeavor to a higher level.

Why do sentiment and endeavor in these branches—the only ones in the College offering direct training in the presentation of thought—need to be lifted to a higher level? Not merely to fit young men for usefulness in the special work required of public writers or speakers, but to complete their general education. If a man be hypnotized or thrown into a fever, it is found that, apparently, he has forgotten nothing that he had ever heard or experienced. Many things have not been made available to him in his normal state merely because he has not been able to recall and use them at the right times and places. A very important part of education is to correct these forms of disability; and the branches which I have been discussing, are those which, in all ages, have been recognized as the ones most effective in doing this. It may be well, too, to remind the Alumni that even the department of English devoted to vocal culture has to do with more than merely giving the strenuous but too often uncultured country lad who comes to college the accent and bearing of refinement, desirable as would be this result alone. It is a theory of one of the Oriental cults that to make a man spiritual—in the sense of having an imaginative and inventive mind—you must first teach him how to breathe, because spirit and air—or breath—are one and the same. This explanation is not scientific, but the effort to represent it as such will not appear wholly absurd when we recall men like Beecher, Phillips, Guthrie and Spurgeon, who, according to their own accounts, began their careers by learning how

and Henry Clay. Admirable, therefore, as are in some regards these English requirements, one feels obliged to say that often the time required for reading and learning facts really immaterial with reference to characters and transactions in the prescribed literary works leaves little opportunity for the kind of study of style which is most practically beneficial.

to breathe, and only subsequently developed their imaginative and inventive powers, until the results became, as Beecher expresses it, "as easy as to breathe." The truth seems to be that when one habitually clarifies the blood in every cell of his lungs—and about every man that I have ever known needs to learn how to do this—he does the same with the blood in every cell of his brain. This makes all of the brain active. If you could make it all sufficiently active you would have genius. Every man would be a genius, if only he could combine the fever-like glow which sets imagination on fire with the healthful steadiness of pulse which keeps the reason cool.

The kind of instruction that I have indicated is not now given—I sometimes fear that it cannot be given—in large Universities. They contain too many students to render possible the oversight required; they teach too many branches crowding upon one another to allow the time required; and, above all, so many among their faculties and trustees consider the work of education ended when *information* has been imparted, that it is practically impossible to make them recognize the necessity at this stage of the student's progress, for that which may be specifically termed *training*.

When a parent asks me why his boy should be sent to these halls, it may seem logical for me to answer because twenty-five years ago the greatest teacher of the country taught here, or because to-day the mountains rise here; but circumstances have rendered it possible for those in authority to give me a better argument. I should like to be able to place against the background filled, it is true, with a few brilliant scholars but with scores and scores of absolutely uneducated men—if by *educated* be meant to have been trained to be able to think and to present thought—who are marching in the processions of those receiving diplomas in the undergraduate departments of our great Universities—to place against such a background and in contrast to it, many and many an average or backward student who, because he came to this little college, could not escape an honest effort made to impel him to recognize his own possibilities and aptitudes, and to train him to the most effective use of these; and who, for this reason, has become in some respects a thinker and in all respects a helper and a blessing to his kind.—*Extract from a Report by the author to the Alumni of Williams College, and published by them, in June, 1902.*

A similar result seems to threaten the universal adoption, now urged by many, of quantitative requirements in other branches. Why should these requirements magnify quantity at the expense of quality, especially in parts of the country where preparatory schools are inferior and where State pride, as also State universities, tend to leniency on the part of examiners? How many teachers aiming to have their pupils fulfil these requirements would be stimulated—or sufficiently independent when not stimulated—to prevent classes from advancing rapidly, as did Dr. Taylor, of Phillips Andover Academy, until he had laid a foundation, as he thought, for accurate, scholarly development? Undoubtedly, there would remain great teachers in the country; but would the system tend to develop them? Might it not rather tend to produce the conditions formerly existing in China, where, with the most thoroughly organized universal standards of examination few passing them were trained to use their scholarship except by way of recalling what someone else had said or done? It might seem strange that what has been termed the scientific conception in education should consummate thus; but it would not be the first time that pushing a pendulum to one extreme has enabled it to fly the more readily to the other extreme.

The tendencies in wrong directions that have been indicated are certainly due largely to the introduction of scientific studies,—studies designed chiefly to impart information. Of course, too, it is true that our educational system, as it existed thirty years ago, needed to have these studies in-

troduced. But they might have been introduced—substituted in some instances, adapted in method in others—so as to interfere less than has been the case with that disciplining of the mind which up to that time had been the chief end of our colleges as well as academies. Upon the system then existing, composed of colleges and of post-graduate schools of theology, medicine, and law, a university system might have been developed through supplementing the post-graduate professional schools already established by similar schools training experts and teachers in physics, chemistry, and all the natural sciences, as well as in philosophy, language, and history. Instead of pursuing this course, our educators have allowed nature-studies, not always directed toward a disciplinary end, to crowd out drill in primary schools, and to overload the higher schools with an amount of work for which there is often neither time nor equipment. Into many of our colleges, too, studies have been introduced which can be pursued successfully by only a post-graduate. Together with the introduction of these has come the elective system,—a system which, tho of inestimable benefit in some regards, has in other regards, as at present conducted, proved injurious. A frequent practical result of it is that, with only a nominal oversight, students devoid of needed mental training elect their courses upon the principle that those are—so to speak—the most delectable which trouble one the least with questions either in recitations or in examinations. Another result is that professors, who are human, vie with one another for popularity, and if they attain it, their courses for this reason alone are falsely con-

sidered successful not only by the students, but also by certain of the trustees who imagine that the sizes of a professor's elective classes give the measure of his ability. Nevertheless, despite the tendencies just mentioned, all resulting primarily from an endeavor to introduce more science into our educational system, despite this lessening of mental drill in order to give place to information, I have never yet heard one professor of long standing in a professional school admit that undergraduate courses—say in Hebrew, anatomy, chemistry, or law, tho pursued as a special preparation for the professional school—could shorten the course required in this school itself,—largely because the special study is not pursued in the sub-graduate institution—and, as is claimed, cannot be pursued there—in the right spirit or in the right relations. In other words, as much time has to be spent in our professional schools as of old, notwithstanding the fact that the ages of students entering them are probably two years above what, with our better facilities for instruction, their ages would have been if, forty years ago, our educators had not started out to load the old system in the direction of quantity. That their practical influence has been in this direction is simply a matter of record. How few of the published entrance-requirements of our colleges and universities fail to dwell upon quantity—so many books of Virgil or Homer—rather than upon quality! How few fail to mention time—so many years spent upon Latin or Greek—as a prerequisite for even any examination at all! Yet I have personally known one man—of course an Oriental—who, six weeks after he

had seen his first Latin word, knew as much about the language, and could write as accurate a thesis in it, as any of his hundred classmates who, fulfilling all the conventional requirements, had presumably studied the language at least six years.

This suggests the last thought of this paper, which is that the student needs to be trained not only to *recollect*, to *associate*, and to *apply* his information, but also to *advance* in information. Revolution seldom goes backward. Probably we never can reinstate the educational conditions of forty years ago, and, as we might once have done, develop from them, as they were, a satisfactory American system. Probably only by going forward in some direction can we now compensate for what, because we did not avail ourselves of it when we could, we have lost. Let us look at this last requirement, therefore, with this suggestion in mind. Could there be a greater waste of time than to require six years' study of the man just mentioned, who could master a language in six weeks? Could mental activity receive a more effectual quietus than through keeping bright pupils, as is done in many of our schools, for a year or two upon one study, when, if allowed to go at their own gait, they could finish it in a few months? Could desire to understand and to master be more effectually benumbed than by dragging an equal number of dull pupils out of a lower class and into a higher, before their slow minds have become able by thought to comprehend or by practise to apply the principles that underlie the studies taught in the higher class? Yet all these results are common in the graded system of schools and colleges, upon

which we pride ourselves. Of course, those who have provided us with the system have provided remedies for its drawbacks. In one large section of country of which I know, a mere boy deficient at the end of a year in a single branch is made to go back and repeat all the studies of this year. In most well-regulated colleges a student must repeat them all, if deficient in two branches. In other words, because lacking preparation or facility in one or two directions, everything in the young mind that stimulates interest or encourages ambition is blocked. Why not have a method accommodated to the needs of the individual rather than sacrifice the individual to the method? Why not, in part at least, extend to all higher institutions the plan that has been pursued for many years with signal success in the University of Virginia? Why not do away, in part at least, with the class system, except as applied to term work in a few branches; and in these, at the end of each term, open the door and let the bright pupil mount on and up, and turn the dull one back or into some other branch, in order to give his understanding another chance? Why not grant diplomas to those who have completed prescribed courses, whether at the end of one year or of ten? Why not apply in education the principle of concentration which all successful men apply in after-life? One year spent exclusively upon Greek or Latin would give many minds four times as much knowledge of these subjects as four years of attention divided between them and half a dozen other branches.

If it be thought that this method of hurrying forward those who are themselves forward would de-

prive them of the benefits of personal quizzing and practise, why not add examinations in quality as well as in quantity, and give diplomas for what a man can do as well as for what he can recall? * This, in fact, would merely carry out the old conception of the degrees of arts. A Master of Arts was once supposed to be able to use his knowledge, just as a Doctor of Philosophy was once supposed to be able to philosophize, and not—owing, as there is reason to suspect, to a modern endeavor to make a scientific study of English—merely able to count on his fingers the numbers of consecutive and alternate alliterations of each letter of the alphabet in some rightly forgotten Anglo-Saxon doggerel, and all this without sufficient intelligence to be aware that he is wasting his time.

This thought suggests excuses, if they be needed, for reading this paper before an association like this rather than before some educational convention. One excuse is derived from the fact that in America the hope of arresting what is deleterious in any direction lies largely in an appeal to public as distinguished from professional sentiment. Especially, as directed toward educational institutions, does public sentiment with us determine patronage, benefactions, and, to a large extent, the policies of boards of visitors and trustees. But, besides this, it may be said that all conventions, whether of teachers or of any other classes of people who are considering courses of action, are apt to be dominated by men who have the spirit of the advocate, whose influence, therefore, tends to produce the result mentioned in the opening paragraph

*Notice again what is said on pp. 30-33.

of this paper; *i.e.*, tends to emphasize some new contribution to such an extent as practically to destroy the proportions of the whole of the old system to which it has contributed.

Indeed, this very result has actually been produced upon many of those following our own educational leadership. Is there not something, therefore, in the suggestion that new methods should not be received without question, before they have commended themselves to popular common sense? It was this latter, as embodied in the practical clergymen, lawyers, and merchants who were our forefathers, that developed the system of education in vogue in our country forty-five years ago.* This system was given to text-books rather than to lectures, and to an immense amount of repeating, drilling, questioning, reciting, writing, and declaiming, all of which methods, from those of the primary school to commencement stage, were designed to be—what it seems extremely difficult to get into the heads of many scientists of the present day—means, and not ends. And what of this former system, every part of which was a constituent element of the whole? For fifty years it turned out, in proportion to the knowledge imparted—I am not saying that more knowledge might not and ought not to have been imparted—the most thoroughly equipped citizens, whether considered as merchants, inventors, thinkers, or leaders in any department

*Not an unimportant part of that system, perhaps, was the necessarily limited number of pupils attending the district schools of the period. Certainly, some of the evils of the class-system that have been mentioned, as well as certain more serious social evils, might be lessened by substituting for the large public schools of our cities many small neighborhood schools.

of action that, perhaps, the world had ever seen. It made men efficient even tho it may have left them somewhat deficient. If it did not enable them to catalog many of the important facts in material nature, it did enable them to marshal most of the essential forces in human nature. During the controversies attending the movement in our country for the abolition of slavery, is it not true that as many well-prepared agitators for a great reform, cultivated, too, in the sense of being skilled from the bottom of their brains to the ends of their tongues and fingers, could be found in America as in any part of the civilized world? Of course, there is more than one cause behind every effect; but the practical efficiency of American intelligence as then developed—more highly in men like Webster, Beecher and Phillips, than in any of our public men of the present—must have been due, in part at least, to the method of American education. Is it not worth while for us to ask in what degree this whole method, root, branch and fruitage, is now threatened? and, if it be threatened, what may ultimately be the results, as well as what may be done to prevent results that may prove deleterious? These questions are asked, not in any pessimistic spirit, but with a firm conviction that they will be answered satisfactorily just as soon as the American people can be brought to perceive clearly their relationship to present conditions and to prospective developments.

TEACHING IN DRAWING AS RELATED TO THE TRAINING OF THE INTELLECT IN GENERAL *

One thing that differentiates a man from a mere animal is the spirit that incites and inspires him. This spirit, like the water in a living fountain, is constantly overflowing that which forms its basin. Whether one be a merchant, lawyer, preacher or teacher, he can do nothing well without being conscious of being the source of much that runs to waste. In many school-rooms, in many places in our country, knowledge and skill sufficient to start upon successful careers the greatest orators, poets, architects, or painters, are lavished upon pupils few or none of whom give any promise of attaining eminence. What then? Shall instructors in such places become discouraged? How do they know that the work which they are doing may not prove of great value to the world? No such inference can be drawn from the mere fact that they have never been brought into personal contact with pupils manifesting genius. A wave breaking upon the seacoast with its spray dashing up to sparkle in the sunshine has a grand and beautiful effect. But what makes the wave? An innumerable number of little springs hidden in obscure places in the mountains. In the little springs there are no

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waves. But there would be none anywhere, were it not for the cumulative effects of all the springs together. So with great achievements in art. They are the cumulative effects of little degrees of knowledge and skill, started in thousands of obscure places, and apparently wasted as they sink into depths of greater obscurity. Special attainments in this world are based, as a rule, upon general attainments. That which towers high must have broad foundations. If, because of the impossibility of discovering any future astronomer or poet among their immediate pupils, teachers of mathematics or rhetoric lose enthusiasm, there will be no future astronomers or poets anywhere. Not all the bees in a hive have to do with developing the queen-bee. Yet one appears every season, and this because of the work of all. Meantime, they all have also contributed to the provisioning, the comfort, the prosperity and the sweetness of the whole corporate life. So with teachers of drawing in primary schools. Little as sometimes they seem to themselves to accomplish or, through any manifestation of efficiency, seem to be able to accomplish during the few immature years in which a pupil comes under their influence their work, nevertheless, furnishes the beginning, the background, the foundation of everything that makes art in a country worth while, practically or esthetically, materially or spiritually. Not many children unmistakably indicate their aptitudes in early life. At the same time, not many fail to have aptitudes awakened in them by their early instruction. As a rule, few leaving the elementary school between the ages of twelve and eighteen are able without

subsequent training to do anything of value, either in industrial or in fine art. But thousands of them have been started in paths of which, but for their elementary studies, they never would have known, and where these paths lead, the world is waiting usually to be benefited by them, and sometimes to honor them.

One of the most interesting things in this world is an ant-hill. We come upon it in a grass-plot, or a rocky waste, or a field of loam of a certain hue or texture, and it usually consists of a gathering together, grain by grain, of materials and colors not interesting in themselves, yet made so by being selected from surrounding ones. Man has a way of making things interesting through an exercise of a similar faculty of selection. That from which he selects usually comprises two elements—substance and appearance; more strictly, substance not having form and substance having it, or needing to be made to have it in order to be that for which it is of value. It is with this latter, with substance having form, that art is concerned. As we sit in our homes and examine our surroundings, we discover in them artistic appearances infinitely beyond the number of those which any one man, looking at the world about him, could suppose that this could in any way suggest. These appearances are everywhere, whether we look at the carpet, wall-paper, table-service, bric-à-brac or furniture. As manifested in all these places, they indicate the exact degree of the taste of those who have made or have purchased them. Much of this taste, too, as well as the ability to express it in production, has been cultivated in children when learning to draw and

color. But this is not all. Dependent primarily on the same taste and ability, are the house itself, the garden surrounding it, the town in which it stands, with its business blocks and churches, the county with its roads and parks, and the whole country with its harbors, canals and railways, with all the century's various methods of development and transportation. All these necessitate, on the part of promoters or inventors, the drawing of plans, plots, charts, maps and designs. If so, it may be doubted whether, after reading, writing and arithmetic, any branch of instruction begins the knowledge of that which is destined to prove more generally useful in life, than does instruction in drawing.

But in our schools we teach mathematics, rhetoric or the languages, not merely for the benefit of those who are to be accountants, authors, or travelers in foreign lands, but as a means of general mental discipline. Mathematics, besides making an accountant, trains a man to think and to express himself consecutively and logically. The languages, besides making a linguist, train him to do the same accurately and concisely. I was once a member of a class in mathematics hardly more than six of whom out of sixty were called upon to recite more than once or twice a fortnight. These were pupils who were expected to recite well. The instructor was not a good teacher. He was cultivating aptitudes in a few who were not indebted for them to him but to nature. In the rest he was cultivating nothing. Yet tho they were not mathematicians by nature, he might, through the agency of mathematics, have taught them something of more im-

portance for them at least than proficiency in this branch. He might have taught them methods having to do with enabling them to think.

Many instructors never teach thinking in general, particularly in these days when teachers affect to be, and pupils affect to admire, specialists. As a fact, there is no successful specialist whose range of knowledge and of thought is not wider than that of the branch to which he has particularly devoted himself. The specialist in medicine must know, and very definitely, too, not only whether any particular disease is, but also whether it is not, within the range of that concerning which his opinion is sought. Otherwise, he will be merely a quack. Someone has said—it is true as applied only to a philologist—that the man who knows but one language knows no language. An analogous statement would be more true as applied to any one branch of learning, and still more true as applied to the purpose of teaching this branch. He who teaches it for only one purpose does not teach it well for any purpose.

What are some of the purposes, aside from making draftsmen and colorists, that can be accomplished by the branch of study that we are now considering? What influences can the teaching of this exert upon the development of the mental powers in general? In order to answer this question, it will be convenient, and sufficiently accurate in the circumstances, to divide these mental powers into those of observation, reflection and construction. To begin with observation: A few years ago I met a graduate of Princeton on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington. "I have never forgot-

ten," he said, " the first question you asked me in the class-room when I was a Freshman. It was this: the difference between the ways in which the College bell was rung for service on Sundays, and for prayers on other days of the week. I was proud of being able to answer the question; but I could not have answered your next one. You asked how many stories there were in Nassau Hall, and how many windows were on each side of its central door." In putting such questions, which I myself had forgotten, I was undoubtedly trying to make the students realize how much more some perceive in the world than others do, and from that to have them draw a lesson with reference to the importance, for some of them, of learning to perceive. In great emergencies, we all recognize this importance. When a fire threatens several places in a street, when a ship seems about to strike another in a storm or fog, when a general is about to meet an enemy upon land on which there are a few knolls or houses, then that man is apt to be the most efficient who, in the briefest glance, can perceive most clearly the largest number of conditions and possibilities. So in the scientific world, the successful botanist is he who notices with most accuracy every turn of line or color that distinguishes one leaf or limb from another; the successful physician is he who is keen enough not to leave out of his diagnosis a single one of the small and, apparently insignificant symptoms that separate one disease from other diseases. To be able to observe is equally important in less serious circumstances. I once had a servant in my house who apparently never failed to hear anything said

in no matter how low a tone, or to see anything left in no matter how hidden a place. All the members of the household were inclined to feel that, with her about, they were leading rather too conspicuous a life. But when she gave way to another servant, who apparently could hear or see nothing, a cry for help seemed constantly going up that the help for which we were paying never supplied. A friend of mine was intending to take one of two nephews on a trip to Europe. The only reason why he chose one instead of the other, was because this one always seemed to have his eyes open, and he rightly concluded that with such a young man the trip would reveal far more points of interest than it would if taken with one who apparently was half blind. What we term politeness and courtesy are traceable to habits of observing little tones and looks and gestures, fully as much as to a kind and sympathetic heart. Indeed, they tend, just as breadth of knowledge in any direction tends, to produce a kind and sympathetic heart. In all departments of society or business, the man who thoroughly understands those whom he meets is the man who, instinctively, as it were, looks them over, and knows enough to balance against their conscious words their unconscious actions.

A friend of mine, a prosecuting attorney, had been trying for months to find a clue through which to trace a murderer. One day, happening to mention the case in the presence of one whom he had no reason to suspect, he discovered himself suddenly trembling. He was leaning against a wheel in a carriage factory. He glanced around and found that this man's hand was resting on the

same wheel. Then he looked at the man's face. Within a week evidence had been found sufficient to prove this one to be the criminal for whom he was in search. Hundreds of similar instances might be cited, all illustrating the importance of cultivating, when deficient, habits of observation. All habits, as we know, are cultivated best in childhood. Nothing tends to cultivate accuracy in the perception of every phase of form, as does the effort to draw or to color it.

But mental discipline involves, besides observation, reflection. By this is meant now the habit of thinking about what one has observed. Why is this habit cultivated by learning to draw or to color? Because, whenever the thinking mind comes to use forms, its use of them involves thinking of them; and not only so, but involves being trained to think through the use of them. Most of us are not aware of the extent to which we think through this use of forms. We fancy that we think through the use of words. So we do, but only so far as words have been made arbitrarily to take the place of forms. We think in dreams, do we not? In these, what are we doing except thinking? Yet how many words do we seem to hear in our dreams? The vast bulk of our experience then appears to pass before consciousness in visible pictures. The same may be affirmed of what occurs during our reveries, though we seldom analyze these sufficiently to discover the fact. There is reason, too, to suppose that this thinking through the use of pictures is the primitive, elementary method. Of what is a dog conscious when he wags his tail, both when dreaming in sleep, and when leaping in moods wide-

awake? He never uses words. Why should we suppose him ever to have words in his mind? The only rational supposition seems to be that, when he thinks of a bone and by his actions asks for one, he has a vision of it. So with all animals, and with children who have not learned to talk. So, too, with grown people, much more frequently than most of them realize. We all know that the man who makes a large use of illustrations and figures, the imaginative man, or the man sufficiently imaginative to give a graphic as well as logical form to his thought, is, as a rule, a more successful orator than the man who does not. Why? It is because he is addressing his audience according to methods of the mind's nature which operate in a different and deeper way than is exemplified in plain language. He is communicating his thought not merely as it has assumed shape when formulated on the lips, but as it emerges into consciousness, when conceived in the mind. So far as possible, without the intervention or interference of audible forms between his conceptions and his hearers' conceptions, or between what he apprehends and what he desires to have them apprehend, he is bringing that which is in the depths of his own spirit into direct contact with the depths of their spirits. In this way, he is often making them do more than merely understand. He is leading them, step by step, through all the processes of his own mind, starting with these processes at the very springs of psychic action. He is influencing them as if they were expressing their own thought. In making them visualize this, he is making them, for themselves, vitalize it,—making them feel and realize it in a way impos-

sible according to any other method. It is true that words, after they have come to have conventional meanings, are the tools through the use of which the human being thinks. Their value in giving definiteness, distinctness, and availability to thought cannot be overestimated. It is true, too, that after thought has once become associated with a word, the form of this, like the form of an arch in architecture, or of a phrase in music, may be developed and elaborated by being joined and harmonized with other forms, all according to laws of grammar or of rhetoric that have to do with form alone. But a word, as first invented, is merely a name, merely a convenient implement for the purpose of fixing and holding a conception so that it can be used in speech and writing. This is no place, and there is no time here, in which to discuss the origin of language. It is a large subject, and a perfect language has many sources. Certain authorities make much, and others make little, of the representative elements in it, *i.e.*, of words like *hiss*, *buzz*, *rattle*, supposed to be derived from the sounds of things heard, and of other words, especially compounds, like *overlook*, *pastime*, *undertake*, supposed to be derived from the appearances of things seen. But all admit that words are symbols, if not representative, then arbitrary. This is the same as to say that they contain such thought alone as has been formulated, as has, therefore, been rendered definite and finite. But thought itself must include many suggestions of the infinite. Therefore the devil, as representative of the finite rather than the infinite, had a good reason for advising the student in Goethe's *Faust* to confine his discussions of a

proposition supposed to express truth to the consideration of words. Some appear to think that, not only in logic but in poetry, these are all that need to be considered. Let the words be arranged so as to sound musical, and we have a great poet. There could be no more decided error. One might as well say that a man who can produce a great noise by ordering thousands of guns to be fired simultaneously is a great general. The noise has nothing to do with the generalship except so far as it represents, in different parts of a battlefield, the bodies of troops that are moving forward and carrying to successful development the plan of attack. So in poetry, the sounds of the words have little to do with poetic achievement except so far as by being picturesque—individually and collectively—they represent the forms—some of them audible it is true, but most of them merely visible—that are moving forward and carrying to successful development that which is in the poet's imagination. I once heard a remark attributed to the French dramatist, Scribe, to the effect that when he was composing he always seemed to be looking at his characters moving before him on the stage. This tendency to think by describing what appears to be seen, is common, in fact, probably necessary, to all those who produce works of the imagination. It is because of the ability to perceive inward experiences as if they were outwardly present, that many great poets—and some of the very greatest—poets like Dante and Milton, have been what we may term natural, if not proficient, mathematicians, or at least, geometricians. In speaking of University experiences at Cambridge, you may recall what

Wordsworth says. I quote from the sixth book of his "Prelude."

"My inner judgment
Not seldom differed from my taste in books.
.....In fine
I was a better judge of thoughts than words.
.....
Yet must we not entirely overlook
The pleasures gathered from the rudiments
Of geometric science.....
'Tis told by one whom stormy waters threw,
With fellow sufferers by the shipwreck spared,
Upon a desert coast, that, having brought
To land a single volume, saved by chance,
'A treatise of Geometry, he wont,
Altho of food and clothing destitute,
And beyond common wretchedness deprest,
To part from company and take this book
(Then first a self-taught pupil in its truths)
To spots remote, and draw his diagrams
With a long staff upon the sand, and thus,
Did oft beguile his sorrow, and almost
Forget his feelings; so (if like effect
From the same cause produced, 'mid outward things
So different may rightly be compared)
So was it then with me, and so will be
With poets ever. Mighty is the charm
Of those abstractions to a mind beset
With images and haunted by herself,
And specially delightful unto me
Was that clear synthesis built up aloft
So gracefully; even then when it appeared
Not more than a mere plaything or a toy
To sense embodied."

All this is the same as to say that the poet naturally thinks through the use of images. He seems to see outwardly the things that he describes. He seems to hear outwardly the things that he utters. There is a further result of this tendency, and one which it is extremely important that those who deal with art should recognize. It is this: when the mind gets into a habit of thinking through the use of images, it gets into a habit of having thoughts sug-

gested by these images, or, as we say, of interpreting their significance. All of us know this. We know that a philosophical botanist—to say nothing of a poet like Wordsworth—will have scores of thoughts suggested to him by a scene in nature, which would never occur to most of us. Now these scenes in nature,—what are they? They are visible representations of the life and methods at the source of nature. They are illustrations, through the appearances and operations of nature, of what we mean when we speak of divine laws, principles and truths. I think that everyone admits that one of the chief missions to the world of great poetic and artistic minds, like those of Dante, Angelo, Shakespeare, Raphael, and Goethe, is that they interpret rightly these laws, principles and truths. If so, is it not of great advantage for the individual and for the race to have cultivated in the growing generation habits of mind which tend to enable all to recognize easily, when pointed out, and sometimes to recognize for themselves, the import of that which the forms both of art and of nature, whether human or merely physical, are fitted to suggest?

I have said enough, I think, to indicate what I mean, when I claim that learning to observe forms and to think about them has a great deal to do with learning to think properly, which includes the conception not merely of thinking imaginatively, but also accurately, thoroughly and comprehensively, and in such a way as to be able to present intelligently and graphically the results of these modes of thinking.

But besides developing the powers of observa-

tion and reflection, the study which we are considering cultivates what we may term the power of mental construction. Mental construction is the source of that which has not before existed, either as an intellectual or material product. The Hon. Frederick I. Allen, the present United States Commissioner of Patents, has recently been delivering a course of lectures on patent law in the graduate department of the George Washington University. He told me, the other day, that with reference to what he considers the most important part of what he had to say, he had not found one syllable in any law book. He had found it in the writings of the psychologists, of men like John Lock, Sir William Hamilton, Alexander Bain, William James and J. Mark Baldwin, to which names, with his usual courtesy he added Raymond. One fact he told me had struck him as particularly interesting,—and this is what suggested his mentioning the subject to me. On returning from one of his lectures, he took up my “Representative Significance of Form,” and found that the same two passages of poetry, which I had quoted in order to illustrate the action of the artist’s imagination, he had just quoted to illustrate the action of the inventor’s imagination. The point of the argument which he was enforcing was this,—that a principle or law which has never been applied in invention can have no existence until it has been given a form; and it cannot be given a form until the image of it has been conceived in the mind. Therefore, in order to be able to invent, a mind must, first of all, be able to think in images. This is the same as to say that an original product, before it can become real, must be ideal,—in other

words, that the main difference between the action of the mind in physical construction and in metaphysical, is in the order of time in which the one or the other appears. After the preliminary work in the imagination, the arts separate. That which the mind seems to see, the poet records in words, the painter in pigments, the architect in brick and mortar, the machinist in wood and iron. The principle exemplified in art is exemplified in other departments of action. A scientist, philosopher or statesman is often successful in the degree alone in which he is able to visualize the material effects of a collection of facts, principles or motives, in such a way as to substitute for the chaos in which they ordinarily appear, what we term a well outlined system. There is no radical difference in mental action between planning a military campaign executed by force through the agency of bullets, and a political campaign executed by words through the agency of ballots.

I have said enough to show the importance, in a general educational scheme, of a phase of study tending to cultivate the powers of mental observation, reflection and construction. There are other reasons for the same study. But to consider these does not enter into the object of the present paper. It may be well, however, in a single paragraph to point out to what extent that which has been said really involves, if it does not underlie all that might be said on the subject. Why should not instruction in drawing, as given to children, be the beginning, on their part, of a conception of the aims of all art,—a beginning of knowledge concerning the results of practise in it, of appreciation of the effects of

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acquiring skill in it, of discrimination in judging of its products, and of sympathy with the suggestions of its import? Art, in all its phases, is merely a compend of lifelong studies in nature and in human conditions, reported by those with exceptional powers of perception, insight and inference. If men are to become wise, they must have experience. If they cannot travel and become personally acquainted with different parts of the world, and its inhabitants, they must derive their experience from those who can do so. There is no more efficient way of deriving this than from the pictures, poems, dramas, and novels of great artists. But the effects of art are so subtle, they depend upon so many complex causes, that one can derive comparatively little from it, until he has learned to do so. And when he has learned this, the result is so connected with everything in his whole complex constitution, with both mind and soul, that not only his intellectual but his spiritual experience is enlarged almost beyond measure. Yes, many innumerable

“Things there are that art can do for man
To make him manlier. Not the senseless rock
Is all it fashions into forms of sense,
But senseless manhood, natures hard and harsh,
Great classes crusht, and races driven to crawl
Till all their souls are stained with smut and soil—
More human seem these, when the hands of art
Have grasped their better traits and hold them forth.
And men who see these better traits, and see
The tender touch of art that holds them forth,
Behold a beauty never else beheld;
And all their hearts beat more humanely while
They heed the pleas of these humanities.”

—*Ideals Made Real: Raymond.*

It is no slight privilege to be able to take a child by the hand and to lead him, if only a little way,

and to get him interested, if only slightly, in a path that tends where all perceptions are rendered more keen, all apprehensions more thorough, all activities more inventive and all sympathies more universal.

MUSIC AS RELATED TO THE OTHER ARTS AND TO ARTISTIC CULTURE *

“ In the beginning ” is a phrase that can be rightly applied to the acts of only one Being; and the nature and methods of this Being are to us inconceivable. Work as we may in the world, we can never get back to that in which anything starts, nor trace it to that in which it ends. All that we can do is to accept what happens to be near us, and to relate this to what may be supposed to exist in regions remote from us. We are accustomed to think that our deeds will prove wise in the degree in which they are actuated by rationality; but the chains of human reason, like those of great suspension bridges on foggy days, usually rest at both ends in the clouds, and can appeal to thought so far only as they have first appealed to faith.

This fact is evident in the history of all the arts and sciences. The development of none of them started at its logical beginning, or is likely to end at its logical conclusion; tho between the two extremes, like everything human, it has manifested no little logical consistency, always, however, suffering modification as, at either extreme, that which can be fully comprehended is extended.

To indicate the application of this thought to our

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subject, the arts did not begin with the development of that which manifests itself earliest in human experience. Certain conventional methods of poetry, if not the laws determining them, were recognized long before anything sustaining similar relations to music was recognized; and the same can be affirmed of the methods underlying painting or sculpture as contrasted with those underlying architecture; yet in the life of every human being the cooing, crying, shrieking and other inarticulated intonations that constitute the elements of expression developed in music antedate by many months the use of articulated words such as are developed in poetry; as also the vague attacks of palm and fist upon the structure of natural surroundings antedate the defter use of thumb and fingers, as in drawing and modeling. Amid the mists at either end of the suspension bridge upon which it has been intimated that life is apt to find itself traveling, the mind of art expends its thought first upon that which it sees most clearly, and only later looks behind this and beyond it. The condition is a natural one. It is difficult, and takes time, to discover and explain how the elements of mere sound and building—the elements of mere intonation and construction—can give vent to that imitative process, with which, primarily, all art is associated; but it is comparatively easy to discover and explain how the same can be true of written language and painted pictures. As soon, however, as the artistic value of intonation and construction has become apparent, the logical tendency to which reference has been made—the tendency to link conceptions together and to form a unity of them all—

begins to manifest itself not only in the new arts of music and architecture, but in new phases of effects manifested in the other older arts. It is to the influence of music upon these and upon all forms of culture naturally associated with them that I wish now to call your attention.

Let us begin by noticing some effects of the mere recognition, already suggested as important, of the extent to which thought and feeling may be expressed through inarticulated intonations, as distinguished from articulated words. In primitive times, the poetry of a word or phrase was determined by its appeal less to what we may term the ear of the mind than to its eye. By words appealing to the ear, I mean those like *hiss*, *rush*, *roar*, *rattle*, evidently originated by the recognition of resemblances between meaning and sound. By words appealing to the eye, I mean those like *upright*, *shady*, *forerunner*, *turnover*, used in what is termed a metaphorical sense, and evidently originated in a desire to represent or picture certain conditions or relationships of thoughts that are not visible, because inside the mind, through references to conditions or relationships that are visible, because in the external world. It is words of this latter kind upon which the earliest poets seem to have depended mainly for their efforts. In fact, the vast majority not only of metaphors, to which indirect reference has been made, but of similes, and of all phases of what are termed figures of speech, recognized, even in our own day, as peculiarly characteristic of poetic language, are traceable to this tendency to put thought into forms appealing to the eye. Attempts to cause poetry to repre-

sent its meanings through the use of mere sounds were very limited until long after the period of the most ancient poetry. Rhythm, assonance, alliteration, rhyme, and particularly what are termed the tunes of verse, and the selection of different meters for the presentation of different sentiments and subjects, were all of them more or less late developments in the history of the art. That this was so, is probably owing to their not being thought of till after men had become acquainted with musical effects. But whatever may have been the genesis of these earlier poetic methods, it is undoubtedly a fact that only since the marvelous advances in musical theory and practise that have been made in the last two centuries have there been such experiments in the melody and harmony of verbal arrangements as have given rise to products like some of those of Tennyson, Poe and Swinburne. There is no doubt, too, that this influence of music upon poetry has, to an extent, been beneficial. At the same time nothing human, whether we apply the term to character or to characteristics, is ever wholly benefited in case external agencies be allowed to master traits peculiar to its own individuality. Poetry whose distinctive features are subordinated to those of music or of any other art, may become unpoetic; and if they be only partly subordinated, it may become partly unpoetic. No form of influence that a man can exert in this world is so certain to prove successful that, in his efforts to produce it, he can afford to ignore the importance of concentration. Indeed, it might be argued that one reason why the poetry of the present is so little read, and has so little influence, is because of its disregard of this

simple fundamental principle. One takes up a magazine or a book of the day, and sees type arranged in the form of verse. He notices in the successions of syllables an abundance of music, perhaps. But the writers have evidently forgotten—not wholly but largely—that which, when poetry began, gave it its nature and value. In what he reads, he finds little visualizing of invisible thought, little formulation of unformed suggestions, little projection of definite ideas from regions of indefiniteness, little illuminating truth shining out brilliant as a star from vague depths of apparently unfathomable significance. He can read page after page of this modern so-called poetry from which it is hardly possible to obtain by mining a single word or phrase such as is everywhere on the surface, and which the most casual glance reveals sparkling like a gem, not only in the products of the ancient classic poets, but of all the great modern poets like Dante, Shakespeare and Goethe.

All this is not said in disparagement of music. It is a tribute to the power that it can exert, and has exerted. By and by, too, when poetry has recovered from the apparent paralysis following the shocks of the first impingements upon it of these mere sound-effects; when, resuming self-control, it again moves on in ways natural to itself, these influences that have been exerted upon it, like those exerted, at times, upon a hazed Freshman, may prove, by no means, wholly evil. They may be found to have added decidedly to the value of poetry, if, for no other reason, because of having added to the difficulty of producing it. To some, at first thought, mere difficulty in the process of pro-

duction may not seem to supply any legitimate test of artistic excellence. But, certainly, this test applies to some arts—to sculpture, for instance, in which apparently living form is chiseled from lifeless stone—and a little thought will convince us that it applies, to some extent, to other arts. Indeed, there are none of them in which the recognition of particular obstacles overcome does not increase men's appreciation of the general result. This fact is due not merely to that association of ideas in our minds which inevitably relates the artistic to the skilful, but also to that which relates the artistic to the expressional. When a man polishes a diamond its beauty is due, in a sense, to its appearance, and to what his polishing has added to its appearance; but, in another sense, the beauty is due still more to the surrounding light which his polishing has enabled the diamond to reflect. The poet who never allows himself to use an imperfect rhyme, or, except for reasons in the sense, to use words containing consecutive letter-sounds that do not harmonize, is likely, on account of the very attention that he pays to the expression, to make the expression seem worthy of attention; and, not only so, but to make that which is expressed seem worthy of attention. We wonder, at times, why certain modern poets prefer to write plays in blank verse. Most of us ascribe the reason to the influence of tradition. But there is a better reason than this. Foot and line impose limits upon expressional form. The necessity for conciseness in the language impels to conciseness in the thought. Thought like light never becomes really brilliant, never flashes, except from a form in which its rays are concentrated. The sun's influ-

ence on a bright day is pervasive; it is everywhere; but its beams never sparkle from the whole surface of a pool or lake,—only from places where in this they touch some single small drop, or collection of small drops.

The influence of music upon painting, sculpture and architecture is just as noteworthy as upon poetry. Not until, at least, the rhythm of music—to say nothing of its tune—began to affect the human nerves, did the man begin to dance, and not until he began to dance, did his arrested attitudes begin to emphasize those effects of grace which, perhaps, most clearly differentiate the portrait from the snap-shot photograph and the *genre* painting from the portrait. It is not too much to say, therefore, that some lessons learned from the influence of music upon the human form are illustrated in almost all pictures and statues, whether considered as ends in themselves, or as ornamenting architecture. But more than this can be said. The underlying significance of all straight lines, angles and curves, whenever or wherever seen, is subtly connected with the expressional uses of the same in the poses assumed by the various limbs of the human body. Man is so limited in outlook, so self-centered in insight, that he is obliged to interpret not only God but all nature and its manifestations in accordance with his own experience and actions. So, indirectly, the same strains of music that cause dancing, and thus tend to the exhibition of gracefulness in the human form, have an influence on the artistic qualities of other of the visible forms that become subjects of art-production.

A connection, less subtle, perhaps, in nature, and,

therefore, more generally recognized, is that which has been observed and studied ever since the time, at least, of Pythagoras. This is found in the analogy between the ratios representing the respective lengths of cords producing musical harmony and the measurements of spaces producing harmonious proportions in objects of sight. All that men have learned from the study of ratios as applied now to so many effects in painting, sculpture and architecture, was wholly suggested and started by what they had learned from music. There are indications, too, that in the future much more may be acquired from the same source. The analogy between the effects of rhythm and of proportion seem to have been fully established. It may not be long before the same can be also said—and said in a sense not now fully conceivable—of the analogy between the effects of tone and pitch and those of color. It is certainly significant, as showing the tendencies of artistic feeling in this direction, that the one form of entertainment in which, through adaptations of modern facilities for electric illuminating, there is an endeavor to produce varied and harmonious effects of color, in and of itself, is universally connected with music. Nothing of the kind seems as yet to accompany the drama, either tragic or comic; but it is getting to be very common in the ballet and the opera. As pointing in the same direction, another fact seems even more significant. It is, at any rate, more clearly significant. Only since there has come to be a scientific study of the philosophic reasons underlying the laws of musical harmony and composition—such a study as is exemplified in the great work of Helmholtz on “The

Sensations of Tone"—has there been a study of the effects of color-harmony and composition of such a nature and with such a purpose as is manifested in the painting of the modern impressionists. This form of painting might be defined as that in which the effects of outline—if not wholly absent as sometimes seems to be the case—are at least, more or less, subordinated to those of color. The endeavor appears to be to influence the eye by means of color aside from shapes in a way analogous to that in which, in music, the ear is acknowledged to be influenced by sounds aside from words. Is it possible to suppose that such effects would ever have been attempted, if it had not been for suggestions derived from music? It is interesting to notice, too, that, when carried to excess, impressionism, which may be described as painting influenced by the musical motive, is apt to prove unsatisfactory owing to neglect of the natural requirements of picturing in outline, in exactly the same way in which, as was pointed out a moment ago, poetry, influenced by the musical motive, is apt to prove unsatisfactory owing to its neglect of the requirements of picturing in words. One can no more make a thoroughly successful painting without lines that, at least, suggest to the mind a very definite form than he can make a thoroughly successful poem without words and phrases that do the same. Nevertheless, just as the influence of music on verse has been, in part, beneficial, so too has been its influence, so far as exerted, in the directions of which I have been speaking, upon the use of pigments. The conceptions which underlie modern impressionism will probably never cease to manifest themselves, and in ways,

too, perfectly legitimate to the art of painting. Possibly, they may lead to other results as yet hardly foretold. We know how Wagner endeavored to blend into unity the effects of music as combined with those of the other higher arts, especially those of poetry, painting and architecture. One of these days, a similar endeavor may be made in more subtle directions. If colors, as well as musical notes, be traceable to vibrations, why might not harmony—scientifically accurate harmony, too—be produced for the eye as well as for the ear, and possibly for both, at one and the same time? Why should the developing of this color-harmony and the determining of its laws of consonance, modulation, transition and progress require much more insight, ingenuity and constructive ability than has been manifested in developing our present system of musical harmony from the crude conceptions of it held by the ancient Greeks?

It must be confessed that this thought is suggestive of something incongruous. If the mind can ever be affected by color in exactly the same way as by sound, then coloring, like music, may become an art setting in motion the general drift of thought and feeling, but leaving imagination free to formulate what evolves from the drift. Because exerting this kind of influence upon the sources rather than the results of thinking, music never, even when used in worship, tends to dogmatism and bigotry as do, sometimes, the words of hymns, or to idolatry and superstition as do, sometimes, pictures and statues. Its tendencies to a greater extent than those of any of the other arts except, perhaps, architecture, are spiritual and religious. It would be strange if the

play of electric light on the stage of the comic opera and the ballet should lead, some day, to a new art—probably of decoration, tho possibly of performance—which philosophers would have a right to associate with the distinctively spiritual and religious. But it would not be the first time that the world has had experience of such results. Most of us have heard the same kind of music that summons the wild Indian tribes to a war-dance used to collect the throngs of the Salvation Army; and, if we live long enough, we may hear, in many a Sunday-school, the melody of the Merry Widow Waltz inciting to all the virtues. If the teachings of history have not been misinterpreted, we might have had none of the harmony that renders possible the great anthems or masses of the present, had it not been for the Bacchanalian street-airs brought together in rounds, which so distress the serious-minded Plato; or introduced, to relieve, by way of variation, the unisonance of solemn cathedral chants, in disregard of consternation in the souls of the medieval priests.* It is well enough in this world for us to have rules by which to govern our own opinions and actions; but we should never forget that some things may be overruled. Very often, we may find that “God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise.” It is no proof that a form of life or of art is undeserving of sovereignty because it happens to have been born in a manger.

The influence of music has not been confined to the direct effects which it has exerted upon what may be termed the matter—the essential substance—of the other arts, as on rhythm, proportion and

* See the author's “Art in Theory,” pp. 250-253.

harmony of words and colors. The influence is still more noteworthy, perhaps, in the indirect effects which the methods of study and of mental discipline and development peculiar to music have exerted upon that which corresponds to them in the other arts and in all forms of culture derived from these arts or associated with them.

Notice the traces of this influence, first, in the lesson which music teaches with reference to the universal applicability of law, not only in all the arts, but, by implication, in all nature. One can scarcely begin a musical education, before he is compelled to recognize that there are fixt and invariable principles connecting written music with executed music; connecting the notes that can be played together in any one key; and connecting the chords through which one key can be made to pass into another. He soon comes to recognize, too, that the mightiest master of melody and harmony who, as he composes, seems to lose all consciousness of restraint and to give vent to absolutely untrammelled promptings of inspiration, is not one who has risen above the control of rules. He is one who has studied and practised in accordance with them so assiduously that not one cell in his brain can forget them, or break from the habit of fulfilling them. Every musical non-conductor has been, by repeated effort, expelled not only from his conscious but from his unconscious mind. Every nerve in his being vibrates to the touch of harmony, and vibrates according to law.

The fact of the universal prevalence of law finds illustrations, of course, in all the other arts; but it is emphasized in none of them; and, in some of

them, it is quite often disregarded. In almost every picture gallery, one can see paintings produced by colorists who have evidently never mastered the laws of drawing and proportion; or by draftsmen who have never mastered the laws of coloring. In almost every magazine, one can read so-called poems produced by those who have evidently never mastered the laws of verse or rhythm, and, sometimes, not even those of grammar; while almost all the carpenters or stonemasons in the country, to say nothing of housewives or church deacons, think that, upon occasion, without further knowledge, they can be architects. Nothing influences the general conceptions of a community more than the specific conceptions suggested by what seems true of its art. This cannot manifest disregard of law without cultivating more or less disregard of the same in life, whether individual, social, political or religious. There is a connection between thinking that anybody, without any guidance of rules, can write a successful poem, or build a successful house, and fancying that a promoter on Wall Street can disregard the financial laws of the street, and not do something toward bringing on a financial panic; or that a lady of the "Four Hundred" can turn her back upon her poor relations violating thus the laws of both humanity and hospitality, and not do something toward making them turn their backs upon her, even to the extent, possibly, of causing them to enlist for a socialistic revolution; or that a statesman, trusting to his own personal popularity or eloquence, can ignore the laws of diplomacy and the enactments of his predecessors, and not do something to endanger the peace

and prosperity of his country; or that a leader in the Church, under the impression that all that religion needs can be developed from his own unaided self-consciousness, can break away from the laws of form or purpose embodying the historic results of the spiritual life of the past, and not do something to develop from himself the very evils that religion and its methods are intended to prevent. As a fact, everything with which we are brought into contact in this world, works according to law. But, so far as I know, the only art—of course, not the only agency—that illustrates this fact, and proves it to the satisfaction of everyone thoroughly acquainted with the subject, is music.

Intimately connected with this influence in the direction of an appreciation of the universal applicability of law is an influence in the direction of a recognition of the importance of thoroughness. The necessity for this follows logically upon what has been said already. In an art in which everything is done in accordance with law, nothing that is done can be of no value. When results depend upon chains of events, no link in the chain can be allowed to be weak, much less to drop out. If, therefore, a man be a musician, he must be thorough so far as he goes. In singing a chorus, or in playing an instrument, he must sound correctly not some but all the notes. Otherwise, tho the error be noticeable only once or twice, the whole effect will appeal to people as discordant. Of all places in the world in which superficiality can be tolerated, the last place is in the art of music. A really great poet, painter or architect may occasionally neglect to obtain complete mastery over certain elements

of his art. His rhythm may be faulty, his rhymes imperfect, his colors discordant, his spaces disproportional. But in music there is no such analogous possibility. A man is a musician so far as what he presents is musical, and no further. If he be a composer, and deviate from the conventional methods of modulation or transition, he must do this consciously and for a reason, not on account of any lack of knowledge.

It is impossible to suppose that the emphasis given to thoroughness in musical education and performance can fail to have an effect upon methods of thought and action in other departments. Is there nothing to awaken reflection in the fact that Germany, the one country in which there has been not only the highest but the most universal development of musical culture, is also the one country universally acknowledged to stand without a rival as an exemplification of the results of thoroughness in all forms of scholarship? Is there not something in this fact to suggest a patriotic as well as an esthetic reason for desiring to promote in our own land every form in which music can be studied? Thoroughness as a characteristic of mental process or material production is very greatly needed among our people. We have qualities that, in certain directions, seem sometimes capable of taking its place,—an unusual development of intuition, insight, ingenuity, and power of initiative. Nine times out of ten, perhaps, when an American jumps to a conclusion, he can make a successful landing; but the wise ought always to bear in mind the fact that a single slip, at a critical moment, may lose a whole race. No one can be so absolutely

certain of his ground as the one who has learned to be thorough. No one can have imprest upon his mind the general importance of being this, through any agency so well, or so inevitably, as through the study of music.

This fact will become still more evident as we notice the connection between thoroughness, and another indirect influence attributable to this art—the influence exerted through the emphasis placed upon the necessity for skill. To say that, in every sphere in which knowledge is demanded, knowledge alone is not sufficient; to say that one must be able to apply his knowledge, is to utter a truism. But it is a truism that needs to be uttered—over and over again too—almost everywhere except in a school of music. The student in this art, and, in a sense not true of any other, expects to spend hours, days, months, years, in a study of the same vocal or instrumental exercises. He knows, too, that he is often doing this not to add anything to his own store of information, but merely to render available what information he already has. A poet, painter, sculptor, architect may begin to work at once on what he hopes may at some time become a finished product; but never a musician. Neither with voice nor fingers does he practise, at first, upon what he hopes may prove acceptable in a public performance. This is owing to the nature of music, you say. Precisely, and I am trying to show how music, owing to its very nature, cannot but influence conceptions and methods in other departments. My point is that exactly the same kind of preliminary practise that is needed in order to attain skill in music is needed in other departments,

but that, in them, this fact is not recognized as it should be. The only known way of acquiring skill in any branch is through practise. So far as teachers can train skill, they must do so by seeing to it that the pupil does practise. A lesson upon this subject might be learned from the teachers of Turkey and China. Their ordinary schools usually make themselves heard a block or two away from where they are situated. The children are all studying out loud,—sometimes in concert, more frequently in discord. Of course, this method can be carried too far; but, to an extent, it is effective. It is simply a fact, proved in scores of cases, that a very ordinary Oriental boy so trained, after he enters academies and colleges in this country, is able to hold his own with those at the head of his classes. He is always, as a rule, superior to them in reciting in studies that require a good memory, and he is not one whit behind them in studies that require clear thinking, like mathematics, sociology, philosophy and the higher sciences. It is true—or was true until very recently—that the Asiatics continue the methods of the primary school in their universities; and this is absurd. But it is equally true that, with far too little attention to preparatory instruction, we begin the methods of the university in our primary schools, and this is equally absurd.

We need to have impress upon our minds the fact that drill and discipline are not merely a subordinate function,—they are the chief function of education up to the period of adolescence. Studies intended merely to inform or explain, instead of being crowded down, as now, into periods

earlier than this, should be crowded up and out,—not because they have no importance, but because, at this period, other mental requirements that it is impossible to cultivate later in life have greater importance. Exactly the same method pursued in making a scholar in music should be pursued in making any scholar. You want the man when grown to be well informed. Very well, then, you must sharpen his memory when young, so that the information that he gets when older will stick. You want the man, when grown, to be a thinker. Very well, then. When young you must keep his mind awake by quizzing—tickling it, even in the sense of playing with it. Such questioning will accustom him to search for what is inside his mind, to dive into the depths of consciousness and to bring every link in the chain of thought to the light. Hypnotize him, and you will find that, however hidden, what you want is inside of him. He has not forgotten or lost any fact or principle that ever was his. He merely fails to be able to recall or use it. If you train him properly, he can do both. The difference between a smoothbore cannon that shoots a quarter of a mile, and falls wide of its aim, and a rifle cannon that hits its mark several miles distant, depends upon the way in which it has been drilled. It is exactly the same with minds; and no one realizes, or can realize, this fact quite as well as one who has studied music.

There is another influence exerted by the form of culture peculiar to music. It is from studying it that many a child gets his first conception of the possibility of receiving pleasure in connection with education. This is true of the singing lesson

not only of the kindergarten, but of the grammar school. With intervals of great distaste, because of the monotony of almost endless repetition, it is true of private practise; and it becomes more true still as the effects of practise result in facility of execution. Some seem to think that the strenuous work necessitated by drill never can accompany that which can be termed pleasure. One theory of our modern educational quacks—who seem to have forgotten the experiences of their youth because only imagination, which they have not, is able to recall them—is that education should not be made either hard or disciplinary; on the theory that it cannot thus be made entertaining,—as if it could not be, at one and the same time, both,—as if the mind, like the body, did not enjoy exertion, and the triumph of overcoming, in the very degree of the difficulty involved! The idea of recommending a game to a growing boy on the ground of its being easy! In the olden times, some of the most pleasant hours of almost every childhood were spent when all the school were assembled together, in order to be drilled. Of course, such a method of teaching, to be interesting, requires an interesting instructor; but so does any successful method of teaching.

It may be true that a certain degree of education can be obtained without the pupil's deriving pleasure from his work; but without this there can be no great scholarship. In most departments, too, this phase of pleasure is apt to be developed late in educational experience. In no department is it likely to be experienced as early in life as in music. Perhaps this fact explains why it is that so many

of the most enthusiastic students of medicine, natural science, law, philosophy, theology, are found, when we learn their history, to have been in youth more or less proficient in some form of the art that we are now discussing. The two facts go together. The best day-laborer is usually one who wakes up early in the morning. The best life-laborer is usually one who has had something of entertainment and interest to wake up his mind early in life.

This thought suggests a transition to the last influence that will be mentioned as exerted by the form of culture peculiar to music. This is the prominence that it gives to the effects of personality. In all the arts, as we know, it is these effects, manifested in what the artist puts into his product or leaves out of it, that largely determine its quality, that differentiate, for instance, a poet from a reporter, or a painter from a photographer. The same principle is illustrated in every relationship in the world in which one life touches other lives. It is that which brings one's personality to bear upon his surroundings which makes a body better than a carcass, reveals a spirit inside of a body, and proves that life, in any sphere, is really worth the living. In connection with this conception again, as when we were considering pleasure in connection with drill, the association of ideas may seem to some, at first, incongruous. What can be more formless, and, because personality implies the presence of form, more impersonal in its effects than music? Yet let us think a moment. As in the case of music, so poetry, painting, sculpture and architecture all require an external product,—writ-

ten notes, printed type, pictures, statues, buildings. But of music alone can it be said that the full effects of the art—and this is still true, notwithstanding the graphophone—require an interpretation on the part of some person—and generally not the composer—who either plays upon an instrument, or uses his voice. When we listen to a waltz or to a song, unless we produce it ourselves, there is always a medium or agent through whom the effects are communicated; and in the degree in which interest and pleasure are derived from the performance, they are necessarily associated with this agent. Undoubtedly many of those sitting before me will be able to recognize how much more clearly and universally, as contrasted with the remembrance of others, one can recall certain singers in concert or opera, certain members of quartets, or leaders of choruses or orchestras. When I was a boy, I had many teachers with whom I spent many whole days. But of not one of them could I draw from memory as perfect a portrait as of all my music-teachers whom I saw, only once or twice a week, for only comparatively short periods. The connection between teaching a branch which naturally tends to cause one to exert a personal influence, and the possibility of reaching in the pupil the sources of sympathy, opinion and conduct, will be recognized by all. It is doubtful whether any position in life is susceptible of being used for more purposes, or to secure more important results.

The suggestions of this paper, however, have been already too far extended. In it an attempt has been made to show that there are certain prin-

ciples essential to the very existence of every other higher art, as at present developed, which are traceable to music alone; and that no esthetic influence tends so decidedly as that which it exerts to keep alive, in any department of culture, either a realization in theory or an actualizing in experience of such effects as those of law, thoroughness, accuracy, practise, drill, pleasure in work, or personality in presentation. If what has been said be true, then the music-teacher stands in the very front ranks of those who are leading the armies of culture. Without what he, and he alone, is fitted to contribute, no department of that army can be fully equipped, and all the departments together may fail of their purpose. Few of us in this world, as we get older, can escape realizing that there are very apparent limitations to our influence,—that our lifework, large as, in youth, we hoped that it might become, fills, after all, only a little space. In one sense, of course, this is true. Considered by itself alone, a single stone in a large building almost necessarily appears insignificant. But it need not always be considered by itself. It may be considered in connection with other factors—in its relations to what is below, about or above it. Thus considered, if it be, in any sense, a keystone, then, for the very reason that in itself it appears small and unimportant, the interest and appreciation that it awakens, may become very great. This fact is a sufficient excuse for my presenting the present paper.

THE FUNCTION OF TECHNIC IN EXPRESSION ILLUSTRATED THROUGH ELOCUTION *

The most distinctive influence of any person is exerted through something that has to do with his personality. No field of usefulness offers such promise, therefore, as that in which good soil is waiting for the seed of individual experience. The invitation sent me by your committee to read a paper on "The Function of Technic in Expression" was almost as tempting to my capacities for garrulity as would be a question about warfare to a veteran of Waterloo. General Sherman used to say that war was hell. No soldier thinks it heavenly; and to none of us who have fought the good fight of teaching, does the occupation suggest either the largeness or the rest of that adjective. Most of our lives have been spent in doing very small things in a very wearying way, scattering, like a farmer, the winnowings of straw in exceedingly barren-looking furrows, and hoping that Providence would do something with them. But Providence seems mainly bent upon doing something with ourselves, usually measuring out the degree of our success, like that of the great Teacher, by the degree of our own self-development. Whoever is to lead others to high standards must him-

* Delivered before the National Association of Elocutionists, Boston, June 24-29, 1895, and printed in its records.

self have reached them first. If so, he is likely to be tempted by the devil from the top of a moderately high mountain. After an outlook and a draft from the spring that is there, it is not easy to go back to the marshes—sometimes, too, in the valley of humiliation—and wait, and point, and draw, and shove till lazy feet have jumped the ditches.

This is not the sort of occupation which, when one entered upon the work, many expected, or any desired. The inexperienced conception of a professorship like ours is more likely to be that of a man spending all his time in enlarging the range of Demosthenes and Shakespeare by his own contributions, blowing their dead phrases to a glow with the breath of his own inflections, and starring their every climax with the rays of his own gestures; above all, exhibiting his familiarity with the very gods themselves, by pointing the end of every criticism with a rocket bursting into a temporary rivalry of Venus, Jupiter and Saturn and the whole galaxy of the empyrean.

As a fact, however, no boy was ever more cramped and smothered, while playing dumb orator, than some of us have been, spending so much of our lives, as we have, almost literally kneeling behind those who, but for us, would have had little more influence in the world than the dumb and the halt—and with what result? Not infrequently a comic result; for this is a world of incongruities. The born genius, to whom we have been conscious of offering a few hardly-needed suggestions, may thankfully attribute all his success to our efforts. But the man whom we have literally created from the diaphragm up, sending into certain parts of

his lungs for the very first time the real breath of life, is not seldom inclined to resent the impious insinuation that to any influence less than that of divinity could be attributed what he has become. Gratitude is a spring whose flow is measured, not by that which falls upon it from without, but by that which is already stored in the depths within.

So it happens, as already intimated, that most of us recall the experiences of life as do soldiers. Talk of the flush of victory! There has been hardly any of that; not much, even, of dress parade; but, day in and day out, an endless drudgery of drill. This is so because we have been teachers, especially because we have been teachers of art, and for excellence in every art, as well as in that of warfare, preliminary drill is indispensable. As applied to most arts, this statement would not be disputed. No one expects to become proficient in playing instrumental music until after having associated certain keys of a certain instrument with certain notes in a printed staff, and after having done this and passed from one key to another so many times that the whole process, both of mind and of hand, has become automatic. Nor does anyone expect to become a painter until after a corresponding amount of practise in imitating visible effects with brush or pencil. But tell men that the same principle holds good in elocution, and many of them demur. They know that, while few finger instruments or paint pictures, even in an elementary way, every man, in a certain way, speaks and gestures; that he does each by nature, and they argue that he can attain perfection in it through doing, as the Puritans

used to accuse the Universalists of doing in religion, "merely as nature prompts."

"Don't study elocution," was the advice to his students of a theological professor whom I once knew; "be natural." He, himself, was a better man than some of his brethren. He had evidently practised what he preached. It had become natural for him to put his watch inside his lips while lecturing,—not to cultivate his voice as Demosthenes did with his pebbles; not to show his faith in Providence like a glass-chewing dervish; not even to swallow the glass and become a howling dervish; but because he could do it,—possibly prided himself on the fact. Nature had made him, through a sort of chronic lockjaw, as incapable of opening his teeth to let a watch go in as to let words come out. His mistake was the common one of supposing a distinction to exist between the natural and the artistic. When technic is mastered, and its results become automatic, they, themselves, tho not those of nature in its primary sense, become those of a second or acquired nature; and, in this condition, the highest compliment possible for them, as well as the highest tribute to their success, is given when they are termed natural. But it is difficult for some minds to recognize this fact. I have myself served on committees to award oratorical prizes in colleges other than my own, when my colleagues have advocated distributing the honors among those whose gestures and tones thrust most apparently upon attention, the fact that each had been carefully studied; in other words, among those whose study had not been sufficient to conceal art and to attain that naturalness to acquire which alone such study is of any use.

But if the result must be natural, why, it may be asked, must it be produced by art? Because, when a man turns from conversation to public address, he has departed from the conditions of nature; and unless he have that rare artistic temperament which enables exceptional minds to recognize instinctively the new relationships and proportionments, each to each, of the elementary elements of expression, he cannot restore these conditions except as he acquires skill through following the directions of some instructor who has such a temperament.

Successfully changing private speech into public speech involves much the same process as turning a bug into a bird through the use of a microscope. If you merely put one edge of the glass over his head, or tail, or wing, this appears too large for the rest of his body. Only when you hold your microscope so as to magnify every part of him alike is the result natural. When a man begins to talk in public, he necessarily departs from the conditions of nature by using a louder and higher tone and more breath. As a result, he feels a tendency, at the end of every long sentence, to lessen his force, lower his pitch, and cease to vocalize all his breath. But if he yield to this tendency, which now, as you notice, has, in the changed conditions, become what, in one sense, may be termed natural, he produces, as in what is called the ministerial tone, a series of intonations entirely different from those which, in a far more important sense, can be termed natural. In natural conversation, the last word of a sentence, even if passing into a downward inflection, involves, as a rule, the use of high pitch, loud force, and no change in the amount of breath expended. Pos-

sibly, too, a veteran in the service may be excused for adding here, as a suggestion to the younger instructors present, that perhaps the hardest thing to do in teaching elocution, as well as that which contributes most to whatever success one may attain, is connected with making one's pupils practise until they have succeeded in maintaining the same qualities of pitch, force and volume to the very ends of the most of their sentences. Nothing, certainly, can forever break up ministerial tones as well as cultivating in them a habit of doing this.

But before private conversation can be turned into acceptable public address, other changes have to be made. When the general pitch is relatively higher and the force louder, the pauses and inflections have to be relatively longer; in fact, as has been intimated, every element of delivery has to be proportionately magnified. So with the movements of the body. Because the arms must be given a slower and wider sweep, and the hands and whole frame held longer in single positions, few, however graceful by nature, can gesture gracefully, except as a result of an artistic temperament, or of skill acquired from the instructions of another who has one. As for voice-building, the impossibility of overcoming, without continued practise, wrong methods of breathing, vocalizing or articulating is so universally acknowledged that the subject needs no mention here.

That which does need mention, that for which, as I recognize, I have been asked to prepare this paper, is connected with an answer to the question, "How can the necessary instruction in elocution best be given?" To this question let it be said,

first of all, that there can be no unvarying answer. Successful methods of instruction are usually determined largely by the idiosyncrasies and circumstances of individual instructors. One man can deal with large classes; another with only pupils in private. One feels that he must start with voice-building, another with intonation and gesture. A man able to teach at all ought to be able to decide upon his own course. Often only in the degree in which he is left free to do this, is it possible for him to infuse into his work that which is frequently the most important element of success, namely, his own individuality. But, while there is no uniform answer to the question proposed, there are two general aims to which it seems that the training of the student should be directed: first, to a mastery, one by one, of the elements of elocutionary form; and, second, to a theoretical comprehension of the significance represented in the use of each phase of form.

In attaining these ends, my own circumstances obliged me to adapt my methods to the fact that elocution in both the institutions with which I have been connected was a study required of all. The department, therefore, had to be judged by the way in which it succeeded in reaching all, and be judged, too, in accordance with the severest possible test, a test which, if applied to other departments, would have necessitated holding all examinations in public. Prof. Corson, in his admirable work on the "Aims of Literary Study," makes a remark to the effect that in our colleges, those with natural aptitudes for elocution are selected to appear before commencement audiences, and

that the results are attributed not to nature, but to the instruction received. During all but the first half year in which I taught at Williams College, every senior and junior, without exception, was obliged to speak at evening exercises open not only to the whole college, but also to the whole town. The valedictory at commencement was invariably given to the first man in the order of scholarship, and the fifteen or twenty others who spoke with him received their appointments for no other reason than that they followed him in the same order. When I took charge at Princeton, there was a law, which remained in force up to a time when illness obliged me to be absent from the college, requiring speaking before the college and the public from all the seniors, unless excused by the faculty. On commencement day about eighteen of the hundred or more graduates spoke; and these were all taken from about twenty-five of the higher scholars, one of them being particularly selected on account of proficiency in oratory as valedictorian. But I recall that for three years in succession, the student entitled to the highest honor for scholarship, *i.e.*, the Latin salutatory, was chosen to deliver the valedictory, in case he preferred to do so; and before several commencements, upon my recommendation, the privilege of speaking was made optional with every man in the order of scholarship from the head of the class down to the last needed in order to fill out the requisite number. Thus, as you notice, the reputation of the department had to depend upon the average appearance of a large number of students, and because scholarship mainly determined who these should be, the instruction had to

be conducted in such a way that, as a rule, the same diligence that secured high rank in other departments would secure it in oratory.

Again, as I was responsible for the oratory of all the students in college, numbering, at one time, almost six hundred, the circumstances obliged me to adapt my methods to the necessity of economizing time. At one period, in Williams College, I taught not only all the elocution, but also all the rhetoric, including English Literature and Esthetics. At Princeton, I always had the rhetoric of public address, and, for a while, all Freshman rhetoric; and tho, when my department was fully developed, it included an assistant professor and two instructors, I was always desirous, as Professor, not only of Oratory, but also of Esthetic Criticism, of finding time for lectures on the latter subject. It was necessary, therefore, for me to do as much as possible with the students assembled in classes. But how can one, to collective bodies of students, give instruction in manner without interfering with their individuality of manner? Evidently only by confining class instruction, if possible, to certain features in which the manner of all, notwithstanding differences in other regards, must be alike. But are there such features? Why not? I, at least, think that there are. There are certain methods of using the lungs, tongue and palate which are invariably the same in all persons when speaking properly. There are certain methods of emphasizing by means of pauses, inflections and force which all orators, whenever they are holding the attention of their audiences, no matter how different may be their general styles, invariably

employ; and there are certain methods of moving elbows, wrists and fingers, the slightest deviation from which invariably causes a gesture to seem awkward. These methods, therefore, I thought that one could separate from others, and safely teach to students collectively.

In indicating the practical applications of these conclusions, let me say first that voice-building, with which many teachers rightly begin their instruction, I never attempted with the freshmen. The voices of some of them were not sufficiently matured for the practise necessary; and, besides this, many could not perceive the importance of it or be interested in it. But all were prepared to find some interest and profit in the study of intonation and gesture. Nor even when I began upon voice-building, as I did sophomore year, could I accomplish much by at first taking the whole class together. After a single lecture, explaining breathing movements, I found my best course was to appoint an hour when, once or twice a week, students could come to me for a minute or two, and receive each for himself, certain exercises adapted to his individual requirements, which he was expected to practise till the next appointment. After personal instruction had thus insured right methods of making the elementary movements of breathing, vocalizing and articulating, but not before this, as it seemed to me, the class were prepared for concerted exercises, for which, sometimes in connection with lectures on other subjects, I or my assistants met them once or twice a week, during the junior and senior years.

Exactly the reverse of this order of instruction

was adopted in teaching intonation and gesture. These subjects were begun in the freshman year, and with bodies of students collected in classes, the instruction, in accordance with what has been said, being confined to the methods invariably employed by all persons when speaking properly. I found that these methods were violated not only on account of the disproportionate use of some elements of emphasis as compared with others, to which reference has been made already, but also on account of unconscious imitation, as when a country lad came echoing the ministerial tones of his pastor. I found, too, that mistakes arising from both causes could be corrected, to an extent, by conscious imitation of right methods.

With the double purpose, therefore, of keeping out of college false methods, which, if introduced, might be imitated, and of cultivating true methods, which it would do less harm to have imitated, weekly exercises were begun with the freshmen. Once or twice the whole class met together, then they were separated into divisions numbering, when studying inflections, from fifty to twenty, and, when studying gesture, from twenty-five to twelve. Lectures were given on the substance of certain material in my "*Orator's Manual*," which they were told to review and to learn. One exercise each was devoted to the general principles of emphasis, to time and to force, and about three exercises each to inflections, to gesture and to miscellaneous reading. In connection with the lectures, which were intended to explain the significance of the form of emphasis described, the class, at some time in every exercise was asked to repeat, clause

by clause, after the instructor a certain declamation in the "Orator's Manual," printed with which are indications for pauses, inflections, force and gesture. Every time this declamation was repeated, the attention of the student was directed to a new subject; during the lecture on pauses, for instance, to the pauses, and during the lecture on inflections to these. Yet, every time, the instructor himself would use all of what I have termed the essential and unvarying elements of vocal, and, when gestures were reached, of visible emphasis. This particular mode of practise was intended to train the students for that which, at the beginning, was, for half of them, a physical impossibility, namely, to embody the emphasis in the form. As applied to the use of the voice, the conception was that the essential and unvarying elements of delivery, such as pauses and inflections, especially downward ones started in connection with sustained force at high pitch, have to be learned through repetition precisely as is the case with a tune in music. When it came to gestures, after explaining their significance and methods of formation, the instructor spent a few hours in walking from man to man, pulling into shape elbows, wrists and fingers, while showing exactly how to produce about a dozen movements, which, in my opinion, include all that are necessary—not for acting but for oratory. In subsequent exercises, to accustom the student to make easy transitions from one gesture to another, and to do this while speaking, the class imitated the instructor, clause by clause, while he added gestures to the declamation already repeated so many times before.

There were two principal reasons why I thought it best to use the form of practise just described. One reason was that, apparently, attention can be best confined to tones and gestures, and to these alone, when exemplified by the application of them to a declamation already perfectly memorized, and, therefore, requiring no effort to recall it. The other reason was that half the freshmen of a college do not naturally take enough interest in a subject of this kind to practise outside of a recitation room. Therefore, in order to teach them anything at all, it seemed to me essential that I should myself oversee a certain amount of practise inside the recitation room. In doing as I did, I pursued the same course as when, in teaching rhetoric, I required essays, or parts of them, to be written in my own presence.

That certain objections can be rationally urged against some features of the kind of practise that I have been describing, of course, I know. Underlying all of these objections is the general conception that it necessitates imitation. But what of that? Every method of expression necessitates imitation. Man is an imitative being. Children imitate the tones and gestures of their parents; and all grown people of the same countries—Irishmen, Scotchmen, Englishmen—imitate those of one another. So do all speakers in the same college. What is it but carrying out the dictates of common sense for an instructor to avail himself of this fact by taking steps to turn the imitative tendency into right directions?

But imitation, it is said, cultivates methods of delivery not characteristic of the speaker himself,

and, therefore, destitute of individuality. This objection, if it can be proved, is certainly valid. But can it be proved with reference to the methods just described? If concerted practise be confined, as has been explained, to effects which every successful speaker produces in the same way, what harm can be done by causing all one's pupils to produce them in the same way? What these effects are has already been indicated; but the truth of what has been said of them can, perhaps, be clearly apprehended only as they are contrasted with other effects which there should be no endeavor to cause pupils to produce in the same way. These other effects are those directly dependent upon individual temperaments and tendencies. For instance, there is the rhythm of the tones, and, sometimes, the reach of the gestures especially, as determined by the rate of the movement. Notice, however, that as applied even to these matters, it is possible, in class exercises, to repeat the same declamation both in slow and in fast time, and thus to show the student how, while words and gestures continue similarly related, their general effects, absolutely considered, may be different, and to show him, too, how the rate of delivery should be determined by his own individual constitution and interpretation. As a result, some of those trained in the same class, because naturally phlegmatic, will speak and move slowly, and others, because naturally nervous, will speak and move rapidly.

Again, there is the melody of the movement, as determined by the intonations not of emphatic, but of unemphatic words. Melody, as determined by the emphatic words, can usually be shown to follow

a fixt law, one manifestation of it meaning one thing, and another meaning another thing. Therefore, it can be taught to students collectively. But melody, as determined by unemphatic passages, can, without misrepresenting the sense, differ in persons of different temperaments, or from different localities, as in the accent of an Irishman as contrasted with that of a Yankee. Therefore, in my opinion, any class practise of this unemphatic melody is hazardous. Indeed, even to private pupils, it is often best taught when it is not taught. In directing attention to it at all, there is always some danger of tampering with individuality of effect, which is nowhere more clearly differentiated than in these unemphatic passages. But, besides this, to cause the student to think of them in any way has a tendency to cause him to make them emphatic, which is precisely what they ought not to be. Their relation to what is emphatic, especially to the emphatic words, seems best preserved when they are treated more as a flag is when attached to a staff. Wave the staff in the right way, and the waves of the flag will take care of themselves. It is mainly a disregard of this simple principle that causes the artificial effects undoubtedly produced by some of the older systems, noticeably by that of Mandeville. So I think that in nineteen cases out of twenty, perhaps, melody on unemphatic passages can be left to take care of itself; and even with the twentieth man I myself should try to cultivate flexibility by a general course in voice-building before venturing upon anything else.

What has just been said furnishes a partial an-

swer to a still more serious objection sometimes urged against any practise that is even in the slightest degree imitative. This is that it tends to produce an unintelligent effect, *i. e.*, to make delivery determined by certain requirements of form irrespective of that in it which expresses thought and feeling. There is no apprehension on my part that any who have ever been pupils of mine, or who are acquainted with my "Orator's Manual," or with the tendency which that book, when first published, introduced into the teaching of elocution, will suppose this objection to be applicable to methods as actually practised by myself. But they may suppose it to involve a theoretical deviation from their own straight, if not narrow, principle. Let us consider the question for a little from this viewpoint. My theory is, that, in the degree in which any essential characteristic of delivery is defective, there is not a movement of the elbow, wrist or fingers, of the lungs, larynx, palate or tongue, which can be freed from defect except as a result of automatic action acquired through a slow and laborious practise of exercises, every feature of which has been accurately described by the instructor and put into execution by the pupil; for no matter how rapid or how slight a gesture or a tone may be, the eye or the ear will be sure to detect and feel any defect whatever in its expressional quality.

The carrying to its logical conclusion of this conception is what I conceive to be the application to elocution of the requirements of technic. Against this latter as necessitated in elocution, the objections urged are precisely the same as those urged

against it as necessitated in any art. For this reason, they would better be answered, perhaps, in a general rather than in a specific way. Misunderstanding of the relations to expression of technic, and consequent suspicion of it, is common in our own country. I sometimes think that it is constitutional with us. Certainly no race manifests such possibilities of error in this direction as does the Anglo-Saxon. Many of us have apparently become so accustomed to see a form used to express a mental condition diametrically the opposite of that which it should express, that we have ceased to recognize any necessity of having the one correlated to the other. Is there any other race among whom an ideal hero is a man like Rochester in "Jane Eyre," Bertie in "The Henrietta," or the "Disagreeable Man" in "Ships that Pass in the Night"—a man whose exterior exactly misrepresents his interior? Is it a wonder, either, that this non-conformity of the ideal to the real in actual life should influence conceptions of art? An Italian or a Frenchman with a voice naturally melodious, a frame naturally graceful, and both naturally flexible, seems to believe instinctively that the form of expression should be, and can be, conformed to that which is behind it; and he seldom thinks of appearing in public until he has studied sufficiently to secure this result. But an Englishman or an American who, as a rule, has by nature either an inarticulate drawl or a nasal twang, and an awkwardness not only unthinking but unthinkable, he, forsooth, must hold a theory that any study of elocutionary technic is unnecessary!

The truth is that art-theories, like religious

creeds, are framed not so much for the purpose of adjusting conditions to the demands of truth, as of advocating the conditions, whether of truth or of falsehood, which the framers recognize to be their own. The majority of us, tho usually unconscious of the fact, would rather keep all the world below us than, by pointing to a level higher than our own, risk having someone discovered there who, instead of ourselves, has attained it. Accordingly, it is common with the English to fancy that if one have only something to express, he need not trouble himself about the form of expression. So, when they wish to express heartiness of welcome, they imitate the action of men shaking hands with ladies holding up heavy trains on their arms,—actions necessarily suggestive of a pretence of having artificial habits acquired at court, and, by consequence, just as necessarily incapable, in the remotest degree, of suggesting anything even of the nature of heartiness. They, too, and their followers in our country are the only people who have ever seriously assigned high rank to men like Blake, Beardsley, or Whitman; and even when, according to the analogy of the law bringing day after night, they wake up to the fact that the technical aspects of form are worthy of attention, they also acknowledge this in an equally one-sided way, on the same principle apparently, that a boat when nearest capsizing in one direction is always thrown, when there comes a turn of the wave, where it is nearest capsizing in the opposite direction. Swinburne and Oscar Wilde have certainly not neglected the requirements of technic as applied to form. But, therefore, argue the Eng-

lish, with just as much logic as they apply to significance irrespective of technic, these poets are to be judged by their technic irrespective of significance.

Similar conditions have characterized the thought of our own country. Our great transcendentalist, Ralph Waldo Emerson, seldom makes an allusion to art, or an attempt to practise it, without going astray with reference to this matter of technic: and probably not one New England clergyman in a hundred has, even to-day, a sufficient comprehension of the fact that by truth is meant an exact adjustment of form to spirit not to use the text "God is a spirit and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth" as an argument against ritualism,—which it may be but is not necessarily. How very slightly, too, anything like correct form is supposed, in our country, to be a necessary feature of pictorial art, may be accurately estimated by looking at the covers and posters of what are, undoubtedly the best representatives of our artistic conceptions,—our popular illustrated magazines.*

But with us, too, there is abundant evidence of the inevitable danger of capsizing in the other direction,—of paying so much attention to technic that significance will be ignored altogether. Poetic form, for instance, as used by Shakespeare, Coleridge, Scott and Burns, was characterized by apparent ease and facility. Whatever art there was in it, if not wholly concealed, at least called attention, not to itself but to the thought and feeling for

* The "fad" thus criticized in 1895, has now, in 1910, ceased to be the fashion.

the expression of which alone it is of any use. It is true that, in the times of Queen Anne, form like this was considered insufficient for the purpose. It is also true, tho the fact is not often acknowledged, that in our own times there is a similar opinion. But we have learned that the styles of Pope and Dryden were artificial. What will our successors learn about our styles? Certainly, if those older poets cultivated an unnatural rhythmic swing, ours are cultivating an equally unnatural melodic swag, the straightforward movement, which alone is logically appropriate in an art, the medium of which is a series of effects in time, having given place to a succession of side-heaves, occasioned by endeavors to lug along heavy epithets. In the overloaded form, there is scarcely more drift, which used to be considered essential in poetry, than in a fishing-smack with every line on board trailing in the water, and every hook at the end of it stuck fast in seaweed. From the levy made upon every possibility of ornamentation within reach, one would suppose that the contemporary muse were the mistress of a South Sea Islander, who never sees beauty where there is no paint. Or, to turn to an art in which paint is more legitimate,—to pictures. We all recognize that here, too, the form may be unduly emphasized. When one enters a gallery, the work of the great master is most likely to be that which, at first glance, might be mistaken for a mirror reflecting nature outside the window; in other words, a work, in which technic, however perfect in itself, has been carefully subordinated to the requirements of representation. Whatever masterpiece one considers he should never wholly ignore the

question, What does it mean? And if the answer be "Nothing," the condition is unfortunate. Anything made to represent nothing cannot be a successful product of representative art.

Appreciating the full force of this conclusion, and the absolute necessity of having the form, as developed by technic, exactly conformed, in every case, to the requirements of significance, the repetitious practise of pauses, inflections and gestures, the consideration of which led to this digression, was also accompanied, in my own teaching, by a careful explanation of the exact phase of thought or feeling represented by each different method of using them. Before the close of the term, also, three or four separate exercises were devoted to reading. In these the students were expected to apply, mentally, the methods of delivery which their imitative practise had enabled them to produce physically. One of my ways of causing them to emphasize the right words in the right manner was to keep interrupting them with questions. My reason for this, as I explained to them, was that an interested audience is always mentally asking questions; and the moment that a speaker's tones cease to be those natural to the answering of questions, his audience, so far as tones have any influence, will cease to listen to him. Practically, too, I never found one downward inflection, which could not be brought to exactly the right pitch, in response to questions thus put. They produce the same result as was indicated as desirable by the late Dr. Tyng, formerly rector of St. George's Church, New York. He said that the secret of his success as a public speaker was his imagining everyone before him to

be a numskull to whom every little statement must be explained.

A student of mine would begin, "Why put off longer the declaration of independence?"

"Put off how?" I would ask.

"*Longer*," he would answer.

"Say so, then," I would reply, and he would go on:

"Why put off longer the declaration of independence," dropping his voice on the last word.

"Declaration of what?" I would ask.

"Independence," he would answer in a tone slightly higher.

"Of *what*?" I would ask again.

"*Independence*," he would say, this time considerably higher.

"Of *WHAT*?" I would shout; "I'm deaf. I can't hear you."

"INDEPENDENCE," he would cry.

"Well, say so, then," I would tell him again. "You're not lulling babes to sleep. You're trying to rouse men to action."

And so, finally, the voice would rise to the proper pitch; at first, of course, with too much force, but it is easy enough to regulate force after a pupil has learned to use pitch.

Following the class exercises that have been described, there were courses in vocal culture, and at sometime before graduating, every student was required to appear for at least six private rehearsals. To these, he always brought his speech copied on alternate lines of the paper used, between which, as he spoke, the instructor would mark with colored pencils every inflection or gesture which, as

judged by the requirements of significance, was wrong, or was omitted where its use would be an improvement.

Even after I had three assistants in my department, I myself did not entirely drop, as most professors would have done, its elementary work. I considered it more important, as well as more difficult, to drill an unappreciative Freshman at the beginning of his course than to lecture to a possibly appreciative Senior near the end of it. In the kind of drill that was given, and has been described, my experience taught me to believe implicitly. At its conclusion, at the end of a single short term, out of a class of over a hundred, I have frequently found no more than two or three physically unable to make right inflections; and every flexible man—certainly three-quarters of the class—could make satisfactory gestures. The rest knew, at least, how to practise in order to learn to do so; and, if interested in the subject, always finally accomplished the desired result.

A few words more I feel impelled to add with reference to the general effect of requiring all the students of a college to take, at least, some such preliminary instruction in the technic of elocution. As a means of turning attention to professions necessitating public address, especially to the ministry and the law, there is no doubt of its utility. Certainly, a quarter and possibly a third of those entering such professions from institutions where this study is required, do so as a result of its revealing to them oratorical aptitudes of which, but for it, they never would have imagined themselves possessed.

Nor must one forget the close connection between elocution and literature. The man who has learned how to arrange tones and pauses in reading is the man who can best arrange what can be easily read by others. Where elocution is properly taught, not once in a score of times, will you find a prize writer in an upper class who has not started by being a prize speaker in a lower class. When Wendell Phillips made a special study of elocution at Harvard, by his side studied Motley, the historian. But, beyond its influence upon literary excellence, the kind of practise necessitated in elocution, and its very apparent effects, are a revelation to large numbers of students of the true method through which thought and feeling can make subservient to themselves the agencies of expression in any department whatever that necessitates the acquirement of skill; indeed, a revelation of how, if at all, the mind can master the whole body or any of its bodily surroundings.

Notice, too, that the comprehension of facts like these is essential also to character, wherever fully developed. Therefore, there is good reason why the majority of the great teachers, whose names have come down to us from antiquity, like Aristotle, Gamaliel, Quintilian, were teachers of expression, some of them, like the last-named, distinctively teachers of elocution. There is good reason to hope, too, that the time may come when, in our own country, the instructors in this department will not march on commencement day, as so many of them are now obliged to do, with the tutors and assistants at the end of the procession. Unless possession be more important than expression, un-

less the mind be a well and not a spring, unless it be more essential to weigh down the memory than to wing the imagination, unless the term "Institution of Liberal Arts" be a misnomer, this is not the place where they should march.

At the opening of this paper, attention was called to the fact that elocution is an art, subject, therefore, to the principles controlling all the arts. Notice, now, that it is not only an art, but also, in an important sense, the art of arts, the center and fountain of the whole esthetic system. When the fountain plays, there is melody and rhythm in the rush of its spray and the ripple of its overflow; there is color and line in the sunlit bow crowning its brow and in the ghost-like shadow shrinking from the touch of moonlight or the frost. But there would be nothing to hear or to see, except for the fountain itself. Nor would there be anything of the whole art-system except for elocution. Make that which can echo a man's intonations, symbolize his articulations, imitate his postures and the hues and outlines that surround him, and you have the possibilities of music, poetry, painting, sculpture and architecture. Whatever more these latter arts include, they gain all their uses and meanings from the previous use which an immaterial soul has made of its material body. Art is human sentiment made incarnate in the forms of nature; and it first touches nature in the human form, as in elocution.

Now, observe one result of this. All the other arts necessitate an external product; and the difficulties connected with inventing and arranging this, call attention to form in a way that elocution

need not. The musician may forget about significance in thinking of melody and harmony, the poet in thinking of meter and rhyme, the painter, sculptor, architect, in thinking of color and outline. But the form to which the elocutionist must apply the results of technic is a part of himself. Therefore, he, of all artists, is least liable, in his own conceptions, to divorce the form of expression from the significance of expression. Take any elocutionary system and you will see the truth of this,—that of Delsarte, for instance. What does it suggest? To half of us the importance and possibility of accurately representing significance in the form. But to the other half, it suggests gymnastic technic—the importance and possibility of adapting the form to every possible requirement of grace. At the same time, to all of us it suggests something of both conceptions. Such a result is not so inevitable in any other art. Nor is it an unimportant mission of elocution, as I conceive, to make it inevitable in all the arts. But, while doing this, and because doing it, our branch of instruction has a broader mission still. What, as well as it, can enable a man to realize that he has a soul of which his body is merely an instrument, an instrument that can be made to signal any purpose, or to trumpet any call? And the man who recognizes that the human form can be transfigured by the influence of soul,—is not he the one most likely to recognize that, by way of association or suggestion, all forms can be thus transfigured?

The peculiar forms of technic with which we have to do, may, sometimes, as said at the opening of this paper, necessitate our dealing with very small

things; but they are like the small stones which, when put together, frame the grandest edifice. For the principles of expression which we teach,—what are they but those which best interpret that which is most important in humanity, and not in it alone, but in all the audible and visible forms of the universe, from which it is possible for humanity to derive wisdom and guidance?

THE PRINCIPLES OF SUCCESSFUL WRIT- ING AND SPEAKING FUNDAMENT- ALLY THE SAME *

“ No general theory of expression,” says Herbert Spencer, when writing upon style, “ seems yet to have been enunciated. The maxims contained in works on composition and rhetoric are presented in an unorganized form. Standing as isolated dogmas, as empirical generalizations, they are neither so clearly apprehended, nor so much respected, as they would be, were they deduced from some simple first principle. We are told that ‘ brevity is the soul of wit.’ We hear styles condemned as ‘ verbose or involved.’ But however influential the truths thus dogmatically embodied, they would be much more influential if reduced to something like scientific coordination. In this, as in other cases, conviction will be greatly strengthened when we understand the *why*. And we may be sure that a comprehension of the general principles from which the rules of composition result, will not only bring them home to us with greater force, but will discover to us other rules of like origin.” In connection with this general comment, but especially with its latter clause, it is of interest to recall a declaration made more than eighteen hundred years ago by the great Roman rhetorician, Quintilian. “ For

* Revise of the Preface and Introduction of a text-book termed “The Writer.”

my own part," he said, " I think that we ought to write and to speak on the same principles and by the same laws."

It is strange that the centuries that have elapsed since the time of Quintilian have witnessed, so far as history now records, no attempt to make a practical application of his suggestion. Yet, probably, in all these centuries, rhetoric and elocution have been taught as merely different branches of the same subject. They have been taught thus, not solely as a matter of convenience,—because of a lack of means with which to pay for separate instructors; but because it has been felt that the two departments are so nearly allied that they ought, in some way, to be made to go together. Both have to do with language. No one is fully prepared to be a teacher in the one who is not prepared to be a teacher in the other; nor does any pupil, as a rule, show aptitude for success in either who does not show almost equal aptitude for success in both. Effective rhetoricians usually furnish the best candidates for effective public speakers; and the latter are those whose methods of writing best accommodate themselves to the requirements of reading. Most of us know that a good literary style is cultivated by acquaintance with good literature even more than by studying rhetoric, in however excellent a manual; and we know, too, that no small part of the beneficial influence of this literature, whether oratory or poetry, is derived from testing how it sounds, which involves getting the benefit of its distinctively elocutionary effects.

Now might not systems of rhetoric, more largely than at present, avail themselves of inferences that

may be legitimately drawn from facts like these? Might not these elocutionary effects of composition, and the methods of producing them, be taught? Why should not text-books begin to cultivate good style in a manner analogous to that in which it is now so often cultivated by reading? The moment that these questions are asked, they suggest some others. Does not all that has been said thus far, indicate that there is some connection between elocution and rhetoric more deeply grounded than any that is usually supposed? Is there any such radical difference between the two as to justify the radically different methods in accordance with which they have hitherto been taught? May they not, in fact, be radically alike? Let us consider this question for a moment. Elocution and rhetoric both give expression to thought, and, often, as in oratory, to the same thought. If this be so, the only difference between them must lie in the method of emphasizing the thought which each expresses. What is this difference? Both use words; and words are sounds, each of which has a conventional meaning; but the emphasis is put in elocution upon the sounds, and in rhetoric upon the meanings. This is the only invariable distinction between the two. At first, possibly, some may be inclined to doubt the accuracy of this statement. It may seem to them that elocution differs from rhetoric in being spoken, and also in being accompanied by forms appealing to the eye, as in postures and gestures. But a moment's thought will recall the fact that rhetoric also is often spoken, and read aloud, and, even when read with no audible sounds, seems to force the imagination to hear these; and that it also is

accompanied by forms appealing to the eye, as in the printed text. Precisely, too, as in connection with gestures, we recall the general postures of the body, the special conformations of the hands, in their palms, fingers and fists, and the movements of the arms, straight, circular, angular, upward, downward, or on a level, with more or less degrees of emphasis; so, in connection with the printed text, we recall the general look of the page, the special arrangements of sentences, lines and stanzas, and of commas, colons, periods, interrogation-points, exclamation-points and dashes, with a more or less emphatic use of italics, caps and small caps. But gesture and typography, analogous in their nature, and both helps well-nigh essential, the one to elocution and the other to rhetoric, are, neither of them, absolutely essential. It would be possible to hear elocution without seeing gestures, and rhetoric without seeing a printed text. What is essential is the representation of thought through the use of words, the sounds of which are emphasized in the one case, and the meanings in the other; tho, in neither case, is sound or meaning left wholly out of consideration.

This being so, it certainly does not seem that there should be any great difference in principle between the appropriate use of words in an art that emphasizes one feature in them and in an art that emphasizes another feature. Why should not sounds when we are emphasizing the meanings that they express be related to one another in ways analogous to those in which meanings are related when we are emphasizing the sounds that express them? If we admit that this must be the case, an-

other thought suggests itself. Inasmuch as elocution is the simpler art, and therefore the more easy to understand, might it not be wise to avail ourselves of our understanding of this, and apply it to the solution of the more intricate problems of rhetoric? Might it not be especially wise to do so at the present time, in view of the very great progress, not paralleled in the case of rhetoric, that has been made of late in our understanding of the laws of elocution? Within thirty years, the methods underlying the effects of this latter art, have been so satisfactorily studied that their essentials are now practically beyond dispute. Moreover, they have been so analyzed to their elements, so grounded upon first principles, and so comprehensively yet succinctly stated, that they are few in number, readily remembered, and easy to apply. For instance, the sixteen rules for the use of the upward and downward inflections, not all of them together beginning to cover all possible exceptions, which were given in the latest and best book upon elocution published in England in 1876 are all contained in "The Orator's Manual," published in 1879 in a single fundamental principle and its converse, and to this principle there can be no exception. These principles of elocution, moreover, because of the thoroughness and comprehensiveness of the analysis and generalization to which they have been subjected have all been put into positive form. None of these facts are true of rhetoric. Its rules are numerous, difficult to remember, hard to apply, and many of the more important of them are put into merely negative form. They tell the student, for instance, that he must refrain from certain faults,

or his style will be neither forcible nor elegant; yet, as everybody recognizes, he could refrain from every one of the faults mentioned, and still continue to have a style lacking either characteristic.

Enough has been said, however, to indicate the general line of thought that has suggested this idea of applying to rhetoric the methods of elocution. A few words more will render clear the feasibility of doing this. By elocutionary methods are meant certain ways of indicating the sense by using tones as they are presented in one of the four elements of time, force, quality or pitch. As presented in *time*, tones are made to have *rhythm*. But there is no essential difference between the rhythm of elocution and of rhetoric. In elocution, again, *slow time* indicates things that *move slowly*, or thoughts that are *important*, and *vice versa*. Precisely the same principles apply in rhetoric to orthography causing *long* or *short* articulation. Once more, by means of elocutionary *pauses in time*, words and series of words are separated from others and grouped together; and so, too, in rhetoric nothing is more essential to clearness of expression than the *time* at which qualifying terms or phrases, like the word *only* or the clause *as it were*, are introduced into sentences, including the means by which articles, nouns, adjectives, pronouns, verbs, auxiliaries, adverbs, and prepositions or clauses connected with them, are separated from others which they do not qualify, and are grouped with those which they do qualify. What may be termed *force* in both elocution and rhetoric is indicative of *energy*. This is manifested, in the former art, by some unusual emphasis or arrangement of tones, and, in the latter

art, in strict accordance with this analogy, by a selection of short, sharply defined, ponderous, or, in some way suggestive words or phrases, and by the arrangements of these at the beginnings or endings of clauses or sentences, as in periodic or climactic order. *Quality* in elocution is indicative of *feeling*, the pure tone manifesting unimpassioned utterance; the orotund, animated or elated utterance; the aspirate, secretive or apprehensive utterance; the guttural, hostile utterance; and the pectoral, awed or affrighted utterance. Corresponding to these in rhetoric, we have various combinations of vowels and consonants, producing imitative or onomatopoeic sounds, or euphonious or harmonious sounds, as in alliteration, assonance and rhyme. Finally, in elocution a *downward pitch* of the voice *points to* an emphasized word or clause, in order to show its particular *relevancy* to the subject; an *upward pitch points away from* a word or clause to show its *reference* to some other one; and a circumflex inflection, using a *pitch in both directions*, *points both to* a word or clause and *also away from it*, to show both or either relationship. This involves its *equivocacy*. These three terms and the distinctions indicated by them are applicable to rhetoric. In this art, *relevancy* of form to form causes *purity* of style; of form to thought, *precision*; of thought to thought, *propriety*. *Reference* of form to form in rhetoric involves the avoidance of ambiguity through the use of exactly the same persons, genders, or numbers in certain words, thus rendering the relationships between adjacent pronouns, verbs, or other parts of speech, immediately distinguishable. *Reference* of form to thought

involves a repetitious use, for the designation of the same object of thought, of the same or exactly synonymous nouns, relatives, verbs, auxiliaries, prepositions, adverbs, and clauses connected with them. *Reference* of thought to thought involves an appropriate use of *figures of speech* either direct or indirect as in metaphor, simile, allegory, personification, etc. Rhetorical *equivocacy* involves a use of such forms of expression as we have in the epigram, paradox, innuendo, and the various phases of sarcasm and irony.

One acquainted with the subject need not be told now that under some one of the above heads can be included every element of rhetorical style. But the completeness of the system, while essential, is not the excuse for its existence; nor its most commendable characteristic. More important than either is the fact that it is based upon a few general propositions, the reasons for which can be so readily recognized, and the applications of which are so logically necessitated, that there are good grounds for believing that they can produce upon the pupil the impression that, in his rhetorical studies, he is dealing not with the names of things, but with the things themselves; and not with the methods of avoiding, in a negative way, grammatical defects, but of introducing, in a positive way, artistic excellences. Thus, possibly, there may be developed in him that interest and prompting to initiative to which there is always some tendency wherever, for laws that may merely repress, there are substituted principles not expected to fulfil their mission except in the degree in which they have been applied in practise.

THE LITERARY ARTIST AS DEVELOPED BY THE STUDY OF ELOCUTION *

The history of literature is the history of the evolution of written discourse from oral discourse. In the early ages, the styles of both orators and story-tellers grew out of the methods of speech. When the story-tellers became artists, they turned the requirements of accent and inhalation into measure and line, and thus developed verse. All verse, even of an epic, died with its composer, unless its peculiar fitness for recitation caused succeeding minstrels to echo it down the ages; and even a lyric died unless its lines, when they were read, could sing themselves into a song so full of sweetness that the world could not forget it. After men began to record their thoughts in manuscript, the ideal of style still continued to be framed upon that of speech. Philosophical disquisitions, like those of Plato, were presented in the form of dialog; and when epics and lyrics ceased to be merely recited, the poets substituted dramas which, for full effect, compelled recitation. To-day, oral requirements continue to determine style in our written orations, our dramas, and the most artistic parts—the conversations—of our novels. Of other forms of composition, the same is true, tho not to the same extent.

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Such being the genesis of literature, what lessons can we draw from it? Most thinkers admit that no method of development manifested in the history of the race is out of analogy with that which is manifested in the history of the individual. If this opinion be justified, we have a right to infer that proficiency in oral discourse on the part of the young is desirable, if not essential, as a preparation for proficiency in written discourse. Do facts, however, warrant this inference? Why do they not? Almost anyone who has had experience in colleges in which elocution is faithfully taught will find it quite difficult to recall any names of any students ranking high in rhetoric, when in upper classes, who have not shown interest and aptitude in elocution, when in lower classes. He can point to scores of graduates, also, of high professional and literary rank, who, throughout their college courses, manifested no ability whatever, except in elocution. This is a fact more important than many suppose. Three men of whom this is true are suggested to me, as I now write. All are living in the largest city of our country, and are well known by reputation. The one, too, occupying the most exacting literary position, where his work is constantly submitted to most critical tests, seemed, in college, utterly devoid of the slightest germ capable of literary development. But he was a hard worker. In elocution he succeeded; and the temple of culture is entered by many doors. The instructor who induces a young man to push open one of them will force him to a glimpse that will lure him further. To apply this to our present subject, the door of literary art stands close beside that of

elocation. How was it with Henry Ward Beecher? He tells us, in his "Yale Lectures," that "it was" his "good fortune in early academic life to fall into the hands of Prof. Lovell, and for a period of three years," he "was drilled incessantly, in posturing, gesture, and voice-culture." Has anyone ever been heard to say that, when in college, Mr. Beecher studied any other subject incessantly? Mr. Motley, the historian, when in Harvard, was probably a student in all departments. But to one study, he and Wendell Phillips together devoted themselves with special assiduity. This was elocation.

All facts, even when only approximately universal, illustrate principles behind them. It is easy enough to perceive a general reason for a connection between a knowledge of elocation and of literary art. The latter is printed to be read; and words, to be read easily, must be selected and arranged for that purpose. This is true, even when they are not to be vocalized. "In reading without utterance aloud," says Alexander Bain, in his *Rhetoric*, "we have a sense of the articulate flow of the voice as it appeals to the ear." If this be so, the deduction is unavoidable that the man who, himself, knows how to read with ease will be the most likely to know how to select and to arrange words so that they can be read with ease by others. He will be the most likely to know just where to introduce the accents causing natural rhythm, the pauses enabling one to breathe without effort, and the important words emphasizing the sense; to know where to hasten the movement by short sentences and syllables that one can pronounce quickly, and where to retard it by long sentences and syllables.

bles that have to be uttered slowly; to know how to balance the sound-effects of epithets and phrases, when ideas are to be contrasted, or to parallel them when they are to be compared; to know how to let the suggestions of proof, if decisive, unwind like a cracking whiplash, at the end of a periodic sentence or climax, or, if indecisive, unravel into shreds at the end of a loose sentence or an anti-climax; to know how to charge his batteries of breath with consonants and clauses that hiss, whine, roar, or rattle, and give thought the victory over form, through rhyme that is loaded with reason, and rhythm that repeats the thought-waves pulsing in the brain, or only to waste his energies in cataloging names for things that never waken realization of what they cannot picture, that never rouse imagination save as they first lull to dreams, and that never stir one vivid feeling except of gratitude when their dull details are at an end.

What has been said is true as applied not only to the writer but also to the reader of writing, not only to him whose compositions are to influence others, but also to him who is to be interested in the best that others can produce. How can one be expected to appreciate that which has caused poets like Shakespeare, Milton, or Tennyson to put their thoughts into verse, if his ear have never been made acquainted by nature or by training with the relations and the meanings of sounds? Upon such a man, all the time and the care that these poets have expended in arranging their words in another form than prose have been wasted. As Prof. J. R. Seeley, lecturer upon modern history in Cambridge University, Eng., says, in his essay upon "Eng-

lish in Schools”: “It is more than a hundred years since Bishop Berkeley propounded the question whether half the learning and talent of England was not wholly lost because elocution was not taught in schools and in colleges. The same question might be repeated now, so slow are we English people in taking a hint. . . . I think that by this means, more than by any other, may be evoked in the minds of the young a taste for poetry and eloquence. This taste is very universal. Generally, when it appears wanting, it is only dormant; because no means have been taken to cultivate the sense of rhythm, and to make the delightfulness of speech understood.” To the same effect, F. W. Newman says, in his article on “A University Curriculum”: “If a systematic reading class of the noblest poetry, under the guidance of a judicious elocution master, be added, no lack of taste for our poetry need be feared.”

There are other reasons, not so commonly observed, why a study of elocution is beneficial to the production and the appreciation of literature. They may be considered under two heads: First, those connected with the character of literature as an art: and second, those connected with the necessity, as a prerequisite for proficiency in any art, of acquiring skill.

In the first place, literature belongs to the department of art. This fact necessitates its appealing, not—as science does—to the understanding through direct statements with reference to ideas or emotions, but to the imagination through forms representative of these. In other words, the imagination thinks of that which art presents, by per-

ceiving images which appear in the mind. But in different arts these images are awakened in different ways. The inarticulated sounds heard in music start within one a general emotive tendency—active or restful, triumphant or desponding, gay or sad, as the case may be—and this tendency influences the general direction of thought; but exactly what the form of the thought—or the image—shall be, the mind is left free to determine for itself. The same composition may make a farmer think of a thunder-shower, a sailor of a tempest, or a soldier of a battle-field. In painting and in sculpture, on the contrary, it is the form or image that is determined by the presentation, and the emotive tendency that the mind is left free to develop in connection with it.

Literary art stands halfway between these two extremes. It appeals to the imagination not only as sounds do—which fact is evident to all of us—but also as sights do. Words almost invariably recall things seen, as do the words “horse,” “house,” “hill,” “outlandish,” “overlook,” “undermine.” The peculiarity of elocution is that it develops, and therefore reveals to men, both these linguistic possibilities. Rhythm, quality, modulation and energy of movement produce effects of sound. The articulation of many of the words, to say nothing of the accompanying gestures, produces effects of sight. If, in elocutionary delivery, a man forget to appeal to imagination according to the methods of sound, he ceases to have that drift which is necessary in order to draw into the channel of his thought, and sweep onward, as music does, the emotions of his audience. If he forget to

appeal to imagination according to the methods of sight, *i. e.*, to remember to what an extent his words, and each word in its place, must cause his audience to think in pictures, then his motive, being merely musical, begins to have the effect legitimate to music. It either lulls people to sleep or, if not, at least leaves their minds free to determine for themselves what shall be the substance of their thought. His delivery fails to hold them to the particular subject that he is presenting. Subtly recognizing this fact, experienced elocutionists always select for recitation a composition that is not only musical but picturesque. They do this not only that their gestures may have something to portray, but that their words may suggest images which their audiences can mentally see. It is true that oratory and certain poems designed primarily for recitation are sometimes characterized by a degree of rhetorical repetition, which, if introduced into essays or into poems of a different character, detracts from their excellence. The repetition is necessary in order to render fully understood that which is to be heard only once. But in that which is to be read from print, a man may glance back and do his own repeating, and he usually prefers to do it. Poetic or oratorical repetition, however, is not a necessary adjunct of the picturesqueness of style just mentioned. I used to wonder why it was that foreign critics—French and German—almost universally fail to assign very high rank to the poetry of Tennyson, while they do assign it to that of Byron. I am quite sure now that the line of thought just suggested, explains, in part at least, both facts. The depreciation of Tennyson seems to be owing to

his overbalancing appeal to the imagination through the methods of sound. Those not familiar with the sounds of English words and the more subtly associated suggestions of these sounds often fail to recognize his artistic qualities.

Tennyson, however, was a great poet. His work very frequently appeals to the imagination through the methods of sight. For that which does not do this, or does it but slightly, we must look to his followers. In the following, for instance, all of us will be conscious of a musical flow of syllables, but most of us will not be conscious of seeing images rise in succession before the imagination; we shall not be lifted into that realm of visual surroundings to which it is the peculiar province of poetry to transport one. On thinking it over, too, we shall probably recognize that the same could be said of much of the ordinary—the very ordinary—poetry of the present, tho it, too, is often extremely musical.

“So much we lend, indeed,
Perforce, by force of need,
So much we must; even these things and no more,
The far sea sundering and the sundered shore
A world apart from ours,
So much the imperious hours;
Exact and spare not; but no more than these
All earth and all her seas
From thought and faith of trust and truth can borrow,
Not memory from desire, nor hope from sorrow.”

—Swinburne's *A Parting Song*.

This same lack of power to conjure visible forms before the imagination is sometimes manifested even in poetry apparently written for the special purpose of doing this very thing; *e. g.*,

“Let Love clasp Grief lest both be drown’d,
 Let darkness keep her raven gloss;
 Ah, sweeter to be drunk with loss,
 To dance with death, to beat the ground.”

—Tennyson’s *In Memoriam*.

“As fire that kisses, killing with a kiss,
 He saw the light of death, riotous and red,
 Flame round the bent brows of Semiramis
 Re-risen and mightier, from the Assyrian dead,
 Kindling, as dawn a frost-bound precipice,
 The steely snows of Russia, for the tread
 Of feet that felt before them crawl and hiss
 The snaky lines of blood violently shed
 Like living creeping things
 That writhe but have no stings
 To scare adulterers from the imperial bed
 Bowed with its load of lust,
 Or chill the ravenous gust
 That made her body a fire from heel to head;
 Or change her high bright spirit and clear,
 For all its mortal stains, from taint of fraud or fear.”

—Swinburne’s *Walter Savage Landor*.

With this compare poetry that is visually representative. First, a few quotations from Shakespeare:

“A substitute shines brightly as a king,
 Until a king be by; and then his state
 Empties itself, as doth an inland brook
 Into the main of waters.”

—*Merchant of Venice*, Act V., Scene 1.

“Your enemies, wi’ th’ nodding of their plumes,
 Fan you into despair!”

—*Coriolanus*, Act III., Scene 3.

“Vouchsafe to show the sunshine of your face,
 That we, like savages, may worship it.”

—*Love’s Labor’s Lost*, Act V., Scene 2.

Also these from Byron:

“That morning he had freed the soil-bound slaves,
 Who dig no land for tyrants but their graves!”

—*Lara*.

“’Tis midnight. On the mountains brown
The cold round moon shines deeply down;
Blue roll the waters, blue the sky
Spreads like an ocean hung on high,
Bespangled with those isles of light,
So wildly, spiritually bright;
Who ever gazed upon them shining,
And turn’d to earth without repining?”

—*The Siege of Corinth.*

And these from Longfellow:

“The day is done, and slowly from the scene
The stooping sun upgathers his pent shafts,
And puts them back into his golden quiver.”

—*The Golden Legend.*

“Take them, O great Eternity!
Our little life is but a gust
That bends the branches of thy tree,
And trails its blossoms in the dust.”

—*Suspiria.*

The difference in the effect upon imagination of this latter poetry and of that which is written by one who neglects the requirements of visual representation, because carried away from them by an overweening interest in musical effects, will be at once recognized. It will be recognized, too, that it is a difference which, in any period of literature, cannot be widely disregarded without greatly deteriorating the quality of the poetry produced. Nor will it fail to be evident, after what has just been said, that it is a difference which one familiar with the requirements of elocution will be the least likely of all men to disregard.

Let us pass on now to notice the bearings which an acquaintance with the methods of elocution has upon an understanding of the necessity, as a prerequisite for proficiency in all art, of acquiring skill. An understanding, or at least a realization, of this

necessity is not common. Yet not to realize it renders literary production or appreciation, not to speak of other forms of culture, well-nigh impossible. What does skill involve? Let us try to determine this by an illustration.

When Mozart was three years old, he was giving concerts attended by the first musicians. When he was eight, he had composed a symphony containing parts for a complete orchestra. We ascribe such precocious results to genius. But suppose that, at these ages, he had manifested no musical proficiency; yet that, after practising five or six hours a day for ten or fifteen years, he had produced the same, or approximately the same, quality of music. In this case, we should have said that his genius had been rendered able to express itself as a result of his having acquired skill, or—what is the same—as a result of his having studied art. But what should we have thought that this study had done for him? First of all, that it had enabled him to understand the reasons and the methods of printing music, of fingering them upon an instrument, and of arranging tones, one after another, in melody and in harmony; besides this, that the practise involved in musical study had enabled his mind and body to put into execution that which he had learned,—to comprehend in a single glance large groups of notes on a printed staff, and, no matter how numerous and complex, to send his knowledge of them through the brain and nerves, and transfer them to sound with precision and the rapidity of lightning. We should recognize, too, that he never could have become able to do this, unless that which he had studied and practised had, after a time,

passed from a region—so to speak—in which it needed to be consciously overlooked, to a region where it could be overlooked unconsciously. No man ever acquired the skill of an artist until he could—automatically, as it were—read printed notes, finger them, and harmonize them, reserving all his conscious energies for the expression of the general thought and emotion. Notice, however, that when this stage had been reached, the ordinary musician would be just where Mozart was when he started, or, if one wish for a more striking example, where Blind Tom—an uninstructed negro, yet an expert piano-player—was during all his life. The perfect work of the conscious practise necessary in order to acquire facility in art is to cause those parts of either the body or the mind engaged in the task to act unconsciously. Now, when they act thus, what is it that controls their action? It is merely to use a corollary to say that it is those parts or powers of the mind of which we are unconscious. How do we know that these parts or powers exist? From results which their existence alone can explain. What results? Often abnormal results—things that occur not only in manifestations of artistic skill, but also in fright, fever, hypnotism—all of which involve physical methods of benumbing those parts of the body and the mind of which we are conscious, in such ways as to allow the parts of which we are not conscious—those that are subconscious—to take charge of the methods of expression, and thus reveal themselves,—sometimes to the agent of the action, sometimes to others. The man in danger of drowning or of burning tells of having revealed to him in a few moments mil-

lions of the minutest experiences of his life, which he was sure that he had forgotten. The lips of the man in fever repeat the most technical details of unstudied sciences and languages,—terms and phrases heard but once and to none of which he had listened attentively. The hypnotized patient has a personage, a theory, suggested to him, and at once he repeats and develops concerning it, with absolutely perfect manifestations, it is claimed, of recollection, imitation, illustration, and logic, anything in the way of characterization or statement that he has ever heard, seen or imagined. Now this seems exactly what Mozart and Blind Tom could do; and exactly what lightning calculators can do; like Zerah Colburn, for example, who, before the figures could be written down, had answered the question, “What is the cube root of 268,336,125?” Mozart was brought up in a musical family. Probably almost everything that he heard with reference to the theory or the practise of music, he could, at once and forever, recall, imitate, illustrate, and develop logically. When a man’s mind acts in this way, we term him a genius. But genius is a matter of degrees. When a man’s mind has merely a tendency to act in this way, we term him a genius; and this tendency may be greatly developed by the study of art. In fact, it may be developed in some cases in which it is only latent. Many find the strongest indication of the genius of Henry Ward Beecher in his marvelous illustrative ability, in his imaginative facility in arguments from analogy. He himself, in his “Yale Lectures,” says that, while in later life it was as easy for him to illustrate as to breathe, he did not have this power

to any such extent in early manhood, but cultivated it.

Now, notice the inference from what has just been said. If the subconscious powers of mind that every man possesses operate like an automatic machine, producing approximately perfect results of recollection, imitation, illustration, and—as developed from the premise submitted—of logic, then the problem of education is how to cultivate the conscious powers of the mind so that they shall be more and more pliant to the touch of subconscious influence, and thus be enabled to manifest outwardly that which is within one. The problem of expressional art is how to cultivate the conscious agencies of expression so that they shall respond automatically to the promptings of the subconscious agencies. The musician has always practically solved this problem when he is pouring his whole soul into his music, unconscious of anything but the emotional effect that he desires to produce upon the souls of his hearers. The sculptor and the painter have always solved it, when they are projecting into line and color, unconscious of being hampered by any thought of technic, that picture which keen observation of the outer world has imprest upon their conceptions. The poet has always solved it, when he has lost himself in his theme, unconscious of anything except that to which Milton referred in “Paradise Lost,” when he said that it

“Dictates to me slumbering or inspires
Easy my unpremeditated verse.”

As intimated here, this state in which thoughts and emotions, *i. e.*, mental forms, pass from the

inner mind into external material forms, through methods, of the details of which, at the time of its action, the mind is unconscious, is the result of what we sometimes term inspiration. But notice, too, that it is often, even in cases of the most indisputable genius, a result, in part at least, of acquired skill. Therefore, the inspirational and the artistic are frequently exactly the same in effect.

Now what is the department that can best cause the young to realize that this is the case, and, consequently, to realize precisely what it is that skill acquired by practise can do for one? I think that it must be a department in which, in the first place, the young are least likely to imagine, before trying it, that practise is essential; in the second place, one in which the largest number can have an opportunity of practising; and in the third place, one in which, if they do practise, they can have an opportunity of recognizing most clearly, through their own experience, the results of their labor. This department is elocution. No one who has taught in a college and has listened to the opinions of the majority, perhaps, of its professors, needs to have argued that it is the department in which practise is least likely to be thought essential. What can be more natural, it is asked, and therefore, can demand less aid from art than speaking? If it be suggested that gestures and emphasis are often unpleasing and inappropriate, it is supposed that these defects can be corrected by a word or two of common-sense criticism, which, as you will notice, is exactly contrary to the conclusion legitimate from the argument that has just been presented. Not three weeks ago, I read an article in a paper

supposed to represent a knowledge of the conditions of culture, attempting to show that the quality of the voice does not depend upon methods of breathing, but entirely—not partly as everybody admits—upon character. I once had a pupil who, when a babe, had dropt upon his head and spine, with the practical result of telescoping his lungs and keeping his chin very near his abdomen. Tho a dwarf, he was anxious to be a speaker; but it took a full year of hard practise for him to learn to make, in a satisfactory way, a single elementary vowel-sound. Two years later, he had a voice more sweet, rich, and powerful than any man in his large class. I refuse to believe that the change was owing to a change in his character. Nor will I admit that, deformed as he was, his organs of expression were in need of reformation in any sense not true of those of scores of his fellows whose lungs, if not actually telescoped, had cells as effectually shut up as if this were the case. The light in a cathedral, after nightfall, when shining through the unhewn stone and wooden beams that occupy the space where will be the rose window, as yet unfinished, does not give expression to the Gothic character of the building; nor can it give this, until the work of art has chiseled the stone, and filled the interspaces with delicate tracery and color. A similar relationship often exists between the result of elocutionary art and the expression of human character.

The second and the third conditions for a department best causing the young to realize the necessity of acquiring skill can be considered together. The department in which the largest number of students can have an opportunity of practising, and

which, at the same time, can afford them the best opportunity of having individual experience of the results of practise, is elocution. Comparatively few can study painting, sculpture, music, or architecture; and if they can, years often must elapse before they can make sufficient progress to realize what practise has done for them. But in a properly-equipped school or college, without interfering with any other study, it is possible for every student to be taught how to breathe, vocalize, emphasize and gesture appropriately, and to practise sufficiently to do all automatically. When he has attained this stage, he will be prepared to reach out, and apprehend how the principles involved in the mastery of the elements of elocution apply to success in literature. He will realize that a man need not be a genius, in order to write well, and that, if he be a genius, he cannot write well without developing his gift according to the methods common to every art. In the degree, too, in which he comes to take an interest in his work, he will begin to perceive the fascination that there may be in the study of form as form; and no man ever became an artist or able to appreciate art in any department, until he had begun to perceive this. The young seldom perceive it. They are more apt to feel suppressed than stimulated by talk with reference to fine discriminations in the selection of words, or artistic ingenuity in the arrangement of them. Always ready to admit in a general way the value of style, in trying to detect its qualities for themselves they are apt to use tools too big and bungling to discover any except superficial excellences. Like the savage, they stand agaze at the huge, the loud, and

the coarse; they fail to notice the delicate, the gentle, and the fine. They believe in the realm of the telescope, not of the microscope; in that which can wing itself among the clouds, not in that which must watch and walk while keeping the motive power of flight alive. They forget that the eagle has eyes, as well as pinions; and that the keenness of his sight does not prevent him from soaring, but prevents him, when he soars, from losing himself.

Of course, the claim is not meant to be made here that no other study could train the mind in the directions indicated. It is claimed, however, that no other study can do it as readily, or is so available. Fifty years ago in our country, this fact, or, at least, the general principle underlying it, was recognized as it is not to-day. At that time, the presidents of all our prominent colleges—men like Nott, Griffin, Hopkins, Woods, Wayland, Lord, Kirkland, Humphrey, Finney—were rhetoricians, if not, as was the case with many of them, elocutionists. The whole curriculum was made a unity by aiming it in the direction of expression, which certainly is a wise thing to do, if the problem of education be, as has been stated in this paper, how to get knowledge not into the mind, but out of it. Every member of the faculty, too, had to contribute a certain amount of time to what was felt to be the necessity of listening to speeches or of correcting essays. At present, presidents are largely scientists or business men, and no instructor not teaching English bothers himself about essay-writing or public speaking. This condition has its advantages, and perhaps cannot be prevented; but it narrows the influence of certain professors, and it deprives the students of

needed stimulus. Besides, it puts an unjust burden upon the professors of English. I never think of a scientific professor receiving as much salary for instructing his half-dozen or more pupils, as the English professor for instructing his half-dozen hundred, all of whom, to be properly instructed, need, as frequently in science they do not, to be criticized and drilled individually, without recalling the supreme satisfaction—in the consciousness that nothing about or above could compare in importance with her own brood—of an old hen that I once saw strutting and cackling in the cellar of an opera-house, while a performance was going on.

The other day I was told that a prominent New England educational institution had abolished "spouting" on commencement stage. Yet the stream that does not spout a little at its source is usually the last to get where it will fertilize the field toward which it ought to flow. Students' orations were discontinued, I was told, because trustees and professors would not attend the exercises. So, instead of them, there is now a parade of these dignitaries, drest out in silk gowns with hoods of various colors—scarlet, purple, green, yellow, blue, indicative of their degrees. Result?—the seats of the trustees and professors, which used to be vacant on Baccalaureate Sunday and at Commencement, are filled to overflowing. This is the age of the new woman. Does she threaten college-ideals as much as the scarlet woman was once supposed to threaten church-ideals? What will be her influence in the direction of intellectuality? How will she affect high thinking and plain living? Is the color—unobjectionable, of course, *per se*—to be used in

that way which is always esthetically objectionable, namely, as a substitute for a regard for proportion? Is the old American aim of educational training for citizenship to be changed into the English aim of training for class distinctions? Does it really add to college life the dignity of which we hear, to arrive at a condition in which educators, instead of being present at exercises in order to show their sympathy with the literary efforts of the undergraduates, crowd to them in order to show the silks upon themselves; or in which parents and friends, who, without expecting much enlightenment, once enjoyed suggestions of promise in the orations of the young, are now supposed to enjoy far more such suggestions as can be found in the gyrations of the old? In the former times to which reference has been made, when expression was considered an essential part of educational development, our colleges were turning out such men as Webster, Everett, Phillips, Beecher, Longfellow, Hawthorne, Lowell, Holmes, Prescott, and Motley. It certainly seems as if there were something essentially right in a system of instruction that could stimulate the completeness and finish of literary culture manifested by men like these, even if we cannot logically ascribe to the changes made in that system, as some do, the indisputable fact that none of the colleges from which these men were graduated have, of late years, turned out a single orator or author whose artistic appreciation and attainment does not represent a distinctly lower educational result.

THE NEED OF ELOCUTIONARY TRAINING IN THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

It never would have occurred to me to argue the question at the head of this article, had I not been requested to do so by the editor of *The Homiletic Review*.^{*} As the object of a theological seminary is to train preachers, it would seem to follow as a natural inference that some part of its training should be expended upon the voice that is to be used in preaching. The only escape from this inference lies in taking the ground that training of this kind is unnecessary. Some, I believe, actually do say this. As if high excellence in any sphere could be attained without persistent and intelligently directed labor, they tell us that the speaker, like the poet, "is born not made"; but they overlook the fact, emphasized in the biography of every poet, that, if one "born" with poetic possibilities wish ever to obtain sufficient command of the technic of his art to insure him reputation and influence, there is a very true sense in which he must be "made." So with the speaker. From Demosthenes and Cicero down to Clay and Phillips, the testimony of those whom the world calls born orators is almost unanimous with reference to the necessity of training. Who, for instance, is *the* born orator of the American pulpit? Were the question to be submitted

^{*} See *The Homiletic Review* for May, 1887.

to the vote of the country, there is no doubt that, by an overwhelming majority, the answer would be, Henry Ward Beecher. Notice now to what, in his "Yale Lectures," Mr. Beecher largely attributes his oratorical powers. "If you desire," he says, "to have your voice at its best and to make the best use of it, you must go into a drill which will become so familiar that it ceases to be a matter of thought and the voice takes care of itself. This ought to be done under the best instructors. . . . It was my good fortune in early academic life to fall into the hands of Prof. Lovell . . . and for a period of three years I was drilled incessantly (you might not suspect it, but I was) in posturing, gesture, and voice culture. . . . Afterwards, when going to the seminary, I carried the method of his instructions with me, as did others. We practised a great deal on what was called 'Dr. Barber's system,' . . . which was then in vogue, and particularly in developing the voice in its lower register, and also upon the explosive tones. There was a large grove lying between the seminary and my father's house, and it was the habit of my brother Charles and myself and one or two others to make the night and even the day hideous with our voices as we passed backward and forward through the woods exploding all the vowels. . . . The drill that I underwent produced not a rhetorical manner, but a flexible instrument that accommodated itself readily to every kind of thought and every shade of feeling, and obeyed the inward will in the outward realization of the results of rules and regulations. . . . There is just as much reason for the preliminary elocutionary drill of the body as

there is for the training of the body for any athletic exercise.”

What Mr. Beecher is to the American pulpit Mr. Spurgeon is to the English, and a few years ago, Dr. Guthrie was to the Scottish. Spurgeon has written a whole book on elocution, showing the careful study that he has given to the subject, and Guthrie, in his Autobiography, says: “I had, when a student of divinity . . . attended elocution classes, winter after winter, walking across half the city and more after eight o’clock at night, fair weather and foul. . . . There I learned to . . . be in fact natural; to acquire a command over my voice so as to suit its force and emphasis to the sense, and to modulate it so as to express the feelings. . . . Many have supposed that I owe the power I have of modulating my voice, and giving effect thereby to what I am delivering, to a musical ear. On the contrary, I . . . have not the vestige even of a musical faculty, never knowing when people go off the tune but when they stick.”

The testimony of preachers like these will have more influence with the readers of this *Review* than anything that I can say; but my experience may enable me to add to the force of their testimony by presenting a few reasons why this testimony should be what it is. Many traits must enter into the composition of the successful pulpit orator,—intellectual, emotional, spiritual and physical. A man may have all but the last of these—the average theological student usually does—and yet fail of success. Thought, feeling and earnestness cannot exert their appropriate influence, if the speaker’s voice be too weak to express them at all, or

too harsh and inflexible to express them adequately. "Very well," it may be said, "if a man's voice be deficient let him go into some other profession." This, of course, would end the difficulty; but unfortunately, if applied by one with a high standard, it would end most of our preaching. For myself, after an experience with large classes of students for thirteen years, I can say that I have never yet come into contact with any American whose voice did not need at least a little training. And I can say more than this,—that a large proportion of those who needed it most—so much that no friend would have dreamed of advising them to become public speakers—have proved themselves to be possessors of a genuine gift of eloquence just as soon as their organs have been developed so as to enable them to express what was in them. Would it be wise to deprive the Church of the services of such as these?

Most Americans need this training because, as a result of heredity and habit, few in our northern climates use their organs of respiration and utterance in such ways as to produce the best vocal effects. Instead, for instance, of expelling the breath from the lower part of the lungs, where there are large muscles fitted to do this work, and from which place all the air in the lungs can be made to pass into sound, while the bronchial tubes of the upper chest are left in a passive condition in which they are free to vibrate and render the tones resonant, many, especially those of sedentary habits, expel the breath from the upper chest, overtaxing the weak muscles there, utilizing only a part of the air in the lungs, and rigidly contracting the bronchial tubes. The same persons or others misuse also the

muscles at the back of the nostrils, tongue, and palate. Like the bronchial tubes, these, during the process of speaking, should be left in a passive condition so as to act as a vibratory sounding-board to reinforce the tone and throw it forward. But often with every effort at articulation they are contracted, producing, as a result, the sharp or the harsh nasal tone so common among us, if not, as frequently happens, on account of the irritating effects of a wrong use of the organs, producing chronic catarrh or laryngitis,—the latter so characteristic of our clergy as to be popularly termed the “clergyman’s sore throat.” In aggravated cases, the physically sympathetic connection between these muscles and those of the lips and the front of the tongue where the work of articulation belongs, causes stuttering; and it was undoubtedly in order to break up this connection that Demosthenes, as every schoolboy knows, practised with his mouth filled with pebbles. While thus curing his stammering, he necessarily developed also that strength and sweetness of tone, which are heard only where the organs of resonance and of articulation are used properly.

Instead of filling the mouth with pebbles, there are other methods employed in our own day, which are the results of the experiments of physicians and teachers continued through many years. They consist of exercises simple in character but difficult to prescribe because differing for requirements of different voices, or of different stages in the development of the same voice. Hence, the necessity of having some one who understands his business to indicate in each case what the exercise should be.

“Elocutionary training” as Mr. Beecher is careful to say, “ought to be done under the best instructors.” I have frequently found students coming from schools or colleges where there was some tradition of elocutionary training but no instructor, who were practising with the utmost scrupulousness and persistence, exercises whose only effect could be to confirm them in faults which it was of prime importance for them to overcome. They needed a teacher to show them both what to practise, and how to practise; for, at first, it is, for most, a physical impossibility to produce properly the combinations of sounds that they require. They needed a teacher, too, to keep them from practising advanced exercises. Indeed, to effect this, is often the most difficult part of his task, inasmuch as elementary exercises are always monotonous, never otherwise than indirectly beneficial, and seldom productive of results which the student is prepared to appreciate.

Voice-building, of which I have been speaking, constitutes the most important part of the elocutionist’s work. But, in addition to this, he must give instruction in gesture and emphasis. The meanings and methods of gesture can be taught in a few lessons to any diligent pupil who is not positively deformed. To teach emphasis is more difficult. But no one, I think, can teach either this or gesture who has not made a special study of the principles underlying each subject, and of what is required in putting them into practise. I have known of a theological professor, who, for twenty years, had been asking all his friends who were not elocutionists, what was wrong with his delivery, and had never obtained a correct answer.

An ordinarily intelligent elocutionist could have given him a true diagnosis in three minutes; and possibly cured him in three weeks. Faults of emphasis may result from a wrong use of the elements either of time, pitch, volume or force, and that, too, in very subtle matters, like the habitual application of the most force at the beginning, the middle, or the end of a syllable. How can a man of inexperience be supposed to be able to perceive the source of faults like these, or to know what kind of exercises can overcome them? The same question may be asked with reference to faults less difficult to analyze. A very common one among those who are called natural speakers, and who, too, when schoolboys, usually carry off the prizes for declamation, consists merely in ending every sentence of a speech in a manner appropriate for its concluding sentence. Where the fault is manifested, an audience can listen for five or ten minutes, perhaps, without becoming wearied, but generally not longer than this. The manner, irrespective of the matter, begins, after a while, to make one feel disappointed, because the speech does not end. I have never heard of an uninstructed critic who could even detect, much less who could correct a fault like this. I speak from experience derived from noticing the effects of the training of some of the brightest of students upon one another, when I say that what this kind of a critic frequently does is to make a mistake in his diagnosis, and to cause those whom he criticises to cultivate unduly, often by way of imitating himself, certain elements of emphasis to which their attention should never have been directed. The effect produced is arti-

ficiality, which, in speaking, invariably results from paying attention, and therefore, giving importance to something that should be treated as if of little or no importance.

Just here, I am aware that I am treading upon disputed ground. The one reason why some object to elocutionary training is that they suppose that elocutionists, rather than those of whom I am now speaking, cause artificiality. Might it not be more sensible to attribute this result to a lack of judgment on the part of any, whether elocutionists or not, who direct the training; and, other things being equal, will not a man who has made a special study of the subject be apt to direct this training the more wisely? Some decry all physicians on the ground that they kill off their patients. But this is true, as a rule, only of quacks. There are certain physicians who benefit their patients; and the same is true of some elocutionists. If those called upon to select the latter would only exercise a little common sense, it might be true of almost all of them. A man's credentials for such a position should be examined. Has he studied the art, and with whom? Has he had experience in teaching, and with what results? More than that, what kind of a man is he in himself? Has he good judgment and insight? Has he modesty, so that he will give his pupils merely what they need, not what he thinks that he himself needs in order to increase their regard for him? Above all, has he the artistic temperament?—that supremacy of instinct over reflection and that flexibility, mental and physical, which enable a man to remain master of himself and of his material, notwithstanding any amount of the latter

with which instruction and information may have surrounded him? How does he himself, in his own reading and speaking, manifest the results of the system that he purposes to teach? Occasionally, one meets candidates for such positions who articulate with such pedantic precision that he feels like shaking them to see if teeth and tongue, which appear to have cut connection with head and heart, cannot actually drop out. There are others who emphasize with so much artificiality that the chief impression conveyed comes from the dexterity with which subordinate words and clauses are kept dancing up and down, as if intent to assume an importance that will keep the main sense in the background. It seems needless to say that the pupils for whom instruction is desired as well as the cause of elocution in general, will be best served by turning the thoughts of such candidates toward some course in life where they will be less likely to do harm. But there are plenty of teachers who are not of this sort; and to the instructions of some one of them, all the fully-equipped orators with whom I have ever talked on the subject, have attributed a part of their success. I say fully-equipped orators, because I have, indeed, known a few partially equipped, with harsh voices that could penetrate the ear but seldom touch the heart, or with peculiar antics that could attract the eye but certainly not charm the soul, who prided themselves on not having studied that of which it was their first duty to become masters. Not infrequently, however, I have found that these same men had tried one elocutionist, at least once, and I have concluded that he probably told them the truth, for they have assured

me that they had never gone to him a second time.

Were my space not exhausted I should like to dwell upon the fact, that the reading whether of the Scriptures, the liturgy, or the sermon, is something in which even good speakers often require special instruction. I should like to show, too, the indirect influence which a study of elocution has upon many related forms of expression, by bringing a man into connection with principles and experiences common to all the arts. Here, I can only suggest its relationship to literary art. A man who knows just where to pause and emphasize in order to produce the best elocutionary effects, will know also how to arrange his words the most effectively when writing. Still greater will be the influence of the same fact upon his oratorical rhetoric. He will instinctively come to present his thoughts not only rhythmically but emphatically. His good elocution will secure him an audience when he speaks, and often, too, when what he speaks is put into print.

ART AS THE SOURCE OF LOGICAL FORM IN ORATORY AND POETRY

The ability to present thought logically, as is said, which is acknowledged to be well-nigh essential to success, not only in public address, but in all forms of written presentation, is not so much a matter of logic as of art. As such, it does not invariably necessitate logical training, nor even a logical mind. The art, too, may be acquired with comparative ease. Both the principles underlying it, and the methods of applying it are so elementary in character that, were it not for the innumerable cases in which one is obliged to recognize a violation of them, he might hesitate to present them for consideration in pages like these. But, as it is, that which has proved helpful to less mature minds may not be wholly devoid of profitable suggestions to even some of the readers of this *Review*.*

Every art is developed by making a study of methods natural to exceptional men who, because they take to them naturally, do not need to cultivate them. The methods to be unfolded here are applied by large numbers in unconscious and instinctive fulfilment of a principle underlying almost any effort to give expression to thought. Of course, those who do not apply them unconsciously can and should be instructed so as to become able if possible to apply them consciously. The principle is the

* *The Homiletic Review* for October, 1892.

well-known one in accordance with which when we have any conception to communicate to others, we instinctively associate it with some sight or sound in the external world. Otherwise, as thought itself is invisible and inaudible, we might not be able to make them acquainted with it. For instance, this term *expression*, just used, means a pressing out,—an operation that can be affirmed literally only of a material substance which is forcibly expelled from another material substance; but, because we recognize a possibility of comparison between this operation and the way in which immaterial thought is made to leave the immaterial mind, we use the term as we do. So with thousands of terms like *understanding*, *uprightness*, *clearness*, *muddled*, etc. Carrying out the same principle, the ancients represented whole sentences through the use of hieroglyphics; and geometricians and scientists, even of our own times, represent whole arguments—the logical relations of abstract ideas and the physical relations of intangible forces—through the use of lines and figures. In a similar way and with a similar justification, we can apply the principle to the expression of thought in a subject considered as a whole.

The sights or sounds in external nature, to which we may compare this thought, may be conceived of as occupying, chiefly, a certain portion of space, as a house does; or of time, as a melody does. Most things, however, and all having animal life, while chiefly occupying the one or the other of these elements, actually occupy both, or, at least, suggest both; like a man's body, for instance, which has both bulk and movement. For this reason the arts

of sight must usually represent in space not only what occupies space, but also time. Thus a picture often portrays an event; and this requires a suggestion at least, of a series of actions. Indeed, the ability to embody such a suggestion, furnishes one reason why a product of the higher art of painting differs from a photograph. On one side of a canvas, for example, a painter may depict a man as drawing a bow; and on the other side of the same canvas, he may depict an arrow, which has evidently just left the bow, as having hit its mark. In the arts of sound, among which we must class all compositions involving a use of language, a corresponding principle operates. Think how large a proportion of the most artistic, in the sense of being the most effective, passages in orations or poems describe visible persons or events. The words occupy time; but they represent to imagination, so that one seems to see them, face to face, things that occupy space.

Not merely, as judged by separate illustrations, but by general arrangement, that oration or poem is the most successful which presents the thought in this depicted or graphic way,—a way that causes the hearer or reader to seem to see all the lines of the argument mapped out before him, the entire framework of the ideas built up and standing in front of him. But before a speaker or writer can produce such an effect, he himself must be able to see his subject lying before him, or rising in front of him; in other words, he must be able to conceive of it as comparable to some external object whose shape or movement can be perceived. The principle that is now to be applied, being based upon a

conception of this kind is, therefore, of such a nature as not only to make easy the work of dividing subjects logically, but also to make effective the presentation of them.

Let us consider, first, certain methods of forming two general divisions, suggested by the appearance or condition of objects in connection with their positions and effects. Bearing in mind that we are to conceive of our topic as represented by a visible object, let us recall again that this object may be perceived either in space, in which case it has location; or in time, in which case it has movement. Suppose we perceive it in space, then we may notice The Object and also Its Relations to other objects, or—what is the same thing exprest differently—we may notice Itself and also Its Surroundings. This way of looking at it will give two divisions, into one or the other of which we can put all that we want to say about the object so perceived; and, for this reason, about the topic also, which the object is supposed to represent. These two divisions, thus derived, may now suggest others analogous to them in principle, but differing in phraseology in order to meet the requirements of different subjects to which they are to be applied. For instance, instead of saying Object and Its Relations, we may say, if treating of persons, Individual and Community; if of their character, Private and Public; if of their influence, as in the case of a statesman, At Home and Abroad. If dealing with corporate as well as individual life, we may discuss its Character and Associations; or its Constitution and Circumstances; or, if referring to principles, natural or philosophic, we may speak of their Elements and

Affinities or their Essence and Environment. Practically there are no ends of the ways in which we may change our phraseology, and yet not depart from the general method suggesting it.

Again, if we choose, we may confine our attention to only the object itself. In this case a thorough examination must include a consideration of Its Outside and also of Its Inside; or, to use the technical terms that conventionally designate these respectively, Its Conditions and also Its Qualities. Here, again, we have two divisions, into one or the other of which we can put all that we want to say about the object, or the topic, considered merely in itself; and changing the phraseology, in the ways and for the reasons indicated in the last paragraph, we may form such divisions as Externally and Internally, Superficially and Intrinsically, Appearance and Reality, Class and Kind, Reputation and Character, Accident and Essential, Form and Spirit, and others like these.

Once more, we may consider the object only in time, or as related to movement; and this again will lead us to put everything into two divisions—namely, The Object and Its Actions, analogous to which we can form other divisions like In Itself and In its Results, Cause and Effect, Character and Influence, Nature and Workings, Motives and Manner, Means and Methods, and Principles and Practises.

Recalling now what has been said in the three paragraphs above, we may notice that the Relations of the object as suggested by what surrounds it in space, the Object itself, and its Actions as they are perceived by its movements in time, can also furnish divisions, into which to put all that need be said of an

object or a topic. But, holding still to our purpose, which is to compare the topic as a whole to some perceptible object, let us suppose this, first, to be one appearing in space, and, therefore, characterized mainly by shape; and let us make three divisions suggested by shape, somewhat analogous, tho not closely so, to Relations, Object and Actions. Plato was evidently thinking of an appearance in space when he said that every work of art must have Feet, Trunk and Head. Following out his suggestion, we may make divisions like Bottom, Sides and Top; Foundation, Walls and Roof; Mineral, Vegetable and Animal; Physical, Intellectual and Spiritual; Grounds, Beliefs and Speculations; Certainties, Probabilities and Surmises; Fact, Theory and Practise, etc.

Now, let us compare our topic to an object appearing in time, and, therefore, characterized mainly by movement. This is evidently what Aristotle did when he said that every work of art should have Beginning, Middle and End. Following out his suggestion, we may make divisions like Past, Present and Future; What I recall, What I see, What I anticipate; Antecedents, Achievements and Expectations; Source, Nature and Results; Derivation, Condition and Tendencies; History, Character and Destiny; and so on indefinitely.

Going back, now, to the fact mentioned in the fourth paragraph above this—namely, that we may divide the Object into its Outside and Inside; or into its Condition and Qualities; we may extend Relations, Object and Actions, into Relations, Conditions, Qualities and Actions; and thus obtain four divisions. These, too, by the way, are the very

terms that are used in logic to indicate the leading attributes of objects, and a knowledge of which is especially helpful when one is describing or defining; as when we say of a man, that, in his relations he is social, in his condition healthy, in his qualities intellectual, and in his actions energetic. Making the same changes in phraseology as in the previous cases, we may parallel these divisions by such as the following: as applied to a person or community, by Surroundings, Constitution, Temperament, and Conduct; by Associations, Culture, Disposition and Achievements; as applied to natural objects or to systems of philosophy or government, by Connections, Constituents, Essentials, Effects; by Affinities, Phases, Character and Influence; by Rank, State, Kind and Powers; and so on.

So far our divisions have all been based upon a comparison of a topic to the conditions of an object, as appearing either in space or in time. But the object, besides having conditions, as has just been intimated, has qualities. This fact suggests that we may ask, what kinds of Relations, of Conditions, of Qualities or of Actions can be affirmed; and also that our answers to these questions can in each case suggest divisions. Thus the idea of the kinds of relations suggests that we can consider those that are on One Side and on the Other Side; Before and Behind; Antecedents and Consequences; Means and Ends; at One Extreme and at The Other Extreme; that the object has a Bright Side and a Dark Side; and that it may have certain features that are Advantageous and others Disadvantageous; certain Superior and others Inferior, etc.

The idea of the kinds of conditions suggests that

we may consider some High and others Low; some Rich and others Poor; some Prosperous and others Unprosperous; some Popular and others Unpopular; some Free and others Restrained; some Safe and others Dangerous, etc.

The idea of the kinds of qualities suggests that we may consider some Good and others Bad; some Fine and others Coarse; some Common and others Uncommon; some Pleasant and others Disagreeable; some Admirable and others Despicable; some Trustworthy and others Untrustworthy; some Positive and others Negative, etc.

The idea of the kinds of actions suggests that we may consider some Slow and others Fast; some Beneficial and others Injurious; some Skilful and others Bungling; some Efficient and others Inefficient; some Subjective and others Objective; some Profitable and others Unprofitable; some Peaceable and others Hostile.

The reader will recognize that these methods of dividing subjects will not only make his presentation logical, but will also of themselves suggest thought, and thus aid his powers of invention. For instance, if asked to address a gathering interested in a certain cause, he will have something to say, however embarrassed, in case only he can think of divisions like these, What I recall, What I see, What I anticipate. Or if he be preparing a sermon on a text like "I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ, for it is the power of God unto salvation," he can present the subject, both textually and logically by saying, I am not ashamed of the Gospel, because, in its Source, it is of God; in its Nature, a power; and, in its Results, salvation.

Analyses of the kind suggested can be made, moreover, not only of the topic considered as a whole, but of each subdivision of it. Suppose that one be treating of Political Life. He can speak of it, first, in Itself, and under this he can refer to its Character and its Influence, and to the latter both At Home and Abroad. Then, second, he can speak of its Surroundings, both Private and Public; and with reference to both of these he may mention what is Advantageous and Disadvantageous; and perhaps, too, Pleasant and Disagreeable.

Two divisions, of course, one of which is complementary of the other, are more in accordance with the principles of logic than are a larger number. At the same time, the latter are not necessarily illogical. Aristotle, for instance, in Book II., Chapter 10, of his "*Rhetoric*," says: "All things are done by men either not of themselves, or of themselves. Of things not done by men of themselves, some they do from necessity, others they do from chance; of those done from necessity, a part are from external force; the others are from force of natural constitution. So that all that men do, not of themselves, are either from chance or from nature or force."

The number of divisions may be very greatly extended, too, with no serious detriment to the logical effect. Certain of those that have been given—like Foundation, Walls and Roof, for instance—are of importance, not less because of the completeness than of the order that they introduce into description. A hearer could not be interested in an account of a cathedral, or remember it, if the describer were to mention one feature of the foundation, then

one of the roof, then one of the walls, and then another of the roof again, and so on. As a rule, he is expected to say everything that he has to say of the foundation before he talks about the walls, and to finish his description of these before referring to the roof. Because, in such cases, all that is essential is to preserve the order of thought, it is feasible sometimes, to analyze one or more of the factors of divisions, such as Individual and Community, into many heads, like Individual, Family, Race and Humanity; or divisions like At Home and Abroad into Home, Town, District, Country, World and Universe. Often it is possible to fulfil the requirements of order, and, at the same time—because of allied principles of analysis, together with slightly different methods of applying them—to combine certain of the sets of divisions that have been mentioned. Thus, Rise, Culmination and Decline, together with History, Character and Destiny, can be turned into Rise, History, Culmination, Character, Decline and Destiny.

There is a connection worth noticing now between the methods that have suggested all these sets of divisions, especially as represented in the terms Relations, Conditions, Qualities and Actions, and a well-known principle of logic which is, that in treating a subject, thought should move by successive stages from the generic to the specific, or from the specific to the generic. This connection is owing to the fact that, in passing from the generic to the specific, the process of analysis usually moves from that which has mainly to do with the Relations, or, at least, the environments of a subject, to that which may be said to belong to it specifically, *i. e.*, to its

Conditions and Qualities, because being, as it were, at its core; and that, while passing outward from this, the process of synthesis usually moves so as to show the Actions or influence of that which is, in the sense indicated, specific upon that which is more generic in its relations and environments. Dr. Mark Hopkins, in his "Outline Study of Man," illustrates this method by starting with the general conception of Being, and passing from that through Organized Being, Animal, Vertebrate, Mammal and Man to a Specific Man. Then, affirming something of this man, he retraces his steps exactly in reverse order, applying what has been said, first to Man, then to Mammal, Vertebrate, Animal, Organized Being, and finally to Being. So one may start with the general conception of Humanity, and advancing through Race and Country to Government affirm something of this, and apply what is said in succession to Country, Race, Humanity. So also moving through relations that are Physical, Intellectual and Moral to the Spiritual, he may apply what is said of this in succession to actions that are Moral, Intellectual and Physical; and moving from Nature through Human Nature and Esthetic Nature to Art, he may apply what is said of this in succession to Esthetic Nature, Human Nature, and Nature. It is evident that whenever we begin by observing in this way the more general relations or features of a subject and pass from these to those that are more specific, and, having reached the latter, go on to show the particular influence that these latter exert first in their more specific, and then in their more generic relations, we pursue an order of thought which fulfils a principle similar

to that underlying all the formulæ that have been here unfolded.

Enough has been said now to make clear what this principle is, as well as to suggest the methods through which it may be applied. It is hardly necessary to add that the sets of divisions that have been indicated may be almost infinitely varied in phraseology; or that, for this reason, there is no necessity that they should be used or imitated slavishly. In fact, it is hardly possible that, for any length of time, they should be used thus. The principle at the basis of them is so easy to understand and master that any endeavors to carry it out will, after a few attempts, give a man such a command of it as to render him practically independent of any prescribed methods of applying it.

THE LAWS OF ENGLISH ORTHOGRAPHY: SUGGESTIONS FOR SIMPLIFIED SPELLING *

“ Two educational societies of Great Britain, the English National Union of Elementary Teachers, and the Scottish Educational Institute, have been cooperating recently in an endeavor to devise some practical scheme for lessening the anomalies in English orthography.”—This statement, published lately in some of our newspapers, together with various other remarks, inquiries, and discussions with reference to the same subject, prominent among which is an article in a recent number of one of our popular magazines, entitled *Japanning the English Language*, have recalled to my mind the fact of the existence of a roll of manuscript, that,

* The principal part of the following paper is reprinted from the first of six articles, published weekly, between May 9th and June 13th, 1874, in the *Yale Courant*, then edited by Professor H. N. Day. At that time, the general subject discust was so unpopular, and the particular suggestions derived from it in the papers were supposed to be so unscholarly, that the writer was denied promotion in the institution in which he was just beginning to teach; and he would have been driven from it entirely, had not some one conceived the idea of privately consulting as experts upon philology, certain men like Professors H. N. Day, who had accepted the articles, William D. Whitney and Francis A. March. By-and-by, after weeks of that embarrassment and trouble, often having nothing to do with the original cause, which inevitably follow upon opposition vague in character, but coming from influential sources, and which no gentleman would care to wield the appropriate weapons to avert, answers were received, and read by the President of the College before every member of the Board of Trustees and of the Faculty, with special care, so it was reported, to read them emphatically to those

for some time, has been lying untouched in a drawer of my study table. It is a relic of one of those transient periods of devotion to the study of old English that, probably, is experienced by everyone who, for any cause, desires to become familiar with the implements of our literature.

I recur to these papers now because, in connection with the main object that occasioned them, I was enabled, as I thought when they were written, and still think, to detect some general principles with reference to English orthography, that certainly are not recognized by people in general, and never yet have been presented or classified similarly by professional philologists.

A few of these principles, derived, as will be perceived, legitimately and historically, from a study of the earliest sources of our language, may not prove a wholly profitless contribution to a subject that, just now, seems to be engaging more than usual attention. And with good reason: it is doubtful if, a few years hence, it may not be considered

who express a desire not to hear them. After this, the writer was informed that he had been "triumphantly vindicated." Possibly, he had been, tho it is doubtful whether some ever accepted that view of the subject. Present readers will probably wonder, as he himself did then, why simple statements of facts perfectly easy to verify, and logical deductions from them should ever, in any scholastic community whatever, need vindication. Subsequently, Professor Whitney, when asked by the author to be put into connection with any sources that would facilitate a further study of the subject, wrote in reply, under date of July 1, 1874, as follows: "There have been sent to me at various times plans for a phonetic orthography of English, but none for a reformation of the kind that you suggest; nor do I remember to have seen anywhere a scheme so carefully reasoned out as yours. I wish it might attract a great deal of attention. There are principles enough in English spelling, and you have drawn out and stated such as would bring an immense improvement in it. I do not see that philologists can find fault with your proposals."

one of the wonders of history that a people, the most practical in Europe, should have adhered so long to alphabetic modes of representing sounds, so impracticable that they are satisfactory not even to a nation, accustomed all its life to written characters like those of the Japanese, whom some supposed to be making only a first appearance on the stage of civilization. Logically, one would be led to think that the very genius which, without impairing, but contrariwise improving the expressiveness of our language, has rid it of so much that was superfluous in etymology and syntax, would have had some influence also on its orthography. But while the foreigner can point to such anomalies as he perceives in *though*, *through*, *bough*, *cough*, *rough*, and *lough*, is it not true that we might use hieratics and communicate our thoughts well-nigh as intelligibly?

But, perhaps, the strangest anomaly in connection with the whole, is the fact that Anglo-Saxon enterprise, so chary of a waste of time in other branches of activity, should not have made some earnest effort to prevent the superfluous labor that a defect in language, such as this, must necessarily entail upon the children native to a country, not to speak, at all, of foreigners. While the German and, if he have had schooling, the Italian child of nine can pronounce and spell his language with precision, and is prepared henceforth to use it as a medium through which to acquire that which is more important, very often, as portrayed so graphically in the "Hoosier Schoolmaster," the highest intellectual achievement of the youth of seventeen in America, not only on our Western prairies but in

a thousand places nearer to New York, is, figuratively if not literally, to "spell down" all the neighborhood. While it is claimed that every citizen of Prussia knows enough, at least, to read and write, it is a fact that large proportions of the artisans of England, and that nearly twenty per cent. of our own people can do neither. In view of facts like these, the questions come, first: Is it wise? and second: Is it right? Is it wise to let our children pass through youth in ignorance of subjects of far more importance, just because so much time must be given to the spelling book? Or is it right that fetters of irregular orthography—for nothing else than these have caused it, as all know who, only once, have heard the illiterate try to read—that these should bind and keep so much of truth away from souls whose time, forsooth, is too limited to allow them to learn by rote all of the lexicon! And even the good spelling may afford a sphere of triumph for some of our country cousins, when one regards the many humbler people unable to attain their eminence, what must he infer with reference to a state of things that renders triumphs such as theirs a possibility? To say no more, it certainly is not desirable, not sensible, nor, in supreme degree, republican. The incongruity is palpable,—“a great democracy”; its destiny declared to be the “elevation of the masses,” and the furthering of the “world’s enlightenment”—and yet the various factors of its written language so exclusive in their maintenance of individual dignity that neither foreigner nor native can be absolutely certain of acquaintance with a single syllable till introduced to it by name!

Of course, we all know how this came about. And, seriously, it will be found to be connected in part subtly but yet certainly, with conditions of society which we Americans are fond of thinking that it is the "mission" of our country to improve. Tho owing somewhat to the carelessness and ignorance of the early English printers, who were largely foreigners, and somewhat to the pedantry of men of letters who, in the age that followed the revival of the study of the classic languages, desired their spelling to reveal how much they knew of these—this often, too, as in the case of *rhyme* and *isle*, with utter disregard, or at least with no appropriate investigation, of the question whether the words that they thought fit to change had been derived from the Greek or Latin ones that they were spelled to resemble—nevertheless these are not all, perhaps not even the chief causes, of the discrepancies in our orthography. Whatever afterwards developed them, they first appeared in times when Norman-French was spoken at the English court, and old English mainly by the masses. Of course, to accommodate themselves to such conditions, authors wishing to address both classes of the people, were constrained to spell French words like Frenchmen, and English words like English people. The literary men would do the former, to indicate their acquaintance with good society; and the latter to meet the wants of the populace. The result was an incongruity in sounds of similar letters and of combinations of them very much the same as that prevailing now, an incongruity, however, that has increased with each succeeding century. The alterations made in modes of spelling

and pronouncing certain common words of French, as well as of native origin, and the introduction, and with scarcely an attempt to naturalize them, of all sorts of terms from other foreign sources, have produced a language which appears to have only one principle of spelling upon which our scholars are willing to agree,—the uselessness of trying to determine any definite rules for our orthography, in accordance with which its irregularities may now be lessened, or, in future, be avoided.

Noah Webster's efforts to correct this error have been partially successful in America. Not so in England. Indeed, it may be doubted whether any mere scholar can be successful there. No matter how exhaustless be one's store of dictionary ammunition, or what array of learned names he may summon to his help, the "ordinary Englishman," entrenched in what he terms the "habits of" his "good society," a citadel which we Americans by no means can convince him that we have ability to penetrate, will smile serenely, all unconscious of what we might suppose would inflict some mental discomfiture, if not secure a mental victory. Still more than other ordinary men, the Englishman of this denomination seems insensible to anything that has a merely mental aim. What, forsooth, can be "of matter," unless it comes from matter, or appeals to it? When forms have set a fashion, why should he be expected to exercise his mind and think before he follows it? Indeed, so far as concerns himself, the less it seems conformed to thought, and thus suggests to him the need of his own thinking,—why, the better! This sufficiently explains why, of spellings of an English word, the one that seems

least sensible is usually the most popular. How few of us will not write *Nellie* rather than the old form *Nelly*! Perhaps, too, we prefer *honour*, *by-and-bye* and *plough*, which last good writers, long ago as in the time of Spenser, knew enough to spell with a *w*. And so with scores of words that will be mentioned by-and-by. The very verdant traveler, on reaching home, forgets all things that he has seen except what seemed ridiculous. It is the same with explorations in orthography. What schoolboy having learned to spell *phthisic*, can keep from being tempted to bring it into some composition of his own? Yet Milton dropt each *h* and *p*. Or what American, aspiring after literary culture, and who has traveled in Great Britain, can refrain from indicating this through echoing everywhere the extreme French-English sounds, in words like *mercy*, *purple*, *jolly*? Indeed, it is a question whether some one when he reads this article, and has his attention pointed, for the first time, toward these words, will not resolve henceforward, nevermore to be so unaffected as to give them their familiar, regular, but yet American pronunciations—such is the force of custom when divorced from common sense! If any truths can seem self-evident, this certainly is one of them,—that, in the present state of our orthography, whenever, through a change in either one or the other, the spelling and pronunciation of a word are made to coincide, this change is an improvement. As such, when once it is adopted almost universally in all the countries where a tongue is spoken, it ought to be accepted also by our literary men who care to have our language perfect. But if some door ajar have caused one's ears to

heed a different sound that comes from English "good society," and he be more solicitous to let men know that he has heard it than to keep his fellows true to real improvements that have been effected, then in what is he much better than a literary snob? This question may appear impertinent. But it is not. It is pertinent.

What else is it except the "spirit of the snob" that is to blame for that which Noah Webster justly terms "disreputable to the literary character of the nation,—the history of English orthography?" By "good society" that English people, very naturally and very appropriately, too, for people in their circumstances feel called upon to imitate, is meant, primarily, the aristocracy. And members of this class with their affinities, in times gone by, for foreigners and foreign phraseology, and with their present lazy slight of consonants, as in their "comin'" and "heah," and their "thorough inaptitude for ideas"—to quote from Matthew Arnold—are hardly sources in which one should seek for the pure "well of English undefiled." Accordingly, with more abuses which, with reason and without, we attribute to the mother country, not the least, perhaps is the influence which her social forms have had upon the language that we write: and with other blessings with which we may imagine that the "Great Republic" shall enrich posterity, it may be that, among the greatest, is to be a language—through the influence of those who only can control it rightly,—men of genuine scholarship—rendered as simple in orthography as now it is in etymology and syntax, and as satisfactory to the foreign student striving to pronounce our literature,

as now it seems for the clear communication of ideas in commerce.

Of course, this sounds chimerical. Despite all arguments in favor of a regular orthography put forth by some of our profoundest scholars, the fact confronts us that, as yet, the men who, in apparent confirmation of a homeopathic principle can influence popular thought the most—the superficial men of letters; all the crowds who fail to realize the worth of literature, but yet have sense enough to trade with it because their neighbors treasure it; the publishers and proof-readers to whom a change, however slight, might prove an inconvenience—are arrayed against the scheme. They tell us with an air of mystery that well bespeaks the lack of clarity in their conceptions, that ours, and every language, has a history; that much of what is vigorous, and most of what is picturesque—those qualities that give a word or phrase its literary value—depend upon the earlier if not the primitive sounds of these words, and upon their derivations. And when they have stated this they think that they have proved that English spelling and pronunciation should remain unchanged; for, otherwise, they seem to ask, how can the earlier sounds be kept the same, or the derivations still continue within reach of easy recognition? The question might be difficult to answer, were it forced as logically as they seem to think it, from their premises, which certainly contain much truth.

But what now if, as anyone who chooses to investigate the subject may discover, the spellings and pronunciations which we use at present in the English language, are not such as represent, most

accurately, the earlier or primitive words for which they stand? More than this: what if every change that may be needed in our language of to-day, to render its orthography all that it should be, be no other than would best restore the primitive spellings and pronunciations? For instance, would it mar the literary excellence of English, to let people recognize through the letters that we use in them that words like *numb*, *some*, *ghostly*, *rhyme*, *dough*, *guise*, *weigh*, *neighbor*, *doubt*, *mourn*, *guarantee*, *haunt*, *plea*, *foreign* and *rhodium*, represent the Saxon *numen*, *sum*, *gastlic*, *rime*, *doh*, *gise*, *waey*, *nehbor*, the Dutch *nabuur*, the French *douter*, *morne*, *garant*, *hanter*, the Norman *ple*, *foren*, the Latin *foris*, and the Greek *rodios*?

Unnumbered instances like these might be adduced. At present, it suffices if we recognize that alterations do not always harm a language: they may benefit it. And, moreover, as a fact, some alterations will be introduced in any circumstances. Scarcely a book of English poetry that is printed at the present day, will not reveal upon the same page, words like *tho'*, *thro'* and *biass'd*, each, in turn, as will be seen, preparing the way, if ever the apostrophe be dropt, for increasing the identical anomalies that now they are thus written to avoid. Some years ago, men left off final *k* from words like *music*, and dropt *u* from words like *color*. Why?—was it because they did not think? The German word is *musik*, and the French *couleur*. and *k* and *u*, if they had been retained instead of *c* and *o*, would have spelled the words correctly, and with letters not so often used for other sounds. Did the English writer know precisely why—as no

one here denies—the *c* and *o* could be admissible in cases such as these?—or, was he actuated merely by his whims or his stupidity? To save our language from effects like this, it seems important to recognize that in any circumstances, alterations do take place, and if there be no rules, acknowledged rules, to regulate these alterations, so that words, when changed, shall coincide with certain orthographic principles that underlie the language as a whole, then many an alteration will merely serve to increase the previous irregularity. Hence the importance of trying to prevent the wrong kind of alterations in the future. But if while mainly aimed for this, a man could find some way of lessening, through precisely similar means, many of the irregularities existing at the present, would not his effort to do so be worth while?—all this not considering the dawn of that millennium for literature that would ensue, in the opinion of some of our afflicted *dilettanti*, if, through such means, our Wards and Nasbys might finally and forever, be consigned to that perdition which, through the profanity of their treatment of our present spelling, they have so justly merited. But tho the styles of spelling of such writers as these shall “cease to be,” “they have their day.” And by the light of that day we may read one indication of the times. A caricature, when popular, is a conclusive proof that what is caricatured, is popularly thought to be ridiculous. When this is something to which all have been accustomed all their lives, it indicates the skepticism that may lead to reformation. Be it so! For are there not good reasons that before this never have existed, why irregularities in our orthography

should be corrected—reasons pertinent especially to our own land and age? In our own land regularity seems needed to prevent discrepancies in dialect that, even now, appear in certain quarters, and that, if they be increased, may result in fostering feelings that are sectional, and therefore prejudicial to a patriotic interest in national unity. “I believe,” says Mr. Marsh, in his Lectures on the English Language, that “the art of printing, and especially the periodical press, together with the general diffusion of education, which the press alone has made possible, is the most efficient instrumentality in producing uniformity of language and extirpating distinctions of dialect. The ancient Greeks, occupying the same localities, much more nearly allied in blood, more closely connected politically, possessing greater facilities and motives for personal intercommunication, often gathering from their remotest colonies at the great metropolitan festivals of Athens, of Corinth, and other Hellenic cities, and, above all, possess of a common literature, whose choicest dainties were the daily bread of every Greek intellect, nevertheless, not only spoke but wrote in dialects distinguished by probably differences of articulation, inflection, syntax, and vocabulary. The modern Greeks, on the other hand, both speak and write, not, indeed, with entire uniformity, but, saving some limited, tho remarkable local exceptions, yet with a general similarity of dialect that is very seldom found in languages whose territorial range is so great. Now, the influence which has been most active in producing this remarkable uniformity is the circulation of printed books and journals employing the same vo-

cabulary, and following the same orthography and the same syntax. Like effects have resulted from the same cause in Germany." But how is it in England? How is it in America? Do all who speak the English tongue pronounce the same words similarly? Can they do it, with an orthography that, in so many cases, utterly misrepresents the true pronunciations? Evidently not. We can perpetuate throughout our land the sounds of English, as we speak it in New York, or as the cultivated classes speak it in Great Britain, in no other method so effectual as by making our spelling regular.

Again, does not our age, and the position of our language in it, suggest additional reasons for attempting to procure this regularity? Are Japanese diplomats the only men who dream of a universal language? Are we not all looking for it? Are we not aware, besides, that English, as it is, is almost this, already, for the world of commerce? And if so, but a little waiving of our prejudices—they are nothing else; a little use of common sense—for it requires no more; and who can calculate what spheres of influence may yet be opened to the sway of Anglo-Saxon thought, religious, governmental, social! No one, certainly, who has watched with care the linguistic indications of the times, will consider such a question prompted merely by an empty hope of one who is, himself, a member of the "coming race." It is only lately that attention has been drawn extensively to this subject through the representations of a foreigner, M. Alphonse de Condolle, in his "*Histoire des Sciences*." He calculates that, at the end of one more century, the number of the people speaking English, in the

British Islands, Australia, and America, will reach 860,000,000, while those speaking German will be only 124,000,000, and those speaking French only 69,000,000. Moreover, even this calculation, which is based on the rate of increase in the population of the different nations, is not all that indicates, as he asserts, how rapidly the English language is becoming universal. In Switzerland, his native land, in families where both are understood, the French drives out the German; not more effectively, however, than the English, similarly circumstanced, drives out the French. In England and America, the French and German families are found to drop their native tongue. But in France and Germany the English families transmit their language through successive generations. Accordingly, he draws the inference that English will supplant these languages more rapidly than his statistics, based upon the increase of population only, would imply.

So much to prove that our surmises of the sway of Anglo-Saxon thoughts, as embodied in our English literature, is more than a delusion founded on partiality or prejudice. A foreigner might say that these thoughts would not benefit the world so greatly. We admit it, from his viewpoint. This, however, is not ours. At present we are thinking of the benefits of such a consummation to ourselves, to all who think and write in English; of the excellence to which the prospect of an audience including half the world perhaps, might inspire the thinker. Would it not be wise to weigh well all our opportunities; and, in view of them, to count the cost if we should lose them through too much conservatism?

“ Pure and simple conservatism,” as remarks Professor Whitney, “ which by no means founds itself upon useful principles, historical or other, but only in certain cases hides itself behind them.” “ If we expect and wish that our tongue become one day a world’s language, understood and employed on every continent and in every clime, then it is our bounden duty to help prepare the way for taking off its neck this heavy millstone.” If, as is maintained, without impairing in the least its literary beauty or its historical consistency, but, on the contrary, with only trifling changes, our language can be made to embody all the orthographic completeness possible to any living tongue, should not an attempt at least be made in this direction? Should we not endeavor to avoid that danger apprehended by M. Alphonse de Condolle, and which well-nigh dissipates all hope of any possible good that calculations such as his might lead us to anticipate,—the danger that when English shall become the universal language, it may divide in different parts of the globe, into different languages related to one another, as the Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish? Should our indifference allow a nation like the Japanese, while searching for a medium of commerce, even a chance of rejecting English; or, if not doing this entirely, of “ finishing up ” its mission, as it has proposed to do, through using new phonetic characters that might be pliant implements to serve the purposes of trade, but certainly could not fulfil the purposes of intellects that might make use of all the instrumental agencies of thought that load the words of Tennyson and Shakespeare?

Has the time not come for an attempt—one more

on different principles than those that have been advocated hitherto—to rid our spelling book of its perplexities? It may have come, or it may not; but, either way, it will not harm the English world to be shown in how far fundamental principles of the language have been violated in the case of almost every irregularity; and hence how feasible and philosophical a plan might be adopted for removing it.

Before proceeding with the main subject thus indicated, it seems well to notice, first, that, in any such plan, the sounds of the letters used should continue to be those that are given them in the English language, and not those that are given them, say, in French or German. To say nothing of the consonants, there is hardly a vowel or a diphthong in either of these languages that has exactly the same sound as in our own; and to attempt to spell our words with letters sounded as are theirs would introduce confusion almost hopeless. Second, it should be noticed that strictly phonetic spelling is by no means necessary. What is needed is merely regularity of spelling. This fact may be rendered clear by a few examples. It has become customary for English people to think that the long sounds of the short vowels heard in *mad*, *met*, *pin*, and *not* are those heard respectively in *made*, *mete*, *pine* and *note*; yet, phonetically considered, the long sound of *e* in *met* is the sound in *mate*; of *i* in *pin* is the sound in *mete*; and of *o* in *not* is the sound in *father*; while the long sound in *pine* could be better represented by *ai*. Similarly, we have become accustomed to sound *ch* as in *church*, *th* as in *thin* and *wh* as in *what*; but, phonetically considered, we

should represent *ch* and *th* by new characters and *wh* by *hw*. It is easy to perceive that changes in spelling that would make every sound of this kind phonetically consistent might entirely disguise our present words, and make it well-nigh impossible to recognize some of them. This fact might necessitate everyone's learning to read again, and render all our present books obsolete, to say nothing of its interfering with having our words reveal to any except scholars either their derivation or their original significance. But, besides this, such changes, tho theoretically justified by supposed phonetic requirements, would not be justified by practical requirements. The desired results could be attained without any such disadvantages. Strictly phonetic spelling of itself would not lessen the difficulties of children or of foreigners when trying to learn our language. In any circumstances, the sound of each letter, and of each combination of letters has to be taught; and it is as easy for a child to learn the method of pronouncing the *wh* in *which*, as it would be to learn the same sound if it were spelled *hw*. In fact, one has to explain to most young people, why *hw* forms the better phonetic representation.

Another thing, perhaps, to remove prejudice, should be stated here, tho the grounds for the statement can be considered only hereafter. It is this—that, notwithstanding the many different sounds possible to English, to spell it regularly, would not necessitate, as many suppose, the introduction into the text of a number of entirely unfamiliar characters. There are only three sounds—those in *far*, *son* or *sun*, and *the* as distinguished from those in *fat*, *fog* and *thin*—which our present characters

could not adequately represent; and for these three sounds we could use characters with which we are already familiar. For the sound in *far* and *father* we could use the antique form—used without italicizing it—of *Œ*, *œ*. For the sound in *sun* and *son* we could use, in connection with the capital U, a new small u sometimes found in fancy type, and resembling both *u* and *o*, while at the same time, we could borrow from fancy type a new capital U to use in connection with the present small *u* for the sound in *put*, and, if long, in *butcher*; and for the sound in *the* as distinguished from that in *thin*, we could use a slightly altered *th*.

Let it be understood, then, that, at present, our aim is merely to find some method through which similar letters always shall be representative of similar sounds. In endeavoring to discover this method, it is apparent that our first care must determine what particular sounds of letters and their combinations are most uniform; *i.e.*, are regular: a gain that in itself will be important, wholly aside from any influence that the result may be supposed to have upon our modes of making alterations. Our work, in truth, must be as conservative as it is radical, necessitating scrupulous analysis before we think of synthesis. Our labor must begin by being scientific; and, that it may be so, as is finely said with reference to another subject, by Prof. Müller, “Let us take the old saying, *Divide et impera*, and translate it somewhat freely by ‘Classify and conquer,’ and I believe we shall then lay hold of the old thread of Ariadne which has led the students of many a science through darker labyrinths.” This labyrinth of English spelling,

as I think, can be penetrated and its intricacies made plain through a similar method; through an endeavor, *first*, to divide and classify, and under as few heads as possible, the different sounds of English letters in their different combinations, which work, that it may be complete, must be done with words as pronounced and spelled not only in our own time but at former periods; *second*, to accept the sounds that occur most frequently in connection with the letters, single or combined, as indicative of general rules; *third*, to group the exceptional sounds; *fourth*, to make the exceptional sounds conform to the rules through changes either in the spelling of words, or, possibly in a very few cases, in their pronunciation; and, *fifth*, to make these changes always according to authority, *i.e.*, as one is warranted to do, either from the fact that in former times or foreign countries the same word or syllable that it is proposed to change has been spelled or pronounced in accordance with the change; or that other words, analogous in character or in derivation are, or have been, so spelled or pronounced.

Those whose attention has never been directed to the subject will hear, perhaps, with some surprise, that under this fifth head may be included all except a very few of the changes that our language needs. For instance, with reference to many common words of Saxon origin, there is evidence that, at certain periods, cultivated people have pronounced them differently from the illiterate, and have given them an orthography to represent this difference. But the influence of the masses has been too decided to be counteracted thus; and

everybody has accepted once more the more general pronunciations. Nevertheless, the altered spellings still remain. Our question now is, ought we not to change these too, *e.g.*, to spell *breast*, *heart*, *friend*, *fiend*, *lamb*, *debt*, *reign*, and *prove*, as, well-nigh universally, they once were written: *breſt*, *hart*, *frend*, *feend*, *lam*, *det*, *raine*, and *proove*—the last two words, perhaps without the final *e*? Again, with reference to words of foreign origin or use, we know that certain English letters represent, almost without exception, certain foreign ones. But why not altogether without exception? If we can write *risk*, *shock*, *gazetteer*, and *benefit* where the French write *risque*, *choquer*, *gazetier*, and *bienfait*, why may we not make similar changes in words corresponding to the French *burlesque*, *chaise*, *financier*, and *contrefait*? Such thoughts suggest a mode of reformation, at the worst, conservative. Its results would merely bring the words to which it were applied within the pale of principles that underlie the language as a whole. Nor need the changes cause much inconvenience. The number of the forms of syllables in which the alterations would be needed is not large; and the reader would become familiar with them soon, because they all are forms in very common use.

It is my intention in what is to follow to discover certain rules resulting from an application of the processes just indicated; and after that, to suggest some authorized mode of causing each word that violates these rules to conform to them. And if my task accomplish no more than to prove the feasibility of regular orthography, this, in itself will be an end that never yet appears to have been at-

tained; and, being such, will more than half-way bridge the gulf that separates our present modes of spelling from a mode that would be worthy of the language that we speak.

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The thoughts that have been presented thus far in this essay, together with its concluding paragraph on page 261, are reprinted, as stated at its opening, from a paper written many years ago. This paper was followed by five others undertaking to classify the words in our language that are spelled irregularly; and, through examining the sources or affinities of these words in English, Saxon, German, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Latin or Greek, to show how far regular spellings of them could be authorized by former native, or by foreign spellings of the same or of analogous words. Those papers are still accessible, but the details with which they are filled would be out of place in this volume. Not so, however, with the general conclusions then reached. At present, indeed, these seem especially timely, in view of their bearings upon that reform in our orthography, so ably organized, about ten years ago, and so efficiently administered by the Simplified Spelling Board. I doubt whether that Board can ever attain its purpose until the majority of English-speaking people come to recognize a fact, which few now seem to believe, namely, that it is possible to spell the English language with unvarying regularity, and in such a way that an intelligent foreigner can learn to pronounce it in an hour, and a child in a few days, while, at the same time, the new spellings will not do violence to the history of the language,

nor render it impossible or even difficult to understand the older spellings in our present books.

Before restating the conclusions of the papers that, for these reasons, are now recalled, it may, perhaps, be well to say that, when they were written, there was no desire—nor is there any at present—to dogmatize about some single method through which the ends indicated can be accomplished. The only purpose was, through practical illustrations, to demonstrate the feasibility of, at least, some method.

To begin with the consonants, the following can be taken as their regular sounds when two or more of them are not combined:

<i>b</i> as in <i>bib</i>	<i>k</i> as in <i>king</i>	<i>s</i> as in <i>sin</i>
<i>c</i> as in <i>cat</i>	<i>l</i> as in <i>let</i>	<i>t</i> as in <i>tin</i>
<i>d</i> as in <i>did</i>	<i>m</i> as in <i>mat</i>	<i>v</i> as in <i>van</i>
<i>f</i> as in <i>fan</i>	<i>n</i> as in <i>nag</i>	<i>w</i> as in <i>win</i>
<i>g</i> as in <i>get</i>	<i>p</i> as in <i>pot</i>	<i>x</i> as in <i>extra</i>
<i>h</i> as in <i>hat</i>	<i>q</i> as in <i>quit</i> or <i>qwit</i>	<i>y</i> as in <i>yet</i>
<i>j</i> as in <i>jig</i>	<i>r</i> as in <i>rat</i>	<i>z</i> as in <i>zed</i>

To make the language, in accordance with these principles, absolutely regular would necessitate spelling words like *cipher*, *cigar*, *cedar* with an *s*; but we are told that the original Arabic word for the first was *sifr*; the Dutch write for the second, *sigaar*; and the Germans for the third, *zeder*. This latter word, as well as the Dutch *zaad* and *zeven* for our *seed* and *seven* will suggest authority for changing, as must be done in many cases, *s* to *z*. As for changing *g* to *j*, one can compare with our *jay*, *jealous* and *joy* the French *geai*, and the Ital-

ian *geloso* and *gioja*. If we wish to drop the *u* after *g* or *q*, we can recall the French *garde* for our *guard*, as well as *coiter* for our *quoit*. Indeed, almost all necessary dropping of silent consonants can be authorized in these ways. For *lamb*, *dumb*, *debt*, *doubt*, *foreign*, the Germans now use *lamm*, *dumm*, etc.; and the old English used *det*, *dout*, and *foren*. The first syllable of our word *scent* in French, Italian, and Latin, is *sent*. For our *hour* and *honor*, the Anglo-Saxon used *ure* and *onur*, and the Italians now use *ora* and *onore*. Our *whose* and *whole* we can trace to the old English and Saxon *hwa*, *hole* and *heil*, to say nothing of the Latin *hos* and the Greek *holos*. Even *knot* and *know* are related to the Latin *nodus* and *nosco*. One could fill several paragraphs with like examples.

Let us turn to the combined consonant-sounds. Of these several, like *bl*, *cl*, *fl*, *gl*, *kl*, *pl*, *br*, *cr*, *dr*, *fr*, *gr*, *pr*, *rn*, *rm*, *sl*, *mp*, *mpt*, *dg*, *sm*, *zm*, are absolutely phonetic, and need not be considered. The following, however, have sounds more or less arbitrary:

ch as in church
th as in thin
fh as in than
sh as in sham
zh like z in azure
wh as in which
ng as in hang

The difference between *hanger* and *anger* is that the latter has a double *g*-sound, rightly spelled as in *angger*.
ck as in pack is a form of double k.

To use these pronunciations rigidly would necessitate dropping the *h* in *character*; but the first syl-

lable of exactly the same word in French, Italian and Spanish, is *car*. So we should write *sh* in *champaign*; but why not? We write *shock* and *shop* in words where the French use *ch*. As for introducing an *h* into a few words like *azure*, there are scores of examples in English where *h* has been both added and taken away, as in *tight*, *list*, *ring*, *lid* from the Anglo-Saxon *tyð*, *tyged*, *hlystan*, *hring*, *hlid*.

Now for the vowel-sounds. Recalling what on page 247 was said of the use of **Ǽ**, **æ**, and **U**, **u**, here are the vowels when short, as is much the most frequently the case:

a as in mat

i as in pin

u as in put

ɑ as in far

o as in not

ʊ as in sun

e as in met

and in son

To carry out these principles we should be obliged to drop many silent letters; but for this we have ample authority in such former English or Saxon spellings as *agen*, *brest*, *hed*, *heven*, *helth*, *herd*, *ile*, *hart*, *foren*, *beleve*, *frend*, *yung*, *yu*, *wunder*, *gest*, *gise*, etc., etc., as well as in such cases as the French *grever*, and the Italian *villano* and *fontana*, for *grieve*, *villain*, and *fountain*. These facts are too well known to need further illustration.

Let us pass on to combined vowel-sounds.

(1) *oo* has the sound in *gloom*, *boor*, *loot*.

The sound of *oo* in *flood*, evidently should be represented by *flud*. In fact, it was formerly spelled with a *u*. The exceptional sounds in *look*, *book*, *could*, etc., might suggest their present appearance, and yet be represented perfectly, according

to the principle explained on page 255, by *look*, *cuod*, or, possibly, *look*, *cuod*.

(2) All vowels before *u*, also *i* and *o* together, and *i* before *a*, form what are technically termed proper diphthongs; i.e., diphthongs in which both vowels are sounded, e.g.:

au (or *aw*) as in *laud*, *io* as in *minion*
law

In certain words a
dieresis could show
that the single vowel
represented the diph-
thong, e.g., *äll*

eu (or *ew*) as in *feud*, *oi* (or *oy*) as in *void*, *boy*
mew

In certain words a
dieresis could show
that the single vowel
represented this diph-
thong, e.g., *müsic*

iu as in *genius**

ia as in *Columbia*

ou (or *ow*) as in *out*, *vow*

To carry out this principle would, of course, necessitate spelling *bought* like *aught*, and *mould* (see page 256) either *molde* or *moald*; and *mow*, *moe*. But ample authority could be found for such changes. Perhaps, the best method of disposing of *io* and *ia* would be to treat the *i* as the consonant *y*, and change and pronounce it accordingly, thus: *minyon*, *Columbya*, *misyon*, *constitusyon*. This would confine the rule (2) above to *u* and to *o* before *i*. Besides this, it would form a better

* See the new form for this suggested on page 259.

etymological development than *shun* for our present ending in *sion*. The use, at the end of root-words and their derivatives of *y* and *w* respectively for the vowels *i* and *u*, as in *boy*, and *fully* and *cow*, is easy to explain and apply. Sometimes, too, as in *annoyance* (for *annoiance*) and *power* (for *power*) it is a help in determining the pronunciation. For such reasons, if it do not seem best to make changes, rules like the following would cover all cases. *Y* is a consonant at the beginning, and a vowel at the end of a syllable, or in a syllable in which it is the only representative of a vowel, as in *yet*, *yon*, *ability*, *synonym*. *W* is a consonant except when immediately following a vowel with which (representing *u*) it can form diphthongs, as in *law*, *mew* and *cow*.

(3) In all cases except when forming the proper diphthongs just mentioned a vowel immediately preceding another vowel is long, as in *maid*, *aorist*, *meat*, *meet*, *seize*, *peon*, *liar*, *lie*, *lion*, *load*, *toe*, *truant*, *sue*, *suit*.

As a rule, in these cases, the second vowel is suppressed, as in *maid*, *meet*, *died*, *load*, *toe*, *sue*, *suit*. Where, in exceptional cases, it is sounded, this fact might be indicated by the dieresis with which we are already familiar, thus *aörist*, *peön*, *liön*, *suët*. But a better method would be to designate all long vowels, that are long irrespective of letters following them, thus: *āorist*, *pēony*, *liön*, *sūet*, *āmiability*, *cōincide*.

It is important to observe how well-nigh universally applicable is the principle stated in rule 3. Because of failure to notice the rule, some very scholarly spelling reformers have given sanction

to accepting the form of *ie* for the sound of long *e*, as in *field*. The objections to this form are, first, that it violates the rule just stated; second, that it leaves long *i*, now needed especially in the participles of verbs ending in *i* long, like *die*, without any form to represent it; and, third, that it introduces a new element of confusion into our spelling, because we already have three representatives of long *e*, as in *meat*, *meet* and *mete*.

(4) The principle in rule 3 applied to a peculiar form of English spelling leads to the following: In root-words and their derivatives and compounds, *e*-final preceded by another vowel, with or without intervening consonants, is silent; but it lengthens the vowel preceding even when separated from it by one or more consonants, *e.g.*, *mete*, *meet*. This use of final *e* is so common in our language, and so easy to master, that there is no need of changing it. If a change were needed, of course the *e* could be placed before the consonant, as in *aerate*, *meet*, *died*, *toed*, and *sued*. If a change be not made the rule necessitates our dropping the final *e* in words like *have*, *live*, *serve*, *favorite*; but notice that we have already dropt it in words formerly spelled *hase*, *hade*, *blacke*, *helpe*, *bosome*, and *burne*. In some words, too, we should have to add an *e* or change the digraph. But notice that many of these very words were formerly spelled with an *e*, namely *childe*, *wilde*, *binde*, *beholde*, *bolte*, *controle*, *worne*, *onely*; and we have added an *e* for no good reason to words formerly spelled *bad* (from *bid*) and *wer*.

Just here, in view of the different forms of spelling that we have in *maid* and *made*, *meet*, *meat*, and

mete, *load* and *lode*, *dew* and *due*, perhaps it is important to emphasize the fact that the object of reformed spelling is to have it in all cases represent the sound, not necessarily to have the sound represent the spelling. It is often an advantage in a language to have some of the words that sound alike spelled differently; and this not merely for the sake of rendering intelligible in the text its puns, but often, too, its poetry, and the suggestiveness of its prose, to which may be added as well the facts of its etymology. Notice how allied to puns in the principle manifested, and yet not puns, are Shakespeare's words *pale* and *sack*, as used in the following:

How are we pack'd and bounded in a pale,
A little herd of England's timorous deer.

King Henry VI, First Part, 4; 2.

I'll either make thee stoop and bend the knee,
Or sack this country with a mutiny.

Idem, 5; 1.

For some minds there are thoughts associated with both *mete* and *meat* connected with the word of like sound used in the expression "It is not *meet* to take the children's bread and to cast it to dogs." Such cases are not rare, and frequently it is a convenience to have the printing reveal just which of two or more words is primarily meant. It is a question whether such considerations are not sufficient to outweigh the inconvenience of being obliged to study in order to become informed with reference

to the different spellings. The words to which these apply are really very few, and can be easily learned in a short time.

(5) Connected with rules 3 and 4 in principle, is a rule that might be made universal; and if so, it would, in most cases, indicate not only spelling, but the right pronunciation. It is this, that a vowel when followed by a single consonant or by two or more that cannot be separated from the pronunciation of a following vowel, is *long*; but when followed by a double consonant, or by two or more that must be separated in pronunciation, it is short, and is to be accented, *e.g.*, *hater, abler, hatter, surpass, hamper; fetus, ether, fennel, impress, wedlock; biting, nitrous, bitter, instill, pilfer; moment, cobra, plotter, bodkin, emboss; musing, butcher, shudder, musket, rebuff.*

Perhaps a better way to attain the result intended to be reached by this rule 5, would be to use, as suggested under rule 3, a mark—*ā, ē, ī, ō, ū*—over all long vowels, the quantities of which might otherwise appear doubtful.

Let us now make a brief summary of what has been said with reference to the vowels. In doing this, it will be well to illustrate the way in which certain of them are influenced by the consonants used with them. The effect is such that some imagine the vowel itself to be different. But as a fact, it is the same, and needs no different representation. It would be very difficult, in view of the accompanying consonant, to pronounce it—as in uttering *what, but*, as contrasted with *far, burr*—in any other way than in a more closed or more open manner.

as short in

Q, q, what, far.
 A, a, bat, bank, matter,
 E, e, met, held, den, bet-
 ting,
 I, i, pit, pin, pinning,
 O, o, not, on, bottom,
 U, u, put, pull,

U, u, but, bun, sun, burr,
 OO, oo, cool, gloom, room,

Gu, aw, or ä, fraud, law, äll, ör, or aull, our,
 eu, ew or ü, Europe, few, üse, müsic, or meusic,

iu, or yu, genius, etc.,
 ou, ow, out, our, hound,

oi (oy) void, boy,

io (yo) minion, minyon, missyon,

ia (ya) Columbia, Columbya.

as long in

father,
 made, mate, mating,
 āorist, āmiable,
 meat, meet, mete, even,
 pēony,
 pie, pine, pining, iodine,
 boat, toe, voting, cōincide,
 sue, fruit, lute, fluting,
 butcher,

buok, wuod, cuok, buoy,

By giving these sounds to the vowels, single and combined, and giving to the consonants the sounds that have been indicated, we should have a system of orthography applicable to both pronunciation and accentuation which, on the whole, would be about as easy to master as that of any language in existence. How little it would change the character of our present spelling, or interfere with our continuing to understand our present books, may be illustrated by printing, in the forms that it would necessitate, the proposition mentioned at the opening of this article, in which Mr. Mori, "Japanese chargé d'affaires near the American Government," made his sugges-

tion with reference to "simplified English." His words were these:

"the spoken langwaje ov Japann, being inaddeqwate tu the grōing necessitiz ov the people ov that empire, and too poor tu be made by a fonettic alfabet sufissyently ūseful az a ritten langwaje, the idēa prevailz amung menny ov our best educated men and moste profound thinkurs that if we wuod keep pase with the aje we must adopt sum copius expansibul and expanding Europēan langwaje, print our laws and transact ōll public bizziness in it az soon az possibul.* — My proposisyun iz tu make and plase in our scools and in the hands ov the people at lorj spelling-buoks, dicsyonāriz, grammarz, and uther text-buoks, teaching what may be turmd simplified English."

The object of printing this passage has been to show the feasibility of having English spelled with absolute regularity. Even without introducing some of the changes—like that, for instance, of the doubled consonants—our orthography might be made sufficiently regular for practical purposes. In some cases, too, a change in pronunciation might be more desirable than in spelling. But these are matters of detail. The object of this paper has been to reveal the character and effects of the general principles involved.

In conclusion, there is no need of answering the question most naturally suggested here, namely, "Why cannot we adopt these changes?" Everybody who knows anything of human nature is aware that to secure the success of any project aimed for the betterment of existing conditions,

* The use of English for a similar reason is now, in 1910, seriously advocated in China.

something more is needed than to prove that it is sensible and feasible. All victories over thought in the world are gained very much like those of a game of chess. Many pawns that interfere, many obstacles of apparent insignificance, like those embodying results of the sheerest prejudice or pedantry, must be removed before access even can be gained to that in the mind which makes any effort really worth while. The writer of this paper, therefore, has no conception that the suggestions which it has presented will all, or any of them, lead to any immediate practical results. But is it too chimerical to hope that the facts that have been brought out may silence somewhat those erroneous statements made so often that no rules at all exist in accordance with which English orthography has been developed thus far, or may yet be perfected; that these facts may cast some light upon the pathway of the few who wish and work for changes in our spelling but know not, as yet, what course they should pursue that they may change it for the better; or that, finally, the same facts may induce some younger educators of our nation, writers of sufficient influence and thinkers of sufficient loyalty to a language that they should desire to benefit, to endeavor to begin a gradual, perhaps, but efficacious method of reform. Such a method need not lead to measures so radical and revolutionary as to discourage expectation. And if not, the only question ought to be how long,—how long shall agencies that have so little to commend them interfere with a course of action that, to say the least, is rational; and, at the most may issue in results that never yet have been so much as possible to the writers of any other age or nation?

THE MAYFLOWER PILGRIMS AND THEIR PRESENT REPRESENTATIVES *

In all history there have been few events as important as that which we have met, this evening, in order to commemorate,—the landing of the Mayflower Pilgrims on the coast of New England in 1620. Before the times of the English independents—a few hundred people, whom these Pilgrims represented—there may have been others holding the same opinions that they held, but there had been few willing, to the bitter end, to back their opinions by unflinching devotion; willing, rather than surrender them to endure persecution and exile, to sacrifice almost everything that a civilized man holds dear,—ease, comfort, property, home, country, and even, if necessary, life itself. It is because of this attitude of mind, on the part of the Pilgrim Fathers, that half the enlightened nations of the world to-day have accepted their opinions, and made them dominant in Church, and State, and society.

What were these opinions? What was the one principle underlying them all? It was this,—that human beings ought to be ruled in accordance with the thoughts and wishes of people in general, not of a few allowed to occupy commanding positions

* Address delivered when Governor of the Society of Mayflower Descendants of the District of Columbia, at their annual banquet, November 21, 1907, and reported in the local newspapers.

owing to supposed hereditary rights, or to the arbitrary exercise of force. The Pilgrims thought that the wisest conception is usually the result of the widest consultation, and that what is wanted by all can usually be best obtained by asking all what they want. They were very religious in their way. They believed in "divine rights"; but they did not believe that these rights should be enjoyed solely by a king, bishop, or some other earthly lord. They believed in divine inspiration, but their Divinity seemed sovereign over every man, and the indications of His will best exprest through the free utterances of all. So they said that countries ought to select their own rulers, congregations their own pastors, and communities their own social leaders. For saying and trying to practise this, they were persecuted, driven out of England to Holland, and finally came to America. With what result? To-day, France and America elect presidents. In Great Britain, there was a Cromwell, and there is a king; but he is a ruler only in name; the ruler, in fact, being a prime minister, who is an official of an elected parliament. To-day half the churches in England, and all but a single church in our country, and even that, to some extent, are practically ruled as the Pilgrims said they should be. As a matter of form, bishops or other clergy may ordain and install, but where do they put a man over a congregation that refuses to elect or accept him? As for a patent of nobility, this is now regarded in parts even of Europe as a label indicative of something that does not necessarily exist. The main suggestion of the label to most Americans, I think, is the propriety of our having a sort of interna-

tional pure food law for the protection of those tempted by false allurements. This might prevent certain of our fathers from being swindled out of their property, and certain of our daughters, abetted by their mothers, from being poisoned in mind and soul, if not, as some of us fear, in body.

In the opinion of many of the ablest historic writers of the world, it is questionable whether, either in this country or in Europe, the conditions of sentiment and government just indicated would exist to-day had it not been for the settlement in New England of the Pilgrims*—I do not mean of the Puritans, who came later, and were bigots and persecutors, but of the Pilgrims, who were neither, and never believed in either—had it not been, I say, for the settlement in New England of the Pilgrims, and for the ocean which, by separating them from the old country, gave them an opportunity without interference from abroad of carrying their theories into practise.

The conditions in the world have greatly changed, we must not suppose that there is no longer any

* The careful historian will always distinguish the American Pilgrims from the American Puritans. The latter were in England Presbyterians or Episcopalians of the evangelistic type. The former were Separatists or Independents. Hume in his *History of England*, Chapter LVII, says, "The Catholics, pretending to an infallible guide, had justified upon that principle their doctrine and practise of persecution; the Presbyterians, imagining that such clear and certain tenets as they themselves adopted could be rejected only from a criminal and pertinacious obstinacy, had hitherto gratified to the full their bigoted zeal in a like doctrine and practise, the Independents, from the extremity of the same zeal, were led into the milder principles of toleration. . . . Of all Christian sects, this was the first which, during its prosperity as well as its adversity, always adopted the principle of toleration"—and the history of Plymouth Colony shows that they continued to practise the same principle in this country.

necessity for trying to maintain and continue the kind of work that was begun by these people. The plant of civilization, like that of the field, which may be green with leaves in May, yellow with blossoms in June, and red with berries in July, may not always appear the same; but it always is the same, and needs similar treatment. The peculiarity of the mind of the Pilgrim was that it could and did penetrate beneath the surface of life to detect the principles at work below it; and believed that that which is right in practice can result from that only which is right in theory. The same sort of penetration and adherence to principles is needed to-day. Let me illustrate this from two spheres of activity sufficiently inclusive to be typical of all,—one having to do with our recreations, and the other with our employments.

We all believe in recreation,—in a certain amount of play; but what is the true principle underlying a sane, healthful belief in it? What but this,—that a man should exercise enough, and not more than enough, to keep his brain, which is that for which he should live, healthy, vigorous, and clear? But where do you hear this principle proclaimed, either in social or educational circles? Hardly anywhere. Sports, and especially athletics, are treated as ends in themselves. With what result? When one trains the body so that it becomes numb and cannot be bruised, he necessarily trains the brain, too, so that it becomes numb and cannot be used. Over-training, when it takes place in college, ruins scholarship, and when it takes place either inside or outside of college, it makes many a man a physical as well as a mental wreck long before he reaches

middle life. The argument, too, that we can afford occasional results like these because our nation needs future heroes and fighters, is fallacious. In these days of science, when we have our next war, success will come not to the Goliaths, but to the Davids; not to the pugilists, but to the marksmen; not to the sluggers, but to the inventors. I have always felt a great respect for one of my old pupils who was the best gymnast in his class, but refused to go into either the baseball or the football team. He did so on the ground that mentally he could not afford the time and physically could not afford the training. The latter was a more important reason than some might suppose.

Turning from our recreations, let us look at our employments,—at the objects of them, as usually sought in those larger enterprises typical of business-thought undertaken in order to secure what is termed financial development. We all know, or ought to know, what is the true principle that should underlie these. It is that which, as a fact, too, actuated most of the earlier engineers and promoters of our country, namely, the building of canals, railways, manufactories, and towns, in order to increase the convenience, work, wealth, and comfort of the people considered as a whole. I myself was brought up in the busiest hive of enterprise in the West, and I never in early life heard any project advocated in which these objects were not brought to the front. How often do we hear of them to-day in Wall Street? Their principle there is to promote enterprise in order to secure individual wealth. One can imagine a farmer on the Western prairies rejoicing, when, after a long

drought, he sees a cloud rising on the distant horizon. So all of us, at times, have hailed the advent of business enterprise. But it makes a great difference whether that cloud be filled from on high or from below,—i. e., with dust and débris which it has scooped up from farm and farmhouse, and which it is coming on to augment with other accumulations of the same kind, and then to scatter broadcast, and, through both methods, destroy and bury every vestige of fertility in its pathway. Enterprise actuated merely by a desire to increase the prestige and power of the few through what, uninfluenced by higher considerations, their greed can violently snatch from the many on a plain below them, is far more likely to prove a curse to us all than a blessing.

Our forefathers believed, as I have said, in grounding all their practises on right principles. This was their belief because they had the sense to recognize, and the resolution to make real the recognition, that thoughts are more important than things,—the mind that works the deed more important than the matter in which the deed is wrought. Accepting the sovereignty of thought and mind, they could not yield allegiance to the words and ways of those who seemed to ignore, where they failed to oppose, everything beyond and above this earth and the merely earthly. They could not be satisfied with loyalty to anything except the most advanced and elevated of ideals. I like to think of them as they started from Lincolnshire, gazing wistfully out beyond the prow of the little ship that bore them to Holland, gazing beyond the prow of the *Mayflower* that bore

them across the Atlantic, gazing beyond the rocks and forests that welcomed them when they reached New England. I like to think of them and of those earliest pioneers who were their children, with their eyes fixt less on the farms that they were planting and the cities that they were planning than on what was beyond and above—the “fields of living green,” the “city coming down from God out of heaven”—the ideals after which every worthy result on this earth is always modeled. Such ideals can be ours to-day as truly as they were those of our forefathers in the seventeenth century. What we need is to believe in them and to dare to give them expression.

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER AS DEVELOPED IN OUR REPUBLIC *

That revolution, as we call it, which, one hundred and twenty years ago, our forefathers succeeded in producing, might better, perhaps, be termed an evolution. Ours was not merely like one of those previous movements of the same name in European governments in which one turn of the wheel of fortune brought one party up to be succeeded by another turn that sent it down again. It was not merely like one of those revolutions of our globe, in which it passes at morning from darkness to light, only to pass at evening from light back to darkness again. It was more like one of those convulsions in nature in which one phase of life permanently disappears to give place to another,—like that which happens when the volcano shakes and throws aside forms existing on the surface of the globe, and pours through and above them the glowing life of that which has always before been kept below. It was a movement placing elements of society—the masses of the people—that formerly had been hidden from sight or attracted little attention, where they might become the chief objects of attention.

In looking at anything distinctively American—in tracing, for instance, the history among us of

* Address delivered on July 4, 1896, in Hopewell, N. J., in connection with the dedication of a revolutionary memorial. Reprinted from *The Hopewell Herald*.

any political, intellectual, social or religious movement—one finds, literally, the masses of the people on the surface claiming and receiving the first consideration. On the contrary, in most of the nations of the Old World, at the time of our declaration of independence, one would have found certain ruling or privileged classes on the surface claiming and receiving the first consideration. In some countries they received the only consideration. A few years ago in Egypt, when their ruler, the Khedive, decided to undertake any public measure, whether to make war or only to construct a railway or canal, that decision, originating with himself or his advisers, ended all discussion. Forthwith, gangs of soldiers were ordered into the nearest villages to levy taxes and to draft men for the work. Not infrequently, without an hour's warning, and at the dictation of some almost irresponsible and domineering officer, fathers, husbands and brothers were taken thus to be kept away from their homes throughout their lives. Sir John Bowring, in his autobiography, tells of a scene that he witnessed, several years ago, in Cairo. A man was brought before a tribunal accused of burglary. The court was filled at once with men shouting, "Let him be hanged!" and the judge, without further delay, decided to have him hanged. After he had given the order for the execution, the official turned to his foreign visitor and asked how such cases would be treated in England. "Probably the criminal, after a trial had proved him guilty, would be transported to a distant colony," was answered. "And at what cost?" inquired the judge; and when a probable amount had been named, "What is the cost in

your country," he asked, "of a rope?" When he had been told, "You must be great fools!" he said. But in our country, ladies and gentlemen, you know that the court would supply a criminal like this with free lodgings and a lawyer, jury and, possibly, a judge, some of whom might not be above the suspicion of desiring to secure his services—one more vote—at some approaching political contest. You see, in our country the individual law-breaker would be protected. The party could not afford to hang him. The more fools we, perhaps! Just think how it would brace up the backbone and stiffen the neck of a man, when tempted, if he could say with truth, as he could have done in the good old times, "I'll be hanged if I do it."

When we turn from the Orient to the more civilized nations of Europe, we find that, in the degree in which the people have become intelligent, the government is obliged, in order to maintain its authority, to pay more attention to their rights and wishes. But yet, in many places, the theory underlying administration continues to be the same, namely, that all public movements must start from above, with the crown or its ministers. The first public expression ventured in Russia—no one else would have dared to breathe it—with reference to the emancipation of the serfs, was uttered by the Emperor himself, in a speech to the nobles of Moscow in 1856, in which he told them that the existing manner of possessing serfs could not remain unchanged. Even in England to-day, with few exceptions, it is only a member of the noble or wealthy classes who can serve as an unsalaried legislator; it is only a minister of the crown who is expected

to introduce into Parliament measures of reform, and, after they have been introduced, it is only a score of men there, acknowledged to be leaders, who are permitted, as a rule, by the members, as they scrape down all others, to express on the floor their opinions of these measures. As for the Continent outside of England, all through it, the majority of such things as, in our country, would be done instinctively by individuals or by committees appointed by collections of individuals, are done by the government. If there need to be a new bridge, or sidewalk, or stage-line; if efforts be demanded in behalf of commerce or agriculture, the poor, the inebriate, the ignorant, the immoral, it is the government that is expected to perceive this and to provide whatever is necessary—commissions, asylums, hospitals, schools, churches. It is the government that pays the workman, engineer, physician, teacher or preacher, whom it appoints to manage them. If they be not managed well, it is the government, not the individual, who is responsible—why should he trouble himself even to think about such things? Indeed, in some countries the government almost seems intent upon molding his character so that he shall not think—seriously, at least—about anything. What else can result from forcing all the young men, just at the age when their mental natures are most susceptible to its effects, through the machinery of the army, where they are kept from one to five years in a condition in which they are expected on every occasion to obey another's word of command, to act mechanically without doing any brain-work of their own?

Now compare with these results those that we

find in our own country. Here the people are the real sovereigns. The officials are called, and are, public servants, put into their places to work for their constituents, and removed if they fail to do so; while all the conditions of life are such as to stimulate and develop the influence of the man in private station. We all know—it is merely an historical fact—how character, as regards the power both of thinking and of willing, is developed among those who live where inhabitants are scattered, difficulties many, and people are obliged to take care of themselves and of one another, as on treacherous seacoasts, in the wilds of the West, or near unexplored mountains. In our country we have an elaborate organization of society, the effect of which is to produce something similar,—people who can take care of themselves and of one another. The very school-boys, swinging on the gates and mounted on the fences to see the political procession march by, feel that they themselves constitute a very important factor of the whole performance, which they might improve, too, if they chose; and every Sunday-school girl, with more of real wealth in her flashing eye, and of beauty in her flushing cheek, than all the gems or colors that ever made brilliant the miter or the robe of the representative of a State church, is trained to think that she has a commission direct from heaven itself to move, like the angel that she is, and, with her sweet voice, call toward the house of God not only father, mother, brother, but, in every household where she finds herself, those with inflaming passions and consuming appetites, who need to be snatched like brands from the burning. Abroad, people grown

up hardly know enough to snatch their own goods from their own houses when they are burning. I was once in a fourth story in a city over there, when the two lower stories, including the passageway in which was our staircase, were burned out. Of course, like Americans, all of our own party packed their trunks. The four mature persons who constituted the family with which we were staying, tho more disturbed, apparently, than ourselves, did not touch finger to an article. When asked "Why not?" their answer was, "The police, the police." It did not seem to occur to them that anyone could pack or remove their goods except the police. With us the police would have been an afterthought, scarcely expected to arrive till all the danger was over.

But it is not only the responsibility of our private citizen that it is important to notice, but also his respectability. You and I feel just as respectable as we might, to-day, were we candidates for office with all the opposition papers printing caricatures of us. We feel so largely because we have learned that, when men occupy official position of any kind, obligations to constituents and to parties often trammel not only their expressions, but even their opinions. It is often only the humble private citizen who can afford to be, in the best sense, independent,—afford to plan, speak and do that which shall make him a leader in thought and action. But in our country what a leader he can be! Every writer in our land knows that, as in the case of Mrs. Stowe or of Horace Greeley, the black line trailing behind his pen may lead, has led, many times in many places, to public convul-

sions more salutary, and sometimes not less sanguinary, than could have followed the line of powder trailed under the Parliament Houses of England in the slow match of Guy Faux. Every speaker in our land knows that, if he have the mind to conceive of a plan of reform and the voice to plead for it, then, like those first advocates of emancipation, not one of whom ever held office, crowned only by the sovereignty of pure intellect, using only the weapons of enlightened reason, he may move triumphantly across the country—what Emperor more so?—till, perhaps, millions of resolute men march to war behind him, millions of grateful slaves spring into freedom before him, and all things surrounding echo to his name—which may still ring like an alarum to aspiration in the future when all the trappings that deck the mere official position of his time shall have crumbled into dust. Who cares now to hear anything about certain of our presidents? What heart fails to be thrilled through and through to listen to the story of Garrison or Phillips?

These opportunities for influence, too, are afforded for the private citizen in the direction of administrative affairs not only, but in all directions. Our mingling together as we do, in schools, assemblies, churches, opening the doors between different classes of society, and allowing an easy circulation between one and the other, is constantly prompting those born in the lowliest positions to strive to obtain recognition in the highest circles, by conforming their own lives to the highest standards of manners and of mentality. As a result, most of them are prepared to evince, amid all the

changing conditions of outward circumstances, such a degree of good taste and ready tact as to render a native-born production on our own soil of what abroad is termed a snob, a combination of servility and pretentiousness, almost an impossibility.

And notice, ladies and gentlemen, that the results upon private intelligence and character which I have mentioned spring mainly from the theories underlying our political institutions. They are attributable to our republican government. Some such results always are attributable to republican government wherever it exists. We ought never to forget that the great intellectual periods of ancient Greece and Rome, and of Italy just before the Reformation, were developed in generations trained up in the republics of those times, republics not in the complete sense in which ours is a republic, but in the sense of being governments submitting methods of public administration to large numbers of individuals composing each community, who were thus stimulated to think, choose and take sides. The great intellectual movements that followed the Reformation in Germany, England, and France took place during times in which individuals, if not living in actual republics, were, nevertheless, in the unsettled conditions of public affairs, stimulated precisely as they would have been in republics, to think, choose and take sides. On the contrary, the intellectual activity of Greece closed soon after her people had yielded to the sword of Alexander, that of ancient Rome soon after hers had bowed to the crown of the Cæsars, that of Spain and Italy soon after theirs had knelt to the thumb-screw of the Inquisition. After the first ef-

fects of the Reformation, intellectual progress in Germany and France was almost trampled out for a time by the tread of invading armies led by military despots; and that of the last century has continued, as many think, largely because, amid spiritual assumption often gathered in clouds so dark above that not one ray from heaven seemed any longer visible, amid material armaments crowding so thickly about that often not one path to progress seemed any longer unimpeded, the thinkers and toilers of the Old World have, nevertheless, espied, standing steadfast upon the shore on this side of the Atlantic, a form which the people of France—not I—have deemed worthy of being represented in the greatest statue of the age, “Liberty with her torch enlightening the world.”

Enlightening the world, too, not only politically, but socially and religiously. According to the theory prevalent in the Old World, tho it is not always consistently carried out, we see the authorities in State and Church controlling, and, in order to keep control, repressing the energies of the people, save so far as permitted to labor for those who consider themselves above them. All through Europe this system extends into all the relations of life. In some countries a gentleman thinks it not respectable for him to carry in the street a package weighing a pound. His wife and child over whom he lords may stagger at his side bearing twenty times that weight. “My God,” said one of their ladies to me once, when I had gone shopping with her, “don’t carry that in the street,” and to avoid a public quarrel, I had to let her take home for me my own purchases. In the Orient, things are

worse. The small boys and girls in the shops do the work that supports both parents. If such a system of repression dwarfs the growing body and mind, what does it do for the soul that, looking up through those that represent earthly authority, can conceive of no authority in heaven that is not also tyrannical? What is a ruler or a father there but a being to be feared alone?

But, according to the theory prevailing in this New World, tho it, too, is not always consistently carried out, the order of things just mentioned is reversed. Here the authorities in State and Church are beneath,—public servants, ministering to the people for the organized purpose of stimulating them to the greatest possibilities of free development. And this system, too, extends into all the relations of life. Here the strong man bears the burdens of the weaker woman and both parents those of the weaker child, whose soul looking up through those that represent authority on earth, can hardly conceive of a ruler or a father in heaven who is not a being to be loved.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is because, notwithstanding much in the outward aspects of our institutions which must appear unsatisfactory, there are within the husk, these seeds containing possibilities of harvests full of unlimited promise for the world, that they are worthy of our profoundest reverence and most loyal devotion. There are those who would actuate you to these by dwelling on the fact that our territory is extensive, our resources boundless, our population ever on the increase. But all these things may be affirmed with equal truth of the continent of Asia. There are

those who would point you with pride to the nations and families from which our people trace their origin. But we are of many races, and the mists of the common ocean, through which all have passed, as if to be thus baptized into our land's new life of freedom, have washed away all that rendered most attractive the older life of aristocracy. Rather than any of these things let us cherish those ideas, some of which I have been trying to recall to you this afternoon; those ideas vitalizing our institutions as the soul the body; those ideas that, one hundred and twenty years ago, in colonies where time-honored rights were being wrested away, where lording bishops were laying hands on independent churches, and irresponsible soldiers were trampling upon privileges granted by royal charters and prerogatives exercised by lawful assemblies, caused those men of Lexington, whose action so thrilled your forefathers in your old meeting house here when they heard of it,—caused those eighty farmers of Lexington in the face of eight hundred English veterans who came against them, to stand like a wall of blood between the might of the sovereign and the right of the subject; and finally those ideas which, years later, when freedom to develop all that is best in manhood which had been obtained by the many was being forcibly denied to the few, hurled those trained to be the champions of liberty in the North upon those who had not learned all that they should have learned by being its beneficiaries in the South, as if Providence had designed to pour both together into the flaming caldron of conflict, in order, when the passion of war had cooled, to show, molded

from the elements thus fused, a grander, wiser, nobler man of the people. Fellow-citizens, is it too much to say that to be permitted to live with this man and for this man is a privilege for which we cannot be too thankful; and one for which we cannot fail to hope and believe that our children's children will always continue to be thankful?

NATIONAL PROBITY THE PRICE OF NATIONAL PROSPERITY *

Every man born into this world possesses a certain amount of sense. If, on some occasions, with reference to some particular subjects, he and his friends—his party as we may say—seem to us to have expended very little of it, there is, perhaps, all the more reason to infer that he has a good deal of it left. If he have any of it left, in a country like our own, where it is the duty, as well as right, of everybody to think, one who differs in opinion from him ought to try to appeal to this sense,—to his common sense, as we say. This is the reason why I am here to-night,—to present to some of you who differ from me a few plain facts, and to try to get you to think about them. It is not because I imagine that you have been exercising no thought,—only not quite enough of it; not because I think that there is no truth and force in the arguments that have hitherto influenced you,—only, perhaps, not enough of them.

It seems to me, and to others who agree with me, that one question to be settled in this campaign, for which all other questions, for the time being, should be waived aside, has to do with that which is at the very basis of the commercial life of the

* Delivered first at the Flemington (N. J.) Opera House, then, in substance, at other places, and locally reported several times, during the Presidential Campaign of 1896.

country. At the battle of Spire, where the French had been ordered to give no quarter, a German officer who had been surrounded begged for his life. "Ask any other favor," said a Frenchman, "and you may have it; but to give you your life is impossible." Our political adversaries seem saying to us to-day, "Ask any other favor, and you may have it, but to give you your commercial life is impossible." Occasions when that which is vital to business prosperity is threatened, are not uncommon in a country like ours; and experience has shown that, when they present themselves, all the people of all the parties should, if possible, get together and put an end to them. Twenty years ago, as most of you remember, times were hard, and, apparently, as many people as now were ready to ascribe the trouble to the nature of our currency. They said then that we needed not silver, as is said now, but irredeemable paper money. Their proposition—to the joy of many of us, tho urged largely by members of our own party—was voted down; and without the change that had been advocated there followed the most prosperous times that this country has ever known.

The majority of us, as I think, believe that this history of the past in all of its essential details and results will be repeated now. At least, we purpose to face the issue and fight it precisely as was done with the former issue. We purpose to deal with it as the Gascon did with what someone told him was the ghost of a man whom he had once killed in battle. "Ho!" he cried, "you want to be killed a second time, do you? Here's your man." They purpose to dispose of the matter, too, before they

have had a chance to see what, if let alone, the enemy will do. They refuse to take kindly to the sort of experiment recommended to the boy in order to find out whether or not what seemed a mushroom was a toadstool: "Eat it, and, if you die, it's a toadstool." They fail to consider it wise to wait till all possible harm has been done; and then elect a Congress and President, four years hence, to correct it. They fear that, to pursue this course, might accomplish no more good than that resolution, said to have been seriously introduced once into the English House of Commons, to make suicide a capital offense.

Perhaps some of you think that the three or four references to death just made involve the use of language a little too strong for our subject? Let me modify it then, as the Capuchin monk did with a statement of his, when preaching before Louis XIV, "We shall all die," he cried; then, noticing the sharp glance of the king, he went on, "yes, sire, we shall almost all die." Of course, when referring to death in this connection, one means the death of business, of commerce, of prosperity, and, with it, of a sense of security, of comfort and of happiness. Let me tell you why I think the death of these is threatened. The distinguished leader of the opposition party, in his journey from Chicago to New York, excited much applause on many occasions by saying that this country ought to be independent of Great Britain. Of course it ought. The statement is one of those to which I referred when I said that there is some truth and force in the arguments of the opposition party; but not enough of either. The whole truth can be ex-

prest only by saying that the country ought to be independent of Great Britain so far as this is possible or practicable in view of our own interests. You and I like to be independent of our neighbors, especially of any whom we think to be particularly self-centered. But one who tries to be independent of even such neighbors, when, by another course, he can make something out of them, is not acting the part of a wise man. If we want to make anything out of Great Britain or of any other great nation, it is not possible nor practicable for our country to be commercially independent of it.

Least of all, can we be independent of it when dealing with this question of money. Money is a standard of value, made a standard for the purpose of being made a medium of exchange. I give you a certain quantity and quality of goods, and, you, in return, give me a certain amount of money, and thus we trade; but it would be impossible to trade with money unless we could agree as to what we should consider its exact value. Our annual foreign trade, most of which is done with Great Britain, including exports and imports, to say nothing about exchanges of bonds, and stocks, and real estate, and other forms of investment, amounts to about sixteen hundred millions of dollars a year,—more than half as much as the largest debt that this country ever, at one time, had contracted. To carry on this trade requires money as a medium of exchange; and, as the trade is international, it requires money concerning the value of which both the nations trading can agree. At present, all nations agree with reference to the value of gold. In our country, we use for money not only gold, but

also silver and paper. These latter, however—and not only here but all over Europe—are worth what they are because the government has put its stamp on them. This stamp indicates, and in some cases states, that the government has paid the silver or paper to its creditors and has put it in circulation, and has declared by law that the people shall accept it as a legal tender equal in value to a certain amount of gold. Because of stamping thus this silver and paper, the government has become morally as well as, in some cases, legally bound to pay in gold that which is said to be its value. If it were not for this guarantee, on the part of the government, the paper in a paper dollar would be worth only its market value, that is less than one cent; and the silver in a silver dollar would be worth, as prices are to-day, only fifty-three cents. The free coinage of silver involves the removal of any obligation or guarantee on the part of the government to make good the worth of the dollar in the more valuable medium. It means, unless the passage of the law could lift the price of silver, that the owner of silver bullion worth in the market fifty-three dollars could take this to the United States' mints and have it coined, at government expense, into one hundred dollars, and then have a legal right to force you and me and everybody to whom he was indebted for real estate, or salaries, or wages, to accept this fifty-three dollars worth of bullion for one hundred dollars. In case we had what is termed the free coinage of silver whether silver went up or down in price—and some of our wisest financiers say that it would undoubtedly go down—with it would go up or down the value of

that which we had earned. This would be so because there would be no government pledge, as there is now, behind the silver dollar to make it always worth the same in all the markets of the world.

Should not this result as thus merely stated be enough to condemn the cause of it? Money is meant to be a convenience. We put into it our earnings, or our property, in order to keep the value of these just where it has been. If we use a medium, the value of which we cannot determine from one day to another, it will become not a convenience, but an inconvenience. If the people of this country, next November, vote so that suddenly you and I wake up and find that our wages, salaries and earnings may or may not be worth fifty cents on a dollar—even if we find that, by some unforeseen accident which no financier, at least, seems now to be able to anticipate, they be worth as much as eighty or ninety cents on a dollar,—we shall consider the result not only inconvenient but unjust.

I began to speak, however, of the relations of the subject to foreign commerce. When communities are very small, and have few dealings with outside people, they can use almost anything as money which they choose to agree to use as such. In Abyssinia they formerly exchanged small cakes; in Russia leather stamped by the government; and, in one of the wars in Ireland, the army leaders melted up all the old iron that they could find, and stamped it. But when the Abyssinians came to trade with other races, or the Russians crossed the borders of their own land, or the army in which the iron had circulated moved into another district, the cakes,

the leather and the iron became worth no more than their market value. Even upon a supposition that a silver dollar stamped by our government without a government obligation to keep it as good as gold—for we must not forget that this is what free coinage involves—could circulate for more than fifty-three cents in our own country, what reason have we to suppose that it could circulate for more than this in foreign countries? And if not, what then? To-day, silver is the standard in Mexico; and a Mexican dollar actually contains more silver than an American. Yet for one American silver dollar—and because of our government's obligation to keep its value on a parity with that of gold—for one American silver dollar, you can buy almost two Mexican dollars. Suppose that, six or seven years ago, you had invested twenty thousand American dollars in Mexico, and that these were owing you and that, because of some unforeseen action of the Mexican government, it would not be possible for you to get in return for them any more, say, than twelve thousand American dollars, what would you think of the action of the Mexican government that had rendered such a form of repayment possible; or of the people of Mexico who had authorized the action? That is just the form of repayment to European investors which, according to the acknowledgment of everyone who thinks of the subject at all, will be rendered possible and, according to the views of thousands of our wisest thinkers, will be rendered probable, by the mere election to office of the party-candidates whom I am here to oppose. Can you imagine any degree of confidence which the people of Europe may have in our country, or in our

institutions, which this action on our part would not totally destroy?

I asked this question of a gentleman of my own town, the other day, and he replied that it was none of his concern what Europeans thought of us. It was a reply, the bearing of which, it is evident that he had not considered. It, certainly, is as much the duty of a nation, as of an individual, to "avoid the appearance of evil" by providing "things honest in the sight of all men." And no one who has read with any care the speeches and writings of patriots and statesmen, not of our own country alone, but of foreign countries, can fail to recognize that there is, at least, one weighty reason why these principles should be applied by those of us who live in this country. It is because the country represents that which the people of France have embodied in the statue placed by them in the harbor at New York, "Liberty with its torch enlightening the world." There was a time, and there are many places in the world now, in which to give liberty to every human being—the right to be educated and thus to become informed; the right to think and to utter the thing thought; the right to choose and to follow the course chosen; the right, in short, to do whatever will not interfere with the same right as exercised by another—all these, together with the right to vote for rulers and legislators so that they will never dare to make laws preventing the exercise of such rights,—there was a time when to give liberty in this sense—these rights to the people in general—was seriously thought to involve the highest degree of unwisdom. In our country we have claimed, and we have believed that we had proved, that this

course is not unwise. We have pointed to the results of our free schools, as seen in our high level of general intelligence; to the results of our free competition, as seen in the ingenuity which has been stimulated to the development of all possible resources of wealth in the farm and mine and factory; to the results of our free suffrage, which has led to the selection of law-makers, through whose wise provisions all parts of the land have been connected by railways and canals and other channels of commerce, and industries have been so fostered that wages, during the last thirty years, have been more than doubled, prices of many commodities been greatly lessened, and comfort, if not competence, has been placed within reach of almost every industrious and economical household. With still more pride we have pointed to the public spirit and the enlightened humanitarianism of our people, as evinced in the hospitals, asylums, colleges and churches provided, and sustained by private contributions; while, related to this as cause to effect, we have taken pride in certain unique and superior qualities of manhood which we believe that our institutions have developed. We have dwelt upon the self-control of our people as evinced in the quiet of our small villages in which we see, because we need, no policemen, such as appear at almost every corner of European villages; and as evinced in the order of our large cities maintained without the assistance of quartered regiments and military gendarmes, such as seem continuously marching and countermarching through the streets of some of the foreign cities. But, above all, in thinking of the traits that our people have developed, we have

dwelt, as we have thought, rightly or wrongly, that we had a logical reason to do, upon that truthfulness which we believe to be best cultivated where no fear of tyrannical dictation represses expression, and upon that honesty which seems the natural response of a man who has been given his own due when he is called upon to give the same to another. But suppose now that, as a result of submitting public questions to the vote of people in general, it be proved that they manifest no more intelligence than to overthrow the financial methods on which their history proves that their whole prosperity has been built; no more integrity than, by concurrent action, after ample discussion of the subject, to resolve deliberately to cheat foreign investors, or only to dare to run the risk of cheating them out of forty cents on every dollar,—then what becomes of our arguments in favor of manhood suffrage? Why, friends, if we could believe that such a result were possible, we should be obliged to believe also that, for every man in Europe, who, in the past, could subscribe for the erection of a statue of Liberty in the form of a good genius holding aloft a torch with which to enlighten the world, a hundred would be found willing to subscribe for a statue of the same Liberty in the form of a spirit of evil with a torch inverted to symbolize the darkening of the world.

Talk about patriotism as being involved in the issues of this campaign! There is more than that involved. It involves being faithful or unfaithful to the cause of liberty everywhere, to the principles at the basis of what some of us consider the chief instrumentality that makes for the welfare of hu-

manity in general. Think of the long and sad, but gallant and glorious struggle of the people through all the ages to wrest what seemed due them from the tyranny of one ruler, or of one ruling class; then think that it is possible for you by your vote this fall to cast the weight of your influence against those who have been engaged on the right side of this struggle. The tree of liberty which all the world of philanthropists had hoped would fill the air with sweetness from its blossoms and nourish the famishing with its fruit, you will do your best to prove to be only a weed whose fragrance is noxious and whose fruit is deadly! Not care what England or Europe thinks, if our whole people, as a people, prove to be dishonest? I can imagine a man—a noble, right-minded man—looking on the flag of his country after this had been proved, and beginning to imagine himself almost literally in hell, as he felt the heat of his own blushes. How long after our people had begun to have, and to have a right to have, such feelings, do you suppose that our institutions could endure? Or—to consider the subject in a less emotional way—how long, after the intelligent and thrifty classes of our country had begun to find that manhood suffrage had led to public enactments defrauding them of almost half the wages and salaries for which they had contracted; of almost half their savings stored in savings banks and in insurance companies; of almost half their investments in principle and interest—whether stocks, bonds or mortgages—in short, after these classes had begun to have good reason to consider our free institutions injurious to both public honor and private welfare,—how long do you sup-

pose that they would permit these institutions to remain as they are?

Let it once be proved to the satisfaction of any large number of thoughtful men that the result of universal suffrage is a condition in which the people show not only so little conscience as to vote away their national integrity, but so little wisdom as to vote away their individual prosperity, and, just as surely as the sun that rises in the east sets in the west not to reappear again till after a long night of darkness, just so surely will whatever has brought brightness to our modern day of liberty pass into twilight and gloom.

Historians have recorded that at a time when the people of Athens were accustomed to meet together in assembly, in order to render decisions with reference to public policy, Themistocles, their greatest soldier and statesman, rose before them and said that he had conceived a plan by which it would be possible to augment in the very highest degree the power and the influence of their city; but, that, owing to the nature of the plan it would be impossible to carry it out in case it were communicated to any large number of people. He asked the assembly, therefore, to appoint what we should term a committee for the purpose of considering the matter. The assembly decided to have it submitted to the judgment of Aristides, surnamed the just, in whose intelligence and integrity they all felt that they could confide. When Aristides and Themistocles had withdrawn, the latter disclosed his plan. He said that the fleets of all the other Greek states were now lying in a neighboring harbor. He proved that it would be possible to burn them all;

and he proved, too, that this act would, at once, place Athens in a position where she would easily be foremost among the Greek states. Aristides returned to the assembly, and told the people that nothing could be done more advantageous to their commonwealth than to carry out the plan proposed by Themistocles; but, he added, it would involve dealing unfairly with other commonwealths. This was all that he said. And what do you suppose was the decision of the assembly with reference to the matter? How did this people, whom the world ever since has regarded, on account of their contributions to philosophy, to poetry, to art, to ethics as the greatest that the ages have ever known,—how did this people, at this important crisis in their history, show their greatness? How? By unanimously voting against the proposition. Do not make the mistake of thinking, friends, that there is any essential and permanent excellence in any department attained by any people that is not primarily based upon excellence of character. Everybody in our country knows that, whatever advantage might accrue to our own people by voting to pay our obligations according to a silver standard, this silver, taken to Europe, would, without international agreement, prove an unfair equivalent for their money invested with us. Yet some have dared to advocate this course on the ground of patriotism. They would establish the greatness and grandeur of our country by showing how small and mean we can be in our dealings with other countries.

I have been speaking of patriotic considerations. Now let us glance at a few practical ones. I myself cannot recall a single American enterprise involving

a large expenditure of money, whether for water-works, canals, railways, bridges, or the development of mines or manufacturing, that has not largely obtained the means for its development from foreign capital. Almost the first thing that is done after the conception of any such enterprise, is to place its stock and bonds on the London market. It is from thence that the bulk, often, of the money is obtained with which to carry on the work; and the most of the money itself is paid out in this country to labor as engaged either in taking the material from the ground, or in shaping it and placing it in position. How much money do you suppose that England alone has invested in this way in this country? It has been calculated to be about forty-two thousand millions; and remember the entire debt incurred by our civil war was less than three thousand millions. Forty-two thousand millions,—this is the amount that has passed out of English pockets into the pockets largely of American workingmen. And these performers in this political circus of ours who are riding not merely a hobby, but what in the circumstances is very appropriately typified by the term donkey, in their eagerness to appear as champions of an unthinking prejudice are so ignorant of what is going on in the world that they fail to know enough to know that the very first condition enabling one to bait a bull—in this case the English bull—is to gain his confidence. Why, you couldn't milk the mildest kind of a cow even, without doing that! Don't you see the necessity for trying to establish confidence as applied to a source that for years has undoubtedly furnished most of the milk with which to nourish our coun-

try's growth. There was never a better illustration of trying to saw off the limb of a tree on which one himself is dependent for support, than in this stupid talk about being financially independent of England.

Suppose that, by the concerted action of our people, as manifested by the way in which we vote this fall, we cheat the foreigner out of forty-seven cents on every dollar of his investments here; or suppose we do not do it; suppose that we merely take such action as to make him think that we are willing to run the risk of making it possible to do it, what then? How many generations do you suppose it will be before he recovers from a feeling of distrust with reference to the safety of investments in America? I well remember the smothered indignation with which I used to hear it said, when in Europe five years ago, that these were insecure,—as if, forsooth, our business enterprise, sagacity, integrity had not been indisputably proved to all the world! as if all intelligent people didn't know it! But now if, by public action, we prove the contrary to all intelligent people, what then?

In the free trade agitation of four years ago, both on the stump and in the halls of Congress, nothing I think, must have imprest most of us more, whatever our political convictions, than the reiterated presumption, on the part of so many of the speakers, that the progress of our country had been owing to its unlimited natural resources. Why, gentlemen, there are as many natural resources—perhaps, in proportion to the extent of territory covered, there are more undeveloped natural resources—waterways, ores, minerals—in Mexico, Brazil and other

South American republics, yes in Africa and Asia, to-day, than there are in our own country. That which has caused our marvelous development, is not what is in or below our soil, but what is above it,—the manhood that is here, its intelligence, its integrity, the institutions that it has founded, the methods for development that it has originated, the financial principles that it has applied. If as a result of these methods and principles we have advanced in a hundred years further than any other nation has ever before advanced in the same length of time, it seems to be a simple matter of common sense—to say nothing of a wise appreciation of the experience of the past, or a patriotic regard for the teachings of our fathers—not to make too radical a change in these methods and principles, even tho it sometimes may oblige us to talk what a newspaper of this neighborhood, recently forced into the hands of a receiver, because, apparently, there were so few willing to receive it, when not forced upon them, calls twaddle about our traditional method of raising revenue in such a way as, at the same time, to foster our home industries.

To apply this to our subject,—it is not merely because of our resources, but because of the security which it has been supposed that our laws and the integrity of our people would afford to the property-holder, that investors from abroad have sent to this country, rather than to others, the money through the aid of which we have developed so rapidly. Now prove that our laws, at the instigation of a few unwise leaders, can be changed so as not to afford security to the property-owner; that our people are capable, at one stroke, of de-

prising foreign capitalists of half the value of their investment, and it is supposing them to be very gullible, indeed, to imagine that they will make haste to send over here any more money. Better for their patronage would be the small South American Republic; better, because, if its people proved dishonest, they could be brought to terms, as ours could not be, by a few European gunboats. There is nothing so mean as a bully who is a bully because he is big. And that is the proud position, the independence of the opinions and rights of all the rest of the world, to which some of our friends think it patriotic to try to elevate the ideal of manhood represented by our country.

It is no answer to this to say that these investments of foreigners were made years ago, when a dollar was worth less than to-day; and that therefore we have a right to pay back less for it. Large parts of these investments have been made within a very few years—a hundred millions or more since we began to issue bonds for revenue; and, probably, during no other five or six years of our history was so much foreign capital invested here as during the first twelve months following the passage of the McKinley bill, foreigners recognizing, as some of our own people did not, the immense stimulus that it would give to American production.

Nor is it a sufficient answer to this line of thought to say that free coinage would bring up the price of silver, and make a dollar's worth of it equal that of a dollar in gold. No one claims that this would be true of silver as used in England, unless its price were to be determined, as the Repub-

licans urge that it should be, by international agreement; and I know of but one man—a somewhat prejudiced man, because his own elevation to the Presidency depends upon having others accept the view—who has claimed that this would be true in our own country. But history, as embodied in very recent experiences that all of us can recall, is against him. The United States tried to make the price of silver equal to that of gold by the Blaine-Allison act, passed in 1878. This obliged the government to buy a certain amount of silver every month; but, during all the years in which the act was in force, the price of silver kept declining. Then, by the so-called Sherman law passed in 1890, the government was obliged to buy more—four million five hundred thousand dollar's worth of it—every month; but after this, too, the price of silver kept declining. Now suppose we pass a free silver act; and allow any man who has bullion, to bring it to the mint and get it coined into dollars. All the mints of the United States, working the whole time, were unable to coin as much silver in a year as the United States was obliged to buy yearly under the Sherman act. Tell me how no greater coinage of silver than was possible under that act could make the price of silver higher than it did? Of course it can be argued that if the government should buy all the silver, including all the forks and spoons in our country, and then refuse to sell them, it might produce what is termed a "corner" in the market, and thus force up the price. But this is not the action that is proposed. No need of our pausing, then, even to show that it is not feasible!

The project proposed is the free and unlimited coinage of silver. Suppose that we were to allow this. With the enormous stimulus to the mining of silver which would undoubtedly follow, it is a question whether enough in proportion could be coined by the mints to increase the demand sufficiently to raise the price in the least. If the price were not raised, then not only foreigners but all our own people living on wages, or savings, would be cheated out of forty-seven cents on every dollar; and if it were raised, raised to one hundred cents on the dollar, then most things would remain as at present. We should have lost the confidence of Europe; and not even the farmer, now selling his wheat for fifty cents a bushel, would be able to sell it for any more. It is very strange, by the way, that anyone can fail to recognize that if the price of wheat were to go up because of free silver, the price of almost everything else would go up for the same reason. The dollar worth fifty cents obtained for wheat would buy no more than the fifty cents that one can get for it now.

There are, however, two things that would not go up in this way—interest upon one's investments and wages. I remember, one day, going into the study of one of my fellow professors at Princeton, and seeing hanging over his mantel an envelope tied with a white ribbon. It enclosed a letter from the Secretary of the Board of Trustees informing him that, after eighteen years of his waiting and urging, they had, at last, voted to give him a salary which would enable him to live without constant and conscious scrimping. Now if we have fifty-cent dollars, the investments of the college

at present bringing in one hundred cents for the dollar will bring in only fifty cents, and the purchasing power of this man's salary will be diminished by one-half. When I think of such a result as this—of the mere possibility of it—when I think of it as applied to laborers in less lucrative positions; when I think of the long struggle which has been going on in this country for the last thirty years, sometimes through individual effort, sometimes through trade unions, sometimes through arguments, sometimes through strikes verging on the borders of unjustifiable force, to lift, little by little, the wages of our workingmen; when I think of the pride that every true patriot among us has taken in that supreme proof of the success of our institutions,—the fact that, on the whole, the masses of the people in this country are better housed, fed, clothed and educated, because they are better paid than anywhere else,—when I think of these things, and then think of men who have no more sympathy with the struggles of labor, no more appreciation of the triumphs of humanity, no more recognition of that which constitutes the true glory of America, than to go about the country advocating a scheme which they know threatens, at least, to nullify all these advances that have been made here, and to put thousands and hundreds of thousands of our people back into a condition in which they thought themselves rich when making only a dollar a day,—when I think of these facts, it almost shakes my faith in the ability of republican institutions to lift mankind to that high level of brotherly regard for others for which our forefathers prayed and hoped.

I have been trying to make clear to you certain patriotic and practical reasons for considering the measures proposed by our political opponents to be unwise. Before closing, I ought, perhaps, to notice the principal argument by which they seek to refute such opinions as I have expressed. They are not ignorant of what our arguments are. But, they say, that these, tho applying, with a certain force, to the welfare of the capitalist, do not apply to the welfare of him whom they term the laboring man. In answer to this, let me, in the first place, recall for you the fact that I have tried to show the application of everything that I have said to the needs of the laboring man, as well as of the capitalist; and, in the second place, let me tell you why I have done this,—what is the reason of it. There is a principle involved in this reason, a very important principle, and one not always recognized. Therefore, when it thrusts itself into the direct line of thought on an occasion like this, it ought to be brought to the light, if possible, and exhibited so that all may see it clearly. The principle is this, that in a country like ours, you cannot separate, as some try to do, the welfare of the capitalist from that of the laborer. Why, what are the capitalists themselves but laborers! Most of those whom I know labor, so far as that word can describe the condition, harder than many of their employees. So far as they have passed into a state in which they are not termed laborers, they have done this on account of their own ability, diligence and thrift. Yet simply because a man is a capitalist, there are some—a good many in the ranks of our political opponents—who inveigh against him.

Why? Because he has shown ability, diligence and thrift? Or is it because conditions in our country are such as render it possible, as nowhere else, for a man, by exercising these characteristics, to better his condition? Do they mean to attack the institutions of our country, because they afford men such opportunities? Or, in connection with that, do they mean to insinuate that our country can get along without its capitalists? Can it? Does history prove this? Do you recall who was, perhaps, the country's greatest capitalist at the time of our revolutionary war? I think that you must have heard of him. His name was George Washington. There was another capitalist of the same period, Robert Morris, the Philadelphia banker. He gave his private fortune to keep the revolutionary government from bankruptcy. How is it to-day? Can our country get along without its capitalists? Of course there are some very mean ones, without whom we should all like to get along. But how about them as a class? and it is as a class, remember, that they have been made the subjects of these attacks.

Is there anyone here ignorant of the fact that it is upon the capitalists as a class that workingmen are dependent for their work and wages? Sometimes it is not the capitalists but the corporations that are attacked, and some of them undoubtedly with justice. There are evils connected with all things human. But, notwithstanding these evils, I doubt whether one of you has ever heard of a corporation that, in the degree in which it had become great, had not increased both the wages of its workingmen and the cheapness of its products. I

once looked over books containing the records for more than thirty years of a manufactory. The original investment had been not more than two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. At the time when I saw the books an English syndicate had just offered the company for its various extensions, all paid for out of its earnings, nine million dollars. An enormous sum of money, you say, to be made by a few capitalists! Wait! On the pay-rolls of that company were thirty-three hundred employees, supporting a population of ten thousand people. All the employees were receiving much more for the same kind of work than had been given them when the factory had been started. Quite a number of them—and fully half of these, I believe, were women—were receiving seven dollars a day. More than this: every time, in the history of the company, that the directors had found that their sales were paying a fair percentage in addition to that needed for repairs and improvements, they had lowered, before any outside demand had been made for it, the prices of their products; and every time that they had lowered their prices, they had so greatly increased the demand for their products, and hence their output, that the cost of manufacturing each of them had been greatly decreased. At the end of these thirty years, the price of the products—and for fifty years before they had been in demand in the country—was just one-twelfth of what it had been when the factory started. It seems to me, in view of such results, that the capitalists in the small Western city who had contributed, some one thousand and very few more than fifteen thousand, to the original fund of the com-

pany, had done enough good in that community to earn their commission.

Moreover, it was, and is, just as legitimate for them, or for other capitalists to rise through their ability from the ranks of the comparatively poor to take control and to make successes of these great industrial interests, as it is for our statesmen, through their ability, to rise from comparative obscurity, and take control and make successes of our State and National governments. Granted that the president or the director of these corporations receives a large amount of interest every year from such an investment. The interest takes the place of a salary. The President of the United States, too, receives a large amount of money every year as an actual salary. But, as a rule, the one as well as the other deserves what he gets on account of the actual value of his services to the community. Think of the result if, instead of the present natural system in our country, in accordance with which individual men, because of their proved ability, push to the front and become managers of these great corporations, we should have socialism, *i.e.*, should Tammanyize our industries, and put them in charge of those appointed by political officials, or elected by political parties, is it conceivable that in a few years many of the companies subjected to this sort of management would not experience financial failure, and have all their workmen thrown out of employment?

In view of these considerations, the man who misrepresents the relations of labor to capital, and tries to excite the prejudices of the one against the other fails either to know about the subject of which

he is talking, or else to talk what he knows. And, gentlemen, such talk is being made just now in advocacy of a scheme unmistakably directed—whether intended or not—toward the accomplishment of the very evil against which its advocates are pretending to inveigh,—a scheme, I mean, directed toward benefiting, with an utter disregard of anyone else, a few capitalists; in other words, toward benefiting—at the risk of a universal monetary panic, of incalculable losses in savings and wages, and in national honor—a few owners of silver mines. I do not, I cannot, believe that many of the advocates of the scheme are conscious of exactly what their action means. They have been misled; but I do say this, that, so far as they are conscious of it, any ordinary man, who wants to find phrases through which to describe adequately their meanness and hypocrisy, will have to wait till they all together get into their own place in a future state of existence, and begin to describe one another.

Nothing to an American, I think, ought to reveal the wrong tendency of this attempt of which I have been speaking, to separate the interest of the laboring men from those of the capitalists, more than the fact that it has been followed, and is to-day accompanied, by an effort to discredit what most of our countrymen, and many of the old world's profoundest legal authorities deem the best instrument, perhaps, ever devised to secure the rights not of a few men considered separately, but of all men considered conjointly,—I mean the Constitution of the United States. What do you think of the wisdom, not to say patriotism, of a convention that can pass a resolution threatening, as was publicly

charged by a Democratic senator, and denied by no one who heard the charge, to pack our Supreme Court—as could easily be done by increasing its members—in order to have its decrees conform to temporary partizan wishes? What do you think of a proposition—for this is exactly what it involves—that Congress should dictate to that court what its decisions must be, thus virtually nullifying the intentions of the Constitution? According to it, as things are now, a law, before it can be operative, must pass Congress, be signed by the President, and, if questioned, be approved by the Supreme Court. Instead of this arrangement, designed to preserve the welfare of the people by introducing a sufficient number of checks to prevent hasty and ill-considered action, this convention practically advocated rule by Congress and President alone. It went further, and suggested, at least, rule by Congress alone. It condemned our present President for executing laws that it was his sworn duty to execute. As we all know, by making provision, at the time of a strike, to guard the lines of transportation for the mails, he saved, perhaps, hundreds of lives, and certainly hundreds of thousands of dollar's worth of property owned not by those against whom any strikers whatever had grievances, but by private individuals whose freight was loaded in cars that were burning, and whose correspondence was in mails that were delayed. And because he did his duty, this convention censured him. It did this in the hope thereby of gaining votes from these laboring men again. I think that it mistook those to whom it was trying to appeal. So far as I know laboring men, they are not anxious to have any

more encouragement given than has already been given in this country to the mob that oozes out from the ginshop and the slum to discredit and disgrace by its presence their own advance almost every time that they start out on the serious errand of a march toward higher wages. Almost invariably, it is these camp-followers, trailing after them and misrepresenting their purposes, that prevent what otherwise might be a victory. If I understand the laboring man he does not labor under the delusion that any act of government merely designed to keep this mob in its place is designed to interfere with himself. He does not class himself with its members; and the conventions or the spokesmen of a convention who do class him thus, show as little knowledge with reference to him as I have already said that they show with reference to the capitalist.

Laborers and capitalists, according to these spokesmen—who seem to be able to separate the two, tho I myself cannot—make up the entire community. So far as this is true, what has just been said is equivalent to saying that these spokesmen have very little knowledge of the community,—of what it wants or of what it needs. What does it want and need? I fancy that you will agree with me in thinking that, as a rule, it wants and needs that intellectual, rational and moral condition which is termed civilization. The first condition of civilization is obedience to law. Otherwise, of course, there would be universal disorder and so barbarism. Obedience to law is necessary even in a free country. In such a country the government says to a man, “You are free to do as you choose

so long as you do not interfere with another man's doing as he chooses. But there you must stop; and the other man must stop in the same way when he interferes with you." Of course, as you recognize, it is difficult to tell always just where one's action interferes with another's. Besides this, too, it is impossible to let either of the men decide this for himself. As a rule, he would be too prejudiced in his own favor. It is necessary, therefore, to bring in a third party, and let him decide. In most civilized communities, the functions of this third party are exercised by the State. What we term its laws are writings intended to indicate as clearly as possible where different phases of interference occur. After these laws have been formulated and passed, the peace, order or civilization of a community depends upon the degree in which all the people observe them. But some of them, you say, may be imperfect or even unjust. Certainly; and then they should be changed. In our country there is provision for that; they always can be changed. It may take a little time, and so one must have a little patience; but, if he can persuade the majority of the people to agree with him, he can bring about the change. Until the laws have been changed, however, civilization cannot continue except in the degree in which they are obeyed. This is the reason why it is dangerous to censure an executive who obeys them, or to incite a citizen to disobey them. The logical effect of doing either is to bring about, not reform but, revolution. Revolution always entails loss of property and security; and when it takes place in a country where the majority have the means of reforming laws without

revolution, it indicates a desire to act either without consulting them at all, or without waiting to do so. In either case it involves arbitrary disregard of the majority's right to be heard. In a republic, the demagog who leads to revolution, always, through it, leads to despotism.

Of course, I recognize that none of our people have any desire to bring about the result thus suggested. I do not accuse them of such a desire; but I do say that the principles actuating some of them at present, if logically carried out, may lead to it. I do say that there is danger, extreme danger, of their forgetting the words of one of our wisest statesmen, "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." It is the duty of every man in a country like ours to study the tendencies of political opinions and actions, and to avoid those that point in the direction of even possible danger. It is better to be too cautious than not cautious at all. No man exercises caution until he has taken time to think. My effort, this evening, has been directed toward getting you, if possible, to do this. In the degree in which I have been successful, you will probably agree with me when I say that, just now, many of our people are in danger of disregarding those experiences, personal, national and historical, from which the world is accustomed to derive what, whether formulated or not, are termed laws; in danger of disregarding the laws of ordinary human intercourse, in accordance with which no man deals extensively with another unless he has confidence in him; of disregarding the laws of foreign commerce, in accordance with which there can be no trade under the best conditions unless there is an international

standard of values and medium of exchange; of disregarding the laws of domestic business, in accordance with which it is impossible to have prosperity without assurance of permanence in the value of earnings and savings; and of disregarding the laws of civilization, in accordance with which it is impossible to have order and peace where the executive is not sustained in the enforcement of obligation, and the judges are not lifted above the influence of partizanship, or of the untried experiments of demagogic agitators.

Vote for the wrong candidate in this coming election, and your boasted independence of Europeans may prove to be the worst kind of dependence upon them. You may have to buy what you get from them through first buying gold from them at the price which they themselves may chose to put upon it. Their warranted lack of confidence in our people may weigh down the market prices of our securities by just as many of the millions of dollars of investments as they can, at once, unload upon us. Vote for the wrong candidate, and you may carry down just as far the market value of the property of our own capitalists. The absolutely universal fear of this, on their part, whether living in New York, Boston, St. Louis or Chicago, will, unless all the ordinary laws of business cease to operate, bring on a panic such as our country has seldom experienced. Vote for the wrong candidate, and, both in Europe and this country you may check for half a generation those contributions to commerce and industry for which the enterprise and ingenuity of this country are waiting as the rafts of woodmen in frozen rivers wait for the coming of

the spring flood. Vote for the wrong candidate, and you will do your best to ring down the curtain upon that stage of human history upon which has been enacted the most glorious and beneficent contribution to civilization, to methods of government, and to instrumentalities for promoting progress, commercial, industrial, educational, social and religious, that, as many of us believe, the world has ever seen; yes, and you will do your best to prepare the audience to go away congratulating itself upon the fact that, at last, the farce is over.

Gentlemen, you dare not bring about such results. But there is only one way in which effectually to prevent them. This is by voting for the right candidate. Every man in his senses knows that either he will be elected, or else the one whom I have termed the wrong candidate. There is no third possibility. I have the utmost respect for the sound money Democrat in this campaign. He has earned the respect of us all by his patriotic determination to put country above party. But let me remind him that, if he wish to be true to the very highest promptings of this spirit, he must be more than merely neutral. His very loyalty to what he considers Democratic principles, should keep him from being merely this. If, by any miscalculation of the relative strength of the contending parties, the wrong candidate should be elected, it will be upon the sound money Democrats that the blame will be laid. Can the party afford to have it laid on them? I think that I am as good a Democrat as Republican when I say "No."

"Once to every man and nation comes the moment to decide
In the strife of truth and falsehood for the good or evil side;

Some great cause, God's new Messiah offering each the bloom or
 blight,
Parts the goats upon the left hand and the sheep upon the right,
And the choice goes by forever 'twixt that darkness and that light."*

Once again, as in 1861, our people seem to have come to a parting of the ways. Is there any doubt which course—that turning to the right or to the left—should be taken by every patriotic citizen?

* The Present Crisis: J. R. Lowell.

THE SOLDIER'S TESTIMONY TO THE SPIRITUAL IN LIFE *

In our whole country, there is probably no place in which, within equal limits, are the graves of so many whose lives were influential in church and in State as are in this cemetery. But of all the graves that are here, none contain the remains of men more worthy of the respect, the admiration, and the gratitude of us all than the graves upon which we are to leave our gathered flowers to-day. In the Middle Ages, when the cry rang out from the followers of the reformer of Asia, "There is no God but God and Mohammed is his prophet," those who marched behind the banner of the crescent held to a belief that he who died in battle for a cause that he had come to think divine, need give no other proof of his spirit's right to heaven. Life is too complex in its nature and environments—there are too many different demands upon conscience and intelligence—too many obligations to be met on every side of us—too many aims to call forth efforts entirely opposite in character, to allow us to admit that the Mohammedan conception can be safe or wise or true. And yet there is some truth,—much truth in it. Think what life implies. Then think what it implies deliberately to risk and lose one's life—for others. Think of a man mailed in

* Delivered on Decoration Day, 1896, in Princeton Cemetery. Reprinted from the Princeton (N. J.) Press.

the strength of youth and haloed by its hopes, with every possibility of body or of mind intact, each nerve and muscle thrilling with the glow of health. Think of him surrounded by all the comforts of a dearly treasured home, standing on the threshold of a world where every pathway, whether leading on to work or to recreation, is echoing with words of sympathy and is thronged with the forms of friends,—of father, mother, sister, brother, sweetheart, wife or child; where every prospect holds bright promises of recompense for peaceful, pleasurable effort, whose reflected light makes all existence luminous. Think of such a man, with full consciousness of the sacrifice that it involves, resolving to turn his back upon all this, to tear his hands away from the clasp of friendship, to point his eyes away from the smiles of love, and to tramp off toward the din, the dust, the smoke, the toil, the weariness, the suffering of war; going where he knows that the chances are that he will come back never, or never at least with a life as worth the living as the life that he takes away with him; knowing that he may die amid unspeakable agonies, perhaps, deserted on the flooded or the frozen plain, perhaps amid confusion worse than that of hell, trampled to a bleeding mass beneath the hoofs of chargers or the heels of human beings raging with a fury greater than that of which the brute is capable; or, if he escape all this, knowing that he may bring back home a body maimed or diseased, and a mind for which the goals that once allured ambition rise no more, because the paths that led to them were left behind, when this more stony path, that led up toward dark clouds alone and certain peril, was,

with a trembling body but a thrilling soul, deliberately chosen as the one most worthy of his manhood.

Gentlemen of the Grand Army of the Republic, I don't wonder that you and your children, and your children's children are proud of your old blue uniforms. No wonder if their faded color seem brighter to your eyes than all the blue with which the heaven itself can paint its dome above us! No wonder if the dead faint scent of smoke that lingers in them be more grateful to your senses than all the fragrance that can come from all the buds and blossoms where, in this glad month of May, the heaven has joined with earth to kindle to new glow the fires of life on what were but a short time since the white and frozen altars of the winter! This heaven and earth,—they are material. That which your uniforms enclosed in those grand days of old was spiritual. Whatever may have been the general tenor of your lives, the fact that you once volunteered to wear that uniform is a proof that there has been for you, one time, at least, when the aspirations of the soul sat throned above the allurements of the senses; one time when you put duty over ease, conscience over inclination, the welfare of others over the interests of self; one time when you rose into full fellowship with Him, according to whose conception, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friend"; aye, one time, when, if not in as great a degree, in as true a sense, as He did, you proved the existence of a life higher than that of earth. Not by your words, not in a way, perhaps, of which even you yourselves were conscious, nevertheless you proved it—in the surest way possible—by the

manifestation of its promptings in your deeds. What is a country and its institutions for, except to further the safety—physical, mental, spiritual—the safety of life? And a man, who down deep in his soul believes that this little life on earth is all—the matter of supreme importance—when his country is endangered,—what will he do? Fight for it, risk his life for it? die for it? Never. He will fly to another country, where all that seems to him of supreme importance can be preserved.

So from the history of our war of the secession, waged especially as that was, mainly by volunteers, waged for old conditions and the establishment of new ones believed to be essential to the welfare of humanity both white and black,—from that history I derive a lesson not only patriotic but religious. It is a lesson, too, that needs to be recalled by just such services as we are having here to-day. I should be the last to criticize unduly anything fitted to make the outward expression of the inner progress of our country more complete, more in accord with the requirements of refinement, of taste, of beauty. But when you spend too much of thought and labor strengthening and ornamenting that which, after all, is but the scaffolding of life, there is danger that, when the next storm comes, which only the structure within the scaffolding can withstand, it will not be easy to induce the people, or, if induced, to enable them, to level the scaffolding until after its flying splinters have made a wreck of everything about it. It was the “plain living and high thinking” of the generations before the war that gave us Lincoln and his volunteers. In the next emergency, will the high living of our own day

and the thinking, in many regards—as shown, for instance, in so much of our literature—upon the lowest plain conceivable, give anything to match them? Not, certainly, unless you and I, by our influence, do all we can to counteract some tendencies among us the trend of which is unmistakable, tendencies foreign to the whole character of our institutions, tendencies as old as sin and always active, but never so progressively active as in our own country to-day. Fifty years ago, if I had spoken of them, you would have failed to recognize the justice of my allusions. To-day you will all recognize it. They are the tendencies that cause us, in domestic life, to care more for the house than for the home; in institutional life, more for buildings than for instruction; in influential life, more for ceremony than for service; in public life, more for position than for purity; in private life, more for style than for soul; in social life, more for the four hundred than for the seventy million; in active life, more for expediency than for duty; in religious life, more for preaching than for practising; in short, in every relation, more for everything pertaining to apparent form than for anything pertaining to the hidden spirit, more for every whim of man than for any law of God.

The countries of the Old World, the customs and notions of which some of our people are trying so hard to imitate, can prosper, perhaps, even when such tendencies as these become supreme. For the direct purpose of fostering and furthering them, many of the institutions of those countries were founded. But our institutions were founded for a different purpose; and to them such tendencies,

made supreme, might prove fatal. Our institutions were derived from a conception of the Spiritual Fatherhood of God, and therefore, of the brotherhood of man.

Our forefathers believed that it was the duty of every one, when considering private action or public policy, to think not of himself alone but also of others. This is the reason why they agreed to tax all the people, whether having children or not, whether patronizing private schools or not, in order that there might be schools in which the children of the poorest might be educated freely. This is the reason why they agreed to tax all the people not only for general public improvement, but for special commercial enterprise and industrial development,—because they believed that this would add to the opportunities, wages, wealth, and through these, to the domestic, intellectual, social and moral elevation of all the country's inhabitants.

Other nations may claim that with them patriotism and religion go hand in hand. But when we consider that the essence of religion is the acknowledging—not in words but in deeds—of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, of what nation can this claim be maintained with more truth than of ours? Therefore, as we leave our flowers to-day upon the graves of these, our comrades, brothers, husbands, fathers, friends, let us believe, with grateful hearts, that the good and wise God is as good and wise, at least, as we are; and that on the right side of the balance sheet of the Recording Angel, He as well as we can find, with reference to them, much that never can be blotted out. They did what they could—let us go forth from

here resolved to do what we can—to make our country that which our fathers hoped that it might become,—not a place in which a man, living for himself alone, would not be ashamed to exult in his own intellectual, financial, social superiority; but, rather a place worth loving, in which, giving a hand to each of his fellows, every one would do his best to lift them to a level with himself, recognizing that all that elevation of any kind is worth is attained alone in the degree in which there is a general atmosphere of high attainment; recognizing that if a man ever have any little glory of his own, he can realize its most gratifying rewards and its grandest possibilities in the degree alone in which, like the glory of the sun in heaven, it brings universal day and is reflected everywhere.

THE CITY THAT VANISHED AND THE CITIZENSHIP THAT SURVIVED: THE GREAT FIRE IN CHICAGO *

Forty years ago a few miles northwest of the southern extremity of Lake Michigan there stood a small fort. It was rudely tho strongly constructed of logs felled from woods farther to the north, and was intended to protect the few white traders of the neighborhood against incursions of Indians. Aside from the circumstance of the presence of this fort, there was little to attract anyone to the locality. On one side were the level waters of Lake Michigan, and on the other side an equally level stretch of prairie with no undulations and few trees to afford variety to the landscape. The colds of winter were severe in the extreme, and often, for days together, the winds were terrific in their violence. The ground upon which the settlement stood rose but four feet above the surface of the lake; and the inlet near by that afforded the only harbor for the trading vessels of the day was little more than a hundred feet in width, had no perceptible current, and, at no great distance from its mouth, held scarcely more water than might suffice for the safe navigation of an ordinary yawl. Most unpromising surroundings certainly for those of a great commer-

* Delivered by request after a return to the East from a visit to that city during the week following the fire.

cial metropolis! Had not subsequent developments evinced the sagacity of the engineers who, in first locating the fort, discerned in its position the key of this whole western country, one might be tempted to surmise that the site had been chosen mainly from promptings of caution or of cowardice—as one the possession of which would not be likely to be disputed by the unfriendly Indians. At all events, these had already afforded a significant protest against any inclination on their part to frequent the locality by giving to it the name of Chicago, “the place of a skunk,” as it was formerly translated, tho, of late, it has been said to mean “the place of the wild onion.” Neither interpretation, apparently, need rob the word of its suggestiveness.

Nevertheless, in the inauspicious setting in which the untutored savage saw little for himself, the civilized man discovered his opportunity. The traders multiplied, and, before many years the thinly-populated outpost had become a town; and it had been discovered that the treeless prairies to the west of it which had once been supposed to be well-nigh barren were covered with a soil free from root or rock which a single plowing could turn into the fertilest of farms. In 1840, the town contained over four thousand inhabitants; in 1850 over twenty-eight thousand; in 1860 over a hundred thousand; and in 1871 over three hundred thousand; while during the same period, the assessed value of property had risen from scarcely four thousand dollars to the neighborhood of three hundred millions.

Situated as the city is, surrounded by luxurious agricultural possibilities, at the head of the waters

of Lake Michigan, where not only the extensive inland navigation of the country begins, but where also, owing to the fact that the lake extends from the northern borders of the country far southward, most of the northern routes by land from the east must concentrate in order to move on toward the west and northwest, it may be said, of course, that this rapid development has been due to natural advantages of position. But it is not to be ascribed to these alone. The natural and acquired character of the people of the place has had much to do with it. The early settlers were very largely from New England; and they carried with them the intelligence and the enterprise of New England. Almost as soon as the place had a name on a map, it had public and private schools, the latter, at least, abundantly qualified to fit young men for Eastern colleges. Scarcely waiting for financial help from the capitalists of New York, the members of this frontier community had connected Lake Michigan and the Illinois River by canal; and, starting to sell railway stock at five dollars a share, had made their city a center of railway traffic to the west some time before a single railway had touched it from the east.

But besides inheriting energy from a New England stock, the place seems to have possessed, as a blessing, or otherwise, as one may choose to deem it, a climate peculiarly fitted to develop activity in the nerves and brain. In Spain, the courts are said to acquit a prisoner of even a charge of murder when that which incited to it has accompanied the blowing of a certain wind. In Chicago a wind seems to be always blowing either from the land or

from the lake; and as the whole region is absolutely level, there seems nothing to prevent what might be a breeze in other conditions from hurrying by in the form, almost, of a hurricane. It may not be scientific, but it gratifies fancy, to surmise that the cutting nature of these blasts may have had something to do with the whittling off of certain grosser, more lethargic elements of character, which, in other places, would remain, and render these same people less fitting instruments than they have proved themselves to be in furthering the progress of the nation.

By the year 1871 the city had become—and all acknowledged it—the most prosperous in the country. Its streets were wide; its business houses were substantially built of brick, stone or iron from four to six stories in height; and its residence districts stretched away for miles on avenues lined, as a rule, with trees, behind which, usually upon wide lawns, built in the multitudinous variety of styles always characterizing American architecture, were hundreds of comfortable homes, and some luxuriously elegant. The city was situated, as has been said, on the western shore of Lake Michigan at a point where it is entered by what is termed the Chicago River. This is a small stream, made deeper and larger by constant dredging, now perhaps three hundred feet in width, extending about a mile due west from the lake. At this point it is fed by two branches, one flowing from the north, and the other from the south, and both of them very nearly parallel to the lake. This conformation naturally divides the city into three sections—the North Side, as it is called, bounded by the lake on

the east, by the main river on the south, and by the north branch on the west; the South Side, bounded by the lake on the east, by the main river on the north, and by the south branch on the west; and the West Side, including everything west of either the north or the south branch. In growing, the city had naturally clustered about the river and its branches. Over these had been built many bridges and under them two tunnels, and on all sides were wharves for the shipping, upon which were many large warehouses and grain elevators. The North Side was mainly filled with residences; the South Side contained the main business section, tho south of this there was also a residential district; and the West Side contained most of the factories and the homes of the people who worked in them.

A word now as to the construction of the city. Owing to the immense forests of Wisconsin and Michigan, Chicago had already become the greatest lumber market in the world. Moreover, few quarries of building stone and little clay from which to make bricks had been discovered in the immediate neighborhood. Very naturally, therefore, as in the case of Constantinople, which is famous for its great fires, a large number of the buildings of the city, probably seven-tenths of all of them, were constructed of wood; and this in every portion of the city except that devoted exclusively to business. Some of the most expensive residences, too, were of the same material, their builders imagining such houses to be warmer and more dry than those of brick or of stone. Even where these latter materials had been employed, in many instances they were ornamented by elaborately molded

wooden cornices, and were roofed with shingles. Of course, the city authorities had not been so reckless of the danger of conflagration as not to make laws prescribing certain fire limits. But the efficacy of such laws had been evaded, first, by these wooden cornices which, even where they had fallen into disuse in the business blocks, had been followed by almost equally dangerous mansard wooden roofs, covered with slate; and, second, by a custom in vogue in the city of never tearing down a wooden building where the ground upon which it stood was needed for better buildings, but of moving it through the streets to some less desirable place in order there to refit and rent it. So to-day, for instance, if one in mature life wants to find his birth-place in Chicago, it is more than likely that he will be obliged to tramp about its streets to three or four different localities, and, when at last, he has come upon the house, it may require a very subtle argument with himself to lead him to decide whether or not he has been successful. If exceedingly anxious to be so, he may find himself almost as badly off as a swaggering, swearing fellow who walked into a sleeping-car where a friend of mine was vainly trying to get a night's rest. "Now what is the matter with you?" said my friend. "I have lost my berth," cried the other with an oath. "Lost your berth?" said my friend. "I should think that you had. One thing, at least, is very evident—you are one of those that need to be born again." This custom of removing wooden buildings from one part even of the fire district to another, until the poorer portions of the city literally were packed full of them, will show how the very

construction of the place had a tendency to cause a fire such as broke out there on the 18th of October, 1871.

The flames that first attracted the attention of the firemen issued from a barn in the West Side. It was about a mile south of the main river, and a mile and a half west of the lake, near the corner of Twelfth and DeKoven streets. The barn may have been set on fire by an incendiary; but is said to have followed the overturning of a kerosene lamp when kicked by a cow. The subsequent disastrous results seem to have been owing to a combination of exceptional circumstances. On the night preceding, one of the greatest previous fires in the history of Chicago had occurred in the same neighborhood; and, through it, the people in the vicinity and the whole fire department of the city had become unusually exhausted. The houses adjoining the barn where the fire started, and, in fact, all the houses of the surrounding district were of wood, and stood very close together. One, at least, was an extensive planing mill; and many were large factories and taverns. There had been no rain for two months, and a gale was blowing from the southwest. So the flames spread rapidly. But fortunately, as it seemed, a few blocks distant, in the very direction in which the wind was carrying the cinders was the space that had been rendered vacant by the fire of the evening previous. Supposing that the flames would stop here, as a matter of course, the firemen after vainly battling with them in front, contented themselves with going to the rear of the fire and checking its progress to the south and west. But before long, what was their amazement to find that

a new conflagration had broken out beyond this space, not only, but beyond the river on the south side; and that, too, in one of the most dangerous localities in the entire city,—the very next door to the gas works. All about these gas works also the streets and alleys were crowded with wooden buildings; and, before long, the wind was carrying, with all the force of a hurricane, cinders, not only, but huge burning planks and beams, and raining them down in its course, dashing a very storm of flame against the best built business portion of the city.

The cupola of the Court House caught fire from these beams long before they had affected any of the buildings facing the square in which it stood. And so strong was the force of the gale that a large brewery and the adjoining city water-works, covered unfortunately with a shingle roof, which were a mile and a half further to the northeast, caught fire and were consumed before one-fourth of the business blocks upon the south side. What was to become of a city burning in the night whose water-works and gas-works had both been destroyed?

Of course, as soon as the flames were discovered in the business portion of the city, there was a rush across the river on the part of many of the citizens and of such of the fire department as could be spared from the west side. But some of the bridges were burning; others were impassable from the falling cinders; the lights in the crowded tunnels had gone out; and a long detour seemed unavoidable. When the fire department did reach the south side, the foremost crests of the waves of flame appeared to be flooding over untouched portions of the brick and granite blocks actually faster

than a man could walk. The wind acting as a blow-pipe upon the flames had forced them to a heat so intense that, at a distance of a hundred yards, men would be coiled up and drop dead like bugs about a candle; and across streets eighty or a hundred feet in width, the tin coverings of roofs would roll up like paper, and iron shutters would warp visibly and crack apart. A friend told me that in order to get a view of the fire, he drove toward it in a carriage some four hundred yards in a street in which there were no signs of heat, and then, turning immediately to drive back, was able to do so only at the risk of his life. Many instances are cited in which horses and drivers were overtaken where, a moment before, there seemed to be no danger, and burned to death. People moving in carriages and wagons in the direction of the wind—tho this must have been owing largely to the blocking of the streets—found themselves unable to increase the distance between themselves and the flames. A man standing on one side of a park at least four hundred feet square, at a time, too, when the buildings on the opposite side in the direction of the fire were not as yet burning, told me that he saw cinders and coals poured into the entrance to the stairway of a six-story fireproof building which seemed to ignite it as readily as if made of shavings. Of course, anyone in the upper stories of such a building would have had no chance to escape. On the north side, in the residence portion of the city, the fires seem to have burst out from scores of different localities at the same moment. One merchant who, in the early part of the night, had come to the South Side in order to remove goods of great value, was

startled, suddenly, to see a light coming from the direction of his own home which, up to this time, he had never supposed could be in danger. Hurrying back, he was obliged to turn up his coat collar and draw down his hat to shield himself from the rain of cinders; and when he reached his house, altho the main conflagration was a mile away, through his front door as he opened it, the coals swept threatening to set fire to the hall before he could remove his family.

The suffering among these people, on this North Side, as may readily be imagined, was intense. I know of a citizen and his wife, both nearly seventy years of age, living in a place occupying an entire square, who were roused and ready to escape only after every house surrounding them, and the wooden fence about their own place, were in flames. At the peril of their lives; and after burning themselves so seriously that at the time that I write they have not yet recovered, they managed to tear down the fence in one place to such an extent as to be able to jump over it. One man, just before the greatest fall of cinders, came home stupefied by the fact that his store and all his fortune were gone. He said to his wife, "Who knows but our home may go next?" She looked almost immediately from the window to discover that their barn was already on fire, and the new misfortune so paralyzed him that she was obliged literally by main force to drag him to the street. To illustrate the haste in which some were driven from their dwellings, many cases are mentioned of houses in which corpses were left behind and burned. In a German family near the river, there was a grandmother lying at the point of death.

After a hurried consultation, as it was found impossible to remove her, to save her from death by burning, she was bundled up and thrown into the river.

To understand the peril of the situation in the resident-section of the North Side, one must take into consideration that all the fire department and the city authorities and a quarter of its male inhabitants were on the other side of the city excluded from this fated district by the river, all the bridges over which were burning. Besides the fires were not confined to one place. They were breaking out and blocking up the streets in every direction; and all except those very near the north branch of the river, were obliged to fly in front of the flames which, as was said before, pursued almost as rapidly as they themselves could move.

There were two courses that these people could take: One of them was to the north. Toward this a few rode in their carriages; but the majority, of course, went on foot. In the earlier part of the night, some who moved in this direction tried to save their household goods. Express wagons and drays, hired at most exorbitant prices, ranging from twenty to a thousand dollars, were driven one or two miles beyond where the fire was, and emptied. When the fire approached, sometimes there was a new removal to a place beyond. But even this was ineffective. Before Monday noon the flames had again approached. When, at last, the fugitives reached the city limits, all seemed to despair of saving anything; they fled in consternation, while behind them, like a scourge, the flames swept crackling. As the crowds sped on, friends jostled off from

friends, and children from parents; and, when once apart, the cinders that had covered face and clothing rendered most attempts to recognize each other futile. All day Monday the roads leading north were choked with the affrighted multitude. Twenty-four hours later, six, eight and ten miles distant on the prairie, delicate women and aged men, accustomed to all comforts, were picked up, one by one, half starved and frozen, some clothed only in the garments of the night. Some, too, were dead, and some demented. One woman was found holding a Bible, all that she had saved. One little child, in night clothes, fast asleep, was hugging closely to her kitten. So completely had this portion of the city been demoralized, that more than one account is given of families who lived beyond the limits of the fire, returning after a whole day and night spent in the cold and famine of the prairie, to discover that, after all, their homes had been uninjured.

As was said there were two courses for the people on this North Side to take in escaping from the fire. Instead of flying north, some sought the borders of the lake. In any ordinary fire they would have been secure here, for its sands stretch many yards away from any buildings. But this fire was not an ordinary one. Whatever household goods the people stored on the lake shore were burned; and those who were guarding them were forced into the water, all the surface of which seemed to blaze at times with cinders. An aged couple, both of whom were cripples, remained in the water thus for twenty-three hours, and without food. One family fled beyond the sands and

over a long pier till they reached the light-house. After a time the flames set fire to the pier, but were extinguished. Then a burning steamer floated toward them. Just in time to be saved from being roasted alive they managed to signal a small steam-tug. The wind was blowing a gale. They dared not venture on the lake. Nothing seemed left but to attempt to go up the river. They shut themselves in the cabin and started. Should they encounter a single obstacle to check them, the little steamer would burst into flames. Fortunately that was not to be. Tho its sides were often scorched and smoking, they passed through the smouldering lines of wharves and bridges till they reached a place of safety.

While all this had been going on upon the North Side of the river, on the South Side, there had been less of consternation and loss of life, perhaps, but far greater destruction of material wealth. All the first-class hotels, all the banks, all the public halls and libraries, all the wholesale mercantile houses and all the large retail houses were in ashes; and the flames were fast consuming the beautiful residences adjacent to the lake. Only the blowing up of several of these by the orders of Gen. Sheridan prevented the conflagration from becoming general. On this side of the river, few of the household goods in the residences burned escaped destruction. In front of the portion of the city on the shore of the lake, a mile in length and about a quarter of a mile in width, extends Lake Park. On Monday morning the extreme edge of this park nearest to the water appeared crowded with effects which men had toiled all the night to

remove from their shops and houses. Before Monday evening almost every shred of these rescued effects had been consumed; and those who had been watching them had escaped only at the risk of their lives.

On this south side, too, the fires spread with great rapidity. A lady of my acquaintance whose husband was away from home felt so secure that she had sent her servant and a little son a mile away to purchase dinner. Twenty minutes later friends rushed in to inform her that the course of the fire had shifted, and that she must leave the house at once. Begging them to save what they could, she rushed upstairs to pack her silver. In her house was one of the choicest libraries in the city, and a large collection of relics and curios, articles of small bulk but great value,—just the things that one would suppose to be fitted to be successfully removed in such a time of haste. But what did her friends save? I found them in my father's barn when I reached home: a few items of heavy parlor furniture; besides this two mirrors, one of them, of course, broken; then all the globes of the chandeliers which had been carefully unscrewed and taken off, a work of considerable time; lastly, the chandeliers themselves violently detached from the ceiling, and bent beyond all probability of mending.

This fire, like everything else, had its comic side. I heard of a lady who seems to have entertained a notion of converting the whole experience of the jarring and jam of the escape through the streets into a delicate feat of jugglery. She chose as the only relic to save from her home, balancing it

skilfully for miles through the crowd, a glass vase filled with water and gold fish. Others carried their canary birds, children their toys, and if one were brushed from their hands of course would imperil the lives of whole parties in their efforts to recover it. One fugitive very prominent, and justly so, in the city and State, but reputed to be slightly prone to self-appreciation, is said to have been seen galloping away on horse-back, dragging behind him as his one most valuable possession, a full-length portrait of himself. It is only justice to the man, however, to finish the story by giving his own explanation of it,—it was the only thing under his roof that, if he took it through the crowd, somebody would not try to steal from him. For plenty of stealing there was in every part of the city. Men would walk into houses far in advance of the flames, open drawers, and wrap up goods, as tho to save them for the family, and then take them off for themselves. Silver and paintings committed to express men were never delivered. Jewels and treasures that were buried experienced a resurrection long before their owners returned to recover them. A merchant hurried to his front doorstep with a small trunk. “I will give five hundred dollars,” he cried, “to anyone who will keep this for me for a moment.” “I will,” said a man nearby, and he has kept it faithfully ever since. But instances of contrary conduct are reported, too. A broker rushed to his safe, and took out a small chest containing sixty thousand dollars. He was on his knees before it, and, as he turned about to rise, he saw looming behind him the form of a gigantic negro. The broker was alone, at the stranger’s mercy. In a

quick-witted effort to save his life, he turned to the man and said, "I will give you a thousand dollars to take this to the Northwestern Railway Station." The flames were approaching; and, in the confusion of the moment after giving up the box, contrary to his intention, he lost sight of the man. The next day he went to the railway station and found the box and its contents untouched.

In order to save from greater loss there was often a sacrifice of lesser valuables. When the water gave out, one man emptied the contents of his cellar and deluged the blankets on his roof with cider. As the flames retired, the assembled party are said to have caroled as a victorious pæan, "a little more cider." Sometimes, as everywhere else in this world, people lost themselves and their all for the sake of their earthly possessions. A lady was found dead clasping her jewels. A woman who had reached the street with two children rushed back after her money-box. Her children followed, and all perished. More people, however, for the sake of their own and others' lives, lost everything else. One weak woman with a little child behind her rushed from a house with a small but valuable clock in one hand and a silver cake-basket in the other. Finding her strength failing and the flames approaching, she hailed an expressman and begged him to let her ride. "Yes, for the clock," he said, and she gave it. After waiting a while, "I must have the basket, too," he added; and she gave that also. "What have you saved?" a man asked a friend of mine. "My two children," was the answer.

And there are hundreds and thousands, and one could almost say hundreds of thousands, in that city

to-day who esteem themselves fortunate tho they saved, at that time, no more than this,—their own lives and those of their families. Eighty thousand people are known to have lived on the north side of the river, in the district which, with the exception of a single house, was swept clean of habitations; and, certainly, twenty thousand more were rendered homeless by the fires upon the South and West sides. It is said that more than three hundred people must have lost their lives, and two thousand acres is the lowest estimate of the extent of the conflagration. Besides the twenty-two thousand dwellings swept away, the following structures are enumerated: seventy church edifices and halls where regular religious services were held; thirty banks, twenty-three brokers' offices, forty hotels, three railroad passenger stations, three freight stations, four telegraph offices, four express offices, eighty-eight offices of newspapers, twelve of magazines, five public libraries, eleven public and nine private school buildings, fifteen colleges, seminaries or academies; six hospitals, seven asylums, fifty livery stables, eight bridges, twelve mills and elevators, two gas manufactories, five lumber yards; foundries, planing mills, factories and machine shops to the number of forty or fifty; three theaters, one museum, one opera house, four steamboat docks, two shipyards and half a dozen breweries and distilleries.

The loss in money including certainly two-thirds of all the property of the city with most of the insurance upon it is variously estimated as from two to three hundred millions of dollars.* The only

* Estimated to-day at about one hundred and ninety millions.

conflagrations of modern times that, at all, compare with this are those of London in 1666 and of Moscow in 1812. Probably, in both these disasters, more persons were rendered houseless than in Chicago. But owing to the compact manner in which those other cities were built, and the inferior nature of the buildings, the extent of territory burned over, and the loss in dwellings and property were much less. The great fire in London devastated only about three hundred and thirty-six instead of two thousand acres; and neither in London nor in Moscow are the losses in property estimated to have amounted to more than seventy millions of dollars. But, of course, when we compare this loss with that at Chicago, we must take into consideration the fact that the same amount of money represented far more wealth formerly than at present.

Will Chicago soon recover from the effects of this fire? A few think not, but most people think the contrary.* "Let me pass," cried a man excitedly rushing by a crowd of loungers at a railway station at Saint Louis. It was the Monday night after the Chicago fire. "What is your hurry?" asked a bystander. "I want to see the ruins of Chicago," answered he; "and I must take this train. If I miss it the city will be built again before I get there."

* This paper is printed as it was prepared at the time. To-day, thirty-nine years later, it may be said that the city was practically rebuilt within two years. Moreover, owing to the demand for new objects to replace such as had been destroyed, most of those in active business at the time of the fire greatly increased their earnings. On the contrary many of those who had retired from business, and were living on their investments, especially if in insurance companies, or in real estate a little remote from the business center the ground of which they were obliged to mortgage before they could rebuild, were found, after a few years, to have lost virtually everything.

This expression with all its Western exaggeration suggests a far-off flavor of truth. I myself left Philadelphia for Chicago where I had relatives and real estate that seemed to demand my presence on the day following the fire. When I reached my destination, thirty-six hours later, I found quite a number of temporary wooden buildings already completed; one, I remember, that, in the circumstances tempted humor by its incongruity; it was not only clapboarded and shingled according to the best approved styles of workmanship, but also finished off with gingerbread-work at the gables. Another had been painted. Many of the parks were well-nigh covered with temporary sheds for the homeless. And at one of the railways, a station with platform, ticket office, baggage and waiting rooms, all finished in two days, furnished shelter to weary passengers. Before the end of the week, several large warehouses, two or three hundred feet square, and two stories in height, were nearly ready for occupation; eighteen thousand men were said to be at work removing the débris from the ruins, and the contracts had been let for several large structures of brick and marble, one of these three stories in height to be finished in ten days; and many of five stories in height in ninety days.

In the meantime the people had determined evidently that want of room was not to deter them from their wonted business. As early as Friday of the same week as the fire, through all the fine residence portion of the city adjacent to the ruins, the dwellings were spotted with signs made of shingles, literally so in these cases, barrel-staves, barrel-heads, and rough boards, lettered with lamp-

black announcing that such a bank; or So-and-So, grocers or tailors, were to be found within. Along these streets the bustle seemed as great as ever, the steps of the people as elastic, and their driving as fast. But even the doubtful salutation of "How are you, beggar?" with which friends greeted one another, scarcely prepared one for the terribly desert-like appearance of the ruins. Think of riding nearly four miles, as one could do, by starting at the extreme southwestern limits of the fire, through a region which, only a week before, had been the center of as great commercial activity and prosperity as could be found in the country; and, for a mile on either side, seeing nothing but desolation almost as great as that to be found, at the present time, after centuries of neglect and decay, on the site of Babylon or of Nineveh.

If a single night could work such ruin in a modern city, no wonder centuries have spared so little from the monuments of antiquity! Scarcely anything but the fine wooden pavements, almost as perfect as the day in which they were laid, remained to attest that one was traversing the ruins of a once thickly-built city. Little else had survived the crucible of the fire. The stone curbstones, and the granite warehouses had in most cases literally crumbled into ashes. Only here and there, amid piles of brick and twisted iron, a tall wall still standing, a portion of some well-known edifice—possibly a picturesque spire or façade of a church—remained to serve as a landmark of a familiar locality. One needed merely to substitute for these busy workmen prying open vaults and safes, the wild beast and the bird of prey, and the picture of

Oriental desolation would have been complete. A strange fate, indeed, for this new-born city of the prairies, this paragon of enterprise, this ideal of aspiring energy, the crest where the tidal wave of progress flowing to the westward seemed to break upon the borders of the wilderness casting up a surf white with the marble of palaces and glittering in the sunrise as brightly as the gold that had caused it! Strange experience for these light-hearted children of civilization who, with bounding steps had had no thoughts that were not filled with hope! What jealousy had roused that demon of destruction whom our age had supposed could haunt the forsaken homes alone of those long dead and buried, and had caused him to invade the just discovered territory on this side the globe, and, with arms of fire, clutch and snatch to himself those possessions which the men who had toiled so hard to earn them, had scarcely had the opportunity, as yet, even to begin to enjoy?

Possibly, Chicago and all the country, of which the methods of thought and life in that city were typical, needed to be reminded that, after all, the present has some connection with the past; that the same laws which have undermined and destroyed not cities only, but so many other results of the ingenuity and energy of former ages, are still at work, and, in time, may undermine and destroy conditions here. We Americans seem to think that there can never be an end to the rise in the value of real estate or of rents; that there can be no limit to the possibilities of material development, or of the increase of income derived from well placed investments. All right enough, a certain degree of

the confidence and courage that are thus engendered! Beating hearts and glowing brains need expectation and the enterprise awakened by it—as children need their playthings and their games,—to keep up and increase vitality. But in the day when fiery trial flashes on the mind the consciousness that every age is a part of all the past, and is bound to share in its vicissitudes, it may be wise for those who think that everything is lost to recall that, like children, too, when all their toys are gone, grown men, as well, may save the whole of that for which the things that once they held in hand were worth the holding. Victims of that fire there were, who, through using opportunities, when they had them, for education and for culture; through using opportunities, when they had them, for practising hospitality, benevolence and public spirit, had acquired possessions, the brightness of which no smoke could dim, the substance of which no flames could melt; because through these their souls had been brought into sympathy and fellowship not only with created things, but with those creative forces, intellectual and spiritual in essence, that nothing can destroy, and which, when not destroyed, can, of themselves, create a new and often more desirable environment.

Not seldom, too, nothing with so much certainty as a great calamity like this can bring to a man a realization of the true value of that which, in prosperity, he has thus wisely made his own. On the first night of the fire, a man of whom I heard, amid the rush and tumult of the crowd, was roughly jostled from his wife. For two days, tho his search was unremitting, neither friend nor newspaper could tell him whether she were

dead or living. But, at last, as a final experiment, he rang the door-bell of the house of an old friend. She herself appeared at the door, to answer the call; and, at the sight of her, he fell down, apparently lifeless because of joy. Was that wholly a misfortune which could reveal a proof of love like this? There was a lawyer who saved his wife and family, but nothing else. Leaving these in safety, he went to spend a few hours on business in Milwaukee. When he left there, to return to Chicago, a letter was placed in his hand with a request not to open it till the train had started. It contained five hundred dollars, and a check for a trunk in the baggage car filled with a complete wardrobe for his family. Was that wholly a misfortune which could occasion and reveal such delicacy of regard and sympathy as this? And what shall one say of the gold and the goods that, during the week following the fire were showered, without hope of return, upon all the destitute in that suffering city! One might have thought that the flames that had enwrapt it were not, as they were, something that might involve almost equal losses on the part of those contributing, but rather, forsooth, some entertaining spectacle, illumined to solicit in return their gratified applause and patronage!

In that inevitable attempt of the mind to solve what seems the inscrutable mystery of all the circumstances, could one find any explanation more rational or satisfactory than that suggested in terms which, applying as they do to the greatest and most universal of all possible disasters, must apply also to all that they could include, the explanation given in the prophecy, "Yet once more

I shake not the earth only, but also heaven '' (Heb. 12:26); '' The elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up '' (2 Pet. 3, 10); '' And this word, yet once more, signifieth the removing of those things that are shaken, as of things that are made, that those things which cannot be shaken may remain '' (Heb. 12:27)?

THE END

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